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EGYPT

OPPOSITION VIEWS ON RELATIONS WITH AMERICA, ISRAEL

Kuwait AL-QABAS in Arabic 23 Oct 85 p 10

[Article: "How Do the Opposition Parties in Egypt See the Future of Relations with America and Israel?"]

[Text] Different national forces in Egypt have emphasized that the events that have occurred recently in the Middle East are an American-Israeli conspiracy to slander the Egyptian role in the peace process in front of international public opinion.

A powerful wave of anger has struck the different political tendencies after the attack by American combat aircraft on the Egyptian civilian airliner.

AL-QABAS met with a number of leaders of the opposition parties in Egypt to learn their opinions on the future of Egyptian-American-Israeli relations in light of the recent events. The following are the opinions of the Egyptian political leaders:

Dr Wahid Ra'fat, deputy chairman of the Wafd Party, says:

Israel's military aggression against the Palestinians in Tunisia and the United States of America's accosting the Egyptian airliner carrying the hijackers of the Italian ship have led, without the slightest doubt, to injury to Egyptian-Israeli and Egyptian-American relations.

The Egyptian people as a whole have expressed their strong disapproval of the two attacking parties, either by public demonstrations, conferences or declarations published by all of the government and opposition parties and groups.

This spontaneous expression by the Egyptian people is the best indicator of the public anger at Israeli-American conduct toward Egypt and the Arab countries.

In regard to the future of Egyptian-Israeli relations following this incident, the current situation assures complete hardening of Egyptian-Israeli relations. Normalization is not existent and there is no consideration of returning the Egyptian ambassador to Israel.

Concerning breaking Egyptian-Israeli relations, for which some of the other opposition parties are calling, I, and some of the Wafd party leaders, do not think that there is any need to break relations now, because the path of peace remains the sole bridge connecting the Arabs and Israel. I do not think it proper to break relations now, because there is still hope for a peaceful solution.

As for Egyptian-American relations, which all of the declarations issued by the parties also condemn in their position on the two incidents, I think that the existence of relations with the United States of America are beneficial. Therefore the declarations issued by most of the parties do not demand a break in relations with the United States. Rather, they are content to demand review of these relations.

I point out that the United States of America realized the error of this behavior. It announced that it did not mean to offend President Mubarak or his person, and they are still trying to apologize for the incident. President Mubarak made his displeasure with the behavior of the United States clear, and refused to receive the ambassador. He mentioned that the letter sent to him by President Reagan was not opened, and said that there is still displeasure over this injury to his honor.

Government Steps To Break Relations

Eng Ibrahim Shukri, chairman of the Socialist Labor Party, says:

The current situation can be described as the lowest phases of what might be called relations between Egypt and Israel. This is a result of the raid on Palestinian headquarters in Tunisia and the attempt to kill Yasir 'Arafat at a time when there were hopes of achieving an agreement concerning the Palestinian problem.

Further, these measures were a blow to President Mubarak's efforts to continue the peaceful path of negotiations, particularly since he announced, after his last visit to the United States of America, that there had been a major development in Palestinian cooperation with an American delegation and in work to convene an international conference to produce a solution to the Palestinian problem.

All of the opposition parties are demanding that Egyptian-Israeli relations be broken. The Egyptian government, also, has begun to take positive steps in this direction, including that of not receiving the Israeli delegation for negotiations on Taba. The ministry of culture decided to block Israeli participation in the book fair and to limit Israeli tourism.

The incident of the Egyptian soldier killing seven Israelis is salutary matter, because the affair was not governmental action but was public Egyptian anger over the Israeli actions. It rejects all forms of normalization with Israel and does not want any progress towards peace.

As for the United States of America, Reagan's behavior in the face of the Israeli attack on Tunisia was unexpected and a complete bias toward Israel, an endorsement of terrorist actions by Israel against the Arab states.

Further, the interference by American war planes with the Egyptian civilian airliner makes America, from a realistic perspective, a war-like actor against Egypt. Following it, in America, they want to celebrate for having gained endorsement of the Zionist lobby and for distancing the PLO from any negotiations concerning the Palestinian problem. I expect that there will be changes in and reassessment of Egyptian-American relations, and that there will not be the least effective closeness in the near future. If the reactions against America did not reach the necessary degree, it was because of ties with America.

Israel and Peace Are Antithetical, Not Compatible

Kamal Khalid, a lawyer and chairman of the Conservative Wafdists Party, which is under formation, said:

Recent events confirm to us what is well known, that Israel and peace are antithetical, not compatible. Israel has before it a definite colonial goal, ordained for it religiously, which is for its land to be, at first, from the Nile to the Euphrates, which they claim to be land promised to them, and, from there, dominion over the entire world. This is the teaching of Zionism and its religion, from which there is no deviation.

This statement leads, inevitably, to a need to review all of the agreements that have been concluded between Egypt and Israel in the light of Egypt's good intentions or desire to give Israel the opportunity to think seriously of peace.

As for the United States of America, Israel controls the heads of its leaders, and it is therefore necessary to reassess cooperation with it. There is a complete lack of confidence in America, as has happened recently.

It is clear from the piracy that President Reagan committed against the Egyptian civilian airliner that it is a participant in terrorism with Israel. It is also clear that it defies all of the national feelings of the Egyptian and Arab people, and that it attaches no importance to Egyptian-American or Arab-American friendship.

Call To Create an Arab Market

Muhammad 'Abd-al-Shafi, a representative of the Liberal Party, says:

Recent events make us speak not about America as one party and Israel as another, but of both as one party, striking at the roots of all efforts for peace. Therefore, efforts for peace have come from one party, and if our persistence for the sake of peace continues in this manner, it means surrender. We reject a peace which means standing silently in the region before a quarrelsome Israel. We have reached the limit of distress and disapproval.

In the coming phase, we expect similar measures from the two countries in the future.

The Egyptian administration profited a great deal from these recent events, including the appearance of completely united Egyptian ranks, with the various parties and movements and political leaders working to take a united position on these Israeli-American measures.

Further, the need to work to re-examine domestic circumstances has become clear to all of the Egyptian leadership, so as not to depend on America to this large degree. Therefore, I expect new legislation and laws to be issued and existing legislation and laws to be repealed to achieve this goal.

The coming phase will see a slackening in Egyptian-American and Egyptian-Israeli relations. It is also anticipated that the coming phase will see a new Arab solidarity, because if the Arabs do not learn from this lesson they will find that Arab existence itself will be threatened, because what happened to Tunisia can happen to any other Arab state in the region, given the current Arab division.

For my part, I suggest that the Arab states start to work to create an Arab common market, so that the Arab region does not continue to be a consumer market for America and Israel.

We Are Friends with Whomever Is Our Friend, and Enemies with Whomever Is Our Enemy

Lutfi al-Khuli, a member of the executive committee of the Grouping Party, says:

In regard to Egyptian-Israeli relations, as we have seen and continue to see, recent events confirm that Israel does not honor its commitments to Camp David or any commitments pertaining to the matter of peace. Their peace is liquidation of the Palestinian problem and their respect is being considered the political force in the region which controls the destiny of the Arabs, in the forefront of whom is Egypt.

This attack confirms the truth of what the Grouping Party said in opposition to Sadat's visit to Camp David and to what is called the peace treaty.

I think this attack swept away the remainder of the Sadatists, who used to think that it was possible to create a kind of peace with Israel.

The problem posed is how we can become free of the shackles of Camp David. The problem is not Egyptian, but Arab. What is required is not to shout against it, but to end it and to face the economic, political and military results of this. An Egyptian-Arab agreement on a policy to translate this end and to overthrow Camp David is inevitable.

In regard to America, the Israeli-American alliance is the principle enemy. It is not just Israel. Therefore, the problem is the relations that Sadat established with the United States of America, which are burdensome relations and which were concluded in the absence of Arab-Egyptian relations. By its nature it restricts Egypt's freedom at all levels, whether in relation to its

real enemy, Israel, or in its decision concerning its economic and political affairs or concerning the price of bread.

Therefore, it has become necessary to escape from the special relations that are called friendly relations but that are in reality coerced relations, forced on the Egyptian administration by the United States.

Events confirm, once again, that it is a fatal danger for Egypt or any Arab country to have political relations with the United States, because in this there is a blow to national sovereignty.

We must become free of the shackles of these relations with America, and open out to world and international relations under the motto: "We are friends with whomever is our friend, and enemies with whomever is our enemy."

This is not just an Egyptian problem, but to the same extent an Arab problem also, because special relations with America are a major problem for the Arab nations.

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EGYPT

ISLAMIST MOVEMENT GAINS STRENGTH

London ARABIA: THE ISLAMIC WORLD REVIEW in English Nov 85 pp 16-19

[Article by Abdelwahab el Affendi]

[Text]

There were no Friday prayers at the celebrated Al-Noor mosque in the Abbasiya quarter of Cairo that day. As I arrived, the call for prayer could be heard from many mosques in the area, but there were no worshippers at Sheikh Hafiz Salama's mosque. It was sealed off and a police car guarded the entrance. I took out my camera and took one picture of the scene.

A man sitting in a chair in the shade of a building behind me jumped up and shouted at me to go away. It was evident what he was and I obliged; but I walked away towards the entrance of the mosque. A few steps on, and three men came rushing from behind. One of them grabbed the camera and they asked me to follow them. "Who are you?" I inquired. "*Mabahith*" (security), replied the one who appeared to be their leader. However, he had many superiors in the area, as was soon to become obvious. As we walked to the corner of the square, where a group of men were ostensibly engaged in the very common Egyptian practice of killing time on a cafe terrace, it became clear that all the loiterers around the place were in fact security men, many of them fairly senior.

We spent the next half hour in a light-hearted dialogue about all sorts of things, from Sheikh Hafiz Salama and Shariah in Egypt, to TV programmes about Egypt in Britain. In the meantime, they were apparently waiting for a decision on my fate from headquarters. One of them went away to radio for instructions and discuss the results of the findings of the interrogation.

As I walked away after being released, I was quite aware how lucky I was. After all, it was not uncommon for Egyptian security men to beat up suspects first and ask questions later. Worshippers at this very mosque were beaten up and many of them taken to prison not long ago. The Cairo opposition press was abuzz with the story of a man who was beaten to death in police custody in the hitherto obscure town of Fuwa in Kafr al-Sheikh province.

But the news was not simply that a man had been tortured to death. That had apparently happened twice before at the same police station; the beating of suspects is not at all uncommon in Egypt. The story became news because the people of the town revolted. Their demonstration took them to the police station, and they started throwing stones at it. Police opened fire and, according to newspaper reports, killed one demonstrator and injured seven. This increased the anger of the people, who then attacked and burned down the police station after forcing the policemen to flee. The residence of the police chief, on the first floor of the station, also burned down. After that, they went on to the flat of the *Mabahith* chief, who was accused of having organised the beating of the prisoner. All the officer's belongings were piled in a heap and set alight in front of the block of flats in which he lives.

The significance of such an event in Egyptian politics cannot be overestimated. In this country, where government officials seem to have inherited pharaonic claims to the status of

gods, the authority of government officials is very rarely questioned. So when a challenge of this magnitude to government authority is mounted, something very serious must have happened.

Both the timing and place of origin of this revolt are significant. The demonstration started on a Friday and originated in a mosque immediately after Friday prayers. This shows two more noteworthy characteristics of the incident: first, that it was a genuine popular uprising, not organised by any identifiable political group; and second, that it was mounted by ordinary people in a religious setting and context.

For the Mubarak regime, this incident confirms its worst fears about the shape of things to come in Egypt: the prospects of a genuine uprising which crystallises popular discontent around Islamist programmes. The Egyptian government had a vague inkling of this when it opposed so strongly the march that Sheikh Hafiz Salama planned to press for more Islamisation. It was not the march itself that was a threat; it was the chain reaction it threatened to trigger. All evidence points to the fact that Egypt is now like a gas-filled room waiting for a spark.

In spite of protestations from Mubarak and the Egyptian intelligentsia about the unlikelihood of a "Khomeinist revolution" in Egypt, it cannot be denied that if a Khomeini was to rise in Egypt tomorrow, he could take Egypt by storm. The only thing that is delaying a complete Islamic take-over is the lack of leadership and focus of the overwhelming Islamic sentiments that are now groping for expression.

It is ironic that after decades of persecution for the Islamists, Egypt has now become an Islamist's dream. Nineteen years ago, the renowned Islamic thinker Sayed Quth was executed by Nasser for spreading Islamist propaganda. A man who was imprisoned with him talked to me about those days. They were dark times for the Islamists, who felt betrayed by the very society that they were out to serve, and questioned its Islamic character. "We refused to eat food sent by our families, because we believed it was not *halal*. We even believed that our parents and families were not true Muslims at all." It was a traumatic experience. Prisoners spent many sleepless nights trying to reconcile the revolutionary ideology of Sayed Quth

with other optimistic views about the Islamic revival. Many were on the verge of mental breakdown.

Now it has all changed. The one-time revolutionary who was ready to brand the whole society as un-Islamic finds himself classified as a conservative, as more radical youth turns yesterday's revolutionary thought into today's moderate position. Now, whenever the government finds itself in trouble with the radical Islamists, it has no recourse but to turn to its prisoners of yesterday for help. And Ikhwan had indeed been exercising a largely moderating influence on the loose movement that has now come to be called the "Islamic Groups".

This influence is, however, precarious — a fact that is illustrated by the Hafiz Salama case. The march he called for was not supported by Ikhwan at first. In fact, it was vehemently resisted. Ikhwan argued that it was not a well-planned move and that it could be exploited by the enemies of Islam, especially if it resulted in violence, thus offering a pretext for a crackdown on Islamists. Sheikh Salama and his radical followers would not budge. They backed down only to avert confrontation with the police. More significantly still, voices in the ranks of Ikhwan, including some leading figures, later came out in support of Sheikh Salama.

Tension within the youth wing of Ikhwan is also beginning to mount. Some time ago Omar Telmesani, the leader of Ikhwan, gave an undertaking to the authorities that Ikhwan would not make any attempts to organise outdoor Eid prayers. However, on the eve of every Eid-day, posters appeared mysteriously all over Cairo and other major cities announcing outdoor prayers at specified locations. Sweets and packages of presents for children were distributed to worshippers there. Contacts with Ikhwan leaders in order to head off these events were futile. In one incident, the police had to flood a square with water in order to stop the ceremony taking place. The organisers of these events were mostly from the amorphous "Islamic Groups", but Ikhwan youth are known to have been participants. Certainly the sympathy of Ikhwan at these ceremonies is very strong, as is their presence at them.

When I put the problem this poses for his movement to a leading Ikhwan figure, he was quite optimistic about the eventual outcome of the issue. All Islamists respect Ikhwan and look to it for guidance. He

acknowledged, however, a crisis of leadership, although he said that it is in great part only an "apparent" crisis. For the rest, he said that it is due to the failure of the government to legalise Ikhwan. Unless the movement were given legal status, it would not be possible to hold elections and declare the identity of the effective leadership. There is a court case pending over Ikhwan's claim to legality.

My own perception was that the crisis runs much deeper than that. Talking to Ikhwan leaders one gets the impression that the displacement of the emphasis is itself a symptom of the malady. The fact that Ikhwan is not able to operate legally does not wholly explain why they seem unable to offer a convincing leadership to aspiring Islamist youth, or the fact that increasing numbers of these youth are finding it more appropriate to work in "Islamic Groups" operating outside the framework of Ikhwan. Even if this was the only reason, these groups appear to be much more responsive to the needs and hopes of youth than the frustrating and cumbersome Ikhwan mechanism with its "wise", ageing leadership, its cautions and compromises, and above all its lack of an overall vision and a viable strategy for Islamic work.

When one Ikhwan leader tried to dissipate my worries on this point he got me even more worried. He was suggesting that these Islamic groups are under Ikhwan influence because Ikhwan is the main movement from which they all emerged. I told him that I hardly disputed the point, but that it did not mean a thing. In fact a leading journalist who edits a reasonably anti-Islamist weekly was ready to concede to me more than that. He told me that any leading figure in public life I cared to name would have been a member of Ikhwan at one time or another. Nasser and Khalid Mohyiddin, the present leader of the National Gathering (the major left-wing coalition) are only two illustrious examples. But this poses, rather than answers the questions; why do most people with anything to offer choose to leave Ikhwan?

Talking to some Ikhwan leaders one begins to understand — although not yet excuse — why Nasser rebelled against the movement which had helped bring him to power. Any sensible person faced by the pragmatic constraints of coping with life will find the Ikhwan framework grossly inadequate and their institutional

constraints stifling. Nasser's situation is the same for many frustrated young activists today who can see no coherent programme of action; and when they clamour for one, they are referred to the vague generalisation of Hassan al-Banna of over forty years ago.

Worse still, the frustration of the "Islamic Groups" is mounting as they see Ikhwan apparently trying to repeat, with Mubarak, their mistakes with Nasser: granting support to an inherently hostile regime that is giving them nothing in return, and is only buying time until it feels strong enough to crack down on them. It is as if the movement is again digging its own grave and that of other Islamist groups.

Ikhwan and other moderates on the fringes of the Islamic movement dispute this analysis. They claim that in spite of the hostility of the Mubarak regime, a favourable atmosphere has been created by the limited democratic openings. This has encouraged the growth of the spontaneous and diffuse Islamic revival that is now pervading Egyptian society. The Islamic dress for girls is close to becoming the dominant fashion in universities and streets, and popular consciousness has accepted Islamist tenets as never before. This in turn has led the government to give more concessions. As a result the anti-Islamist bias of the media has been greatly moderated. Newscasters are now interrupted even in the middle of a sentence when prayer time comes. Regular programmes on radio and TV discuss not only religious issues as such, but the politico-religious questions, including the question of the day on the need to implement Shariah promptly. Religious experts give opinions on this question which are consistently opposed to the government line, and help to mobilise the masses further in favour of Islamisation. It is this diffuse Islamic fervour that has penetrated to the masses which more than ever guarantees the irreversible nature of the Islamic revival. In such an atmosphere, a Nasser-type crackdown on Islamists will neither be possible nor sufficient to weed out the pressure for more Islamisation.

Mubarak's immediate worry, however, remains the economy. Much more than the clamour for Islamisation, the government seems to believe that the pressures generated by the economic crisis are more likely to lead to an immediate

explosion and are far more difficult to contain.

This problem is the more acute since the legitimacy of the present government hinges on its economic performance, being a self-proclaimed continuation of the Sadat legacy. Sadat swept to power on grand promises of liberalisation that he claimed would automatically spell prosperity. This was the reasoning and justification of the peace treaty with Israel: with peace will come more prosperity, especially with a little American help.

Prosperity in Egypt there was, but not for all. Walking through the streets of Cairo today and talking to people around the city, one is hard hit by realities that are in direct contrast with the prosperity dream that the government has worked so hard to promote. In fact, even the government is now reconciled to the realisation that it has become impossible for its employees to live on the salaries it is prepared to offer. Some Cairo newspapers have even revealed that many leading executives in the private sector who were offered ministerial posts in the September reshuffle flatly refused, because on the salary of a minister, one cannot make ends meet. This prompted a scathing attack by Mubarak on a columnist who wrote that he "pities and sympathises with new ministers" who were underpaid and on top of that were faced with an impossible task.

This shift in economic fortunes has very serious implications for the power structure in Egypt. Throughout its long history, Egypt has been ruled by bureaucrats regardless of where political power lay. But it is precisely the lower middle class, in which all the administration takes place, which has been hardest hit by the recent economic crisis. The "fixed income groups", estimated by Dr Ali Lofti, the new prime minister, at a third of all the work force in the country, found themselves squeezed out of their dominant position in society by the rise of a new class of entrepreneurs, by the economic clout of migrant workers from the oil states and even by skilled labour and farmers, who can now command prices for their services undreamt of by even the best-qualified university graduates.

One prominent journalist, recently back in Cairo after several years abroad, told me how amazed he was to find that his nephew, who is still a student, was able to

earn more than twice the salary he himself has only achieved after more than ten years of employment in the top journalistic establishment in the land. This new-found prosperity for entrepreneurs, however, only helps to push prices out of reach of the majority of citizens, especially in the urban centers. To try to catch up, most government employees now take to moonlighting.

One example is that every taxi driver appears to be an off-duty government employee. Majdi (this is not his real name) who has a job at the prestigious *Al-Ahram* newspaper, now supplements his income by driving a taxi in the evenings and on Fridays. He bought the car through a bank loan. "No-one," he told me, "can now live on his salary. You have to do something else to get by." Another man, an accountant, told me that he worked in a day job in an "investment company". But how does he get time to do his taxi-driver stints in the middle of the morning? "I go to see my colleagues in the morning, I buy them breakfast, we have a laugh or two, and then, after two hours or so, I take my leave."

This also shows another side of the government's dilemma. In order for government employees to earn the extra pound that might keep them from demonstrating against the regime in the streets, they may have to work all night. But how efficient will they be when they arrive the next morning? This is a truly paradoxical safety-valve: it takes the steam out of the government machinery itself, at the same time as letting the steam off the potential hostility to the regime. But how long can the regime sustain a downward spiral of low pay, low performance, low productivity?

The new government, set up by Mubarak at the beginning of September, appeared to be on the one hand a time-buying exercise, and on the other a potential time-bomb. At the time it was announced, speculation was already rife about a reshuffle which everybody agreed was now a necessity. The Kamal Hassan Ali government had taken too many false steps and greatly harmed its credibility as well as that of the regime as a whole. First came the drama involving former Economics Minister Mustafa al-Said. His policies were disavowed by the cabinet and he was forced to resign, but everybody knew that his policies had the highest blessing and that they represented the regime's stance. Then came the disaster of the sewage in the posh resort

city of Alexandria, which polluted the beaches and led to widespread allegations of corruption against those responsible for the sanitation scheme. In the midst of this, the education minister was forced to back down on a decision of earlier school dates after parents protested vehemently, since most pupils work during the holidays. Another embarrassing incident came when the government was forced to back down on another measure designed to impose customs duties on the free area of Port Said. Then came the assassination of an Israeli diplomat in the heart of Cairo. His killers have yet to be traced. And to top all this, the tragic events in Fuwa erupted. In the background was also the Libyan decision to expel tens of thousands of Egyptian workers, thus highlighting the drift of migrant workers back from the oil states, with the serious implications that this is likely to have for the economy.

With the deteriorating economic situation worsening every day, Mubarak had to be seen to be doing something. He did. However, the changes he made were far from impressive. An unknown technocrat was chosen to head an almost unchanged cabinet. Dr Ali Lofti, the former Chairman of the Economic Committee of the ruling National Party, was pitted against the strongmen of the former government, who still commanded the same posts and the same power as before; the strongmen of the former cabinet not only remained, but in a much-publicised process helped the novice prime minister pick his cabinet. Dr Youssef Wali, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Agriculture received a surprise promotion in the bargain, being named Secretary-General of the ruling party. His prestige was enhanced by allowing the consultations for the cabinet formation to be carried out at the headquarters of the party, with him taking a prime role in the process. Present also were Safwat al-Sharif, Information Minister, and Dr Kamal al-Ganazouri, Economics Minister, two symbols of the regime. Unmoved also in the reshuffle was the formidable Abdelhalim Abu Ghazala, the Minister of Defence, and a man whose ambitions are known not to be restricted to the premiership. Also remaining was Ahmad Rushdi, the much-criticised minister of the interior.

So to start with, little changed anyway. But even the direction of likely change does not appear to be that promising. The new prime minister had in the past voiced

many criticisms of the previous government, but the medicines he has prescribed are not likely to be found palatable by anyone. His "revolutionary" ideas about removing subsidies, albeit gradually, are the classic prescription for a Cairo revolution. Sadat tried it in 1977 and had to back down within a week.

So, all in all, the government appears to be in an unenviable mess. But this in turn has its blessings. For this is one of the major considerations holding the Islamists back from launching an all-out assault on the regime. In fact, the more moderate among the Islamists have been arguing that Mubarak is right in saying that the country needs stability to woo foreign investors, to keep American aid flowing, and to boost tourism.

On the other hand, many western analysts have been pointing to a link between the rising tide of Islamic revival and the deteriorating economic situation. The connection appears to be at most superficial. As one prominent journalist put it: "The Islamist tide *may* be one expression of dissatisfaction with the economic and political reality. But that does not explain why this *particular* form of protest was chosen. For there are many others."

If anything, the deteriorating economic situation is pushing many Islamists to moderation. However, many Islamists, even "moderates", are in the meantime pushing for measures that the government thinks may have unfavourable economic impact, like a ban on alcohol that may hit tourism.

Tourism, however, seems to have been hit already, by something much more serious: the increasing prosperity that is swelling the ranks of upper-class Egyptians and raising the expectations of all classes. Already snobbish Egyptians from the remainder of the older upper classes are complaining about overcrowding at beaches, first-class hotels and holiday resorts. More and more Egyptians can now afford to rub shoulders with foreigners in areas which were in Nasser's day exclusively for foreigners and the lucky few. Far fewer workers are available to man the services sector where ridiculously low prices made Egypt a great attraction for Arab and European tourists. And those few are commanding higher and higher pay.

Tourism, as a novel form of exploitation, only thrives on a combination of cultural hegemony and

economic exploitation. The Islamist tide is threatening the first, while the economic conjuncture has taken care of the second. So there appears to be no future for tourism in Egypt, at least not as a major source of revenue.

In any case the current problems in Egypt, as in many other Third-World countries, seem to call more for a qualitative, than a quantitative solution. Mubarak's regime cannot provide that, but it cannot avoid the issue either.

The Egyptians criticise Mubarak so much for his alleged indecisiveness, but that may be his greatest virtue yet. When faced by a task one cannot tackle, at least one should recognise the fact; and that may be the first step to the solution. The second is to forge and sustain a genuine democratic process that may facilitate the emergence of the right solutions and the leadership capable of implementing them.

/9317

CSO: 4500/31

EGYPT

PERSONAL STATUS LAWS DISCUSSED

Cairo CAIRO TODAY in English Nov 85 pp 30-37

[Article by Susan Hall Liang]

[Text]

EARLIER THIS SUMMER, LOCAL newspapers were full of editorials and articles discussing the revoking of a law regarding personal status, in particular, the rights of men and women in marriage and divorce. (the Personal Status laws govern all aspects of "personal" life, including marriage, divorce, inheritance, duties of the husband, duties of the wife, rights of these and all members, both close and distant, of the family, in minute detail.)

Women's associations met to discuss the ramifications of the revocation and to suggest amendments for a new law. Religious leaders praised or condemned the law. Both female and male leaders in the community either denounced the revocation, called for a new law or insisted that no new legislation was necessary, and cartoonists had a field day.

All in all, it made for interesting reading and spoke volumes on the Egyptian commitment to the family as a basic unit of society and to women's essential role within the family. After two months, Law 100/1985, amending certain clauses in the law of Personal Status, was passed laying to rest some of the furor raised over the Court's earlier action.

It all began when Law 44/1979, which amended certain articles of the Personal Status Law 25/1920 (and its amendments in Law 52/1929), was

revoked in May by the Higher Constitutional Court on the basis that the law was not issued according to the constitution. The constitution stipulates that the president may, during the recess of the People's Assembly or in its absence, issue a decision that will have the force of law if delay in the issuance of said law will cause great harm to the nation.

Law 44/1979 came about as follows: in March 1979, President Sadat called on the government to issue a law on personal status that would ensure the protection and security of Egyptian women before the end of the parliamentary session that year. In the absence of any action taken by the People's Assembly, the President decided to take steps on his own. Previously the Minister of Social Affairs had asked the Al-Azhar sheikhs to indicate their objections to earlier reform drafts and eventually obtained their approval of a new draft. On June 20, 1979, while the People's Assembly was in recess, President Sadat, using the new draft bill, issued a Republican Decree amending some of the articles of the personal status laws for Muslims. Two days later, a telecast symposium attended by the Grand Sheikh of Al-Azhar, the Minister of Waqfs and the Grand Mufti gave an indispensable stamp of the religious hierarchy's support for the measures. At their first meeting after the recess, on July 2, 1979,

the Assembly voted overwhelmingly in favor of the amendments. (1)

(1) Rugh, Andrea B., *Family in Contemporary Egypt*, Syracuse University Press, 1984, P. 225.

According to an interview in Al-Wafd newspaper with one of the promulgators of the law, Dr. Adel Moneim Nimr, the reasons for the revocation of this law were based on two points.

"1. The speedy issuance of the decree was unjustified at the time and therefore its issuance was contrary to the provisions of the constitution.

2. The approval of the People's Assembly to Law 44 which was issued in its absence only resulted in the continuation of its extension, but did not effect its actual constitutional errors. In other words, approval of the assembly to such decisions issued by executive authority in its absence, is a political step that does not expurgate it from constitutional error."

Despite the apparent clarity of the constitutional reasons for the law's illegality, editorials and opinions were primarily based on interpretations of the law itself. Dr. Nimr explained in a separate article in Al-Akhbar newspaper that people had "misjudged many articles of the said law. For instance, when taking a second wife the husband does not have to request his wife's permission to do so, but must only notify his first wife of this second marriage...to avoid the many complications, financial and psychological, ensuing from such marriage on the death of the husband. To avoid this, the law said that the husband and/or the marriage legislator must notify the first wife in writing and she is free to remain with him or seek divorce."

On May 25, Al-Ahram published a press release from Dr. Ashraf Mustafa Kamal, head of the Cairo Court for Personal Status, in which he said that during the years before Law 44 was enforced, 4,363 cases were brought before the Court, and that four years later in 1982 the number had jumped to 8,480. The release mentioned that most of the cases concerned requests for divorce because of harm, abandonment or absence of the husband due to another marriage.

Two weeks later Al-Ahram carried an editorial refuting the press release's implication that there was an advantage in returning to the old law. The writer

called this "the enforcement of 'silence' to all persons with a grievance...these laws do not establish justice, but on the contrary, they only restrict the oppressed from complaining," concluding, "we need a new law for the family, devoid of rigidity, free from fanaticism, based on the just rights of Islamic jurisprudence."

Raga' Abdallah in Al-Mussawar listed the rights women had lost with the revocation of Law 44 and said, "This attack is not new to the Egyptian woman. She has faced such an attack since the beginning of this century. Those who witnessed her struggle and the struggle of the past generations for the enforcement of law, must defer to woman and the family all due respect."

In the same paper on the same day, Hussain Ahmed Amin, although sympathetic to women's concern over the law's revocation, and calling it "sad that our society should witness such backwardness at the end of the twentieth century," added that he was "clearly not sorry to see them (women) lose rights that are not the result of a long struggle...rights that are easily gained without struggle are also easily lost.... these have been rights granted--not taken."

According to an article by Amany Kamal Eldin, Enid Hill and Sarah Graham-Brown for The Middle East Magazine, Dr. Muhammed Badawi, instructor in mental health at Al-Azhar University, also felt that the law was passed before its time and that its weakness was that it was imposed by the government rather than fought for by women. However, the article added that feminists in Egypt contested the view that women had not fought for their rights, but agreed that progress in women's personal rights had been minimal.

In most essential public areas, such as the right to vote, the right to own and disperse property and the right to equal pay, women legally already have the same rights as men in Egypt. The law under question, was not, in the mode of Western feminism, designed to bring women equality under the law. Instead they were designed to give women a more secure place within the family unit. (Rugh, p. 221) The article in The Middle East added that while Law 44 "had its flaws, and there were often

practical problems with its implementation, it did offer divorced women some security."

A major issue under discussion was also the "right to the apartment" (see "Cairo Today", June 1985). Law 44 gave the children and the custodian the right to alimony which included a house to be provided by the husband. Whether the custodian (wife) remained in the house or whether the husband would provide another was up to the divorcing couple, according to Dr. Nimr. Nevertheless, critics replied that because of the current lack of available housing, this law infringed on a man's right to a divorce. Other critics added that the law encouraged women to "misbehave," in order to force their husbands to divorce them and then keep the house for themselves.

In mid-June, Rawiya Attiya, the Giza member of the People's Assembly, wrote to Al-Ahram and explained that the 36 female representatives in the Assembly had met at least ten times to discuss the promulgation of a new law

and asked that it be presented "calmly, without fuss, to ensure a good general response by the members and ensure their stand with the rights of women and approval of the majority of the members of all parties."

At the same time, in "Al-Ahaly," the Committee for the Defence of Women and the Family published their suggested amendments to the law. These included: a definition of marriage as a contract between a man and woman based on free acceptance, the purpose being the formation of united family; a marriage deed considered a contract in which the two parties have the right to state their conditions, which will be binding to the two parties; notarisation of the deed.

The committee also suggested that the marriage deed contain the civil status of both parties; names and addresses of the wives the husband is still married to; the health condition of both parties; the right of the wife to divorce if she so wishes, and any other clauses.

On July 4, 1985 a new law was issued, published in the Official Journal Number 27. □

What Women Asked For...

Following the meeting of the Committee for the Defense of the Women and Family, the following are the suggested amendments to be included in the new law:

I - Regarding Marriage

A - Definition of marriage-A contract between a man and a woman based on free acceptance, the purpose being the formation of a united family.

B - Marriage deed-Considered as a contract of agreement since it binds two agreeable parties. Therefore, each of the two parties has the right to state his or her conditions in the contract, which will be binding to the two parties.

C - Notorisation of deed-Both parties must be present at the notary public office to notarise the deed. If notarisation is done by a delegate, he must have a duly notarised power of attorney to do

so, detailing the causes for his representation.

The Committee suggests the addition of the following clauses to the Marriage Deed:

1. Civil Status of both parties
2. Statement by the husband of the names and addresses of the wives he is still married to, if he is permitted to marry again.
3. The health condition of both parties.
4. The right of the wife to divorce, if she so wishes.
5. Any other clauses.

II - Regarding Polygamy:

A - If the husband marries another wife, this is considered as harmful to the first wife, even if such a condition was not included in the marriage deed. It is also considered as harmful to the

second wife if she is ignorant of the presence of the first wife.

B - Though we are eager to limit marriage to one wife only, yet if the husband wants to wed another wife, he cannot notarise the marriage deed except as the Court permits in the presence of the first wife or tutor. If the Court refuses to give him this permit, he can renew his request only after one year.

The Court must investigate the causes for his wanting to marry another wife-- the only causes acceptable being disease or if she is barren.

C - It is a punishable act for a person to give false evidence in statements to obtain the marriage permit.

III - Regarding Disputes'

a. Regarding the continuation of cohabitation: the husband has the right to request his wife to return to the marital home and the wife has the right to protest this, losing her right to support, unless it is proved that her refusal to return to the house is justified.

b. Regarding work: the Constitution gave equal rights to the man and the woman to work, and he cannot forbid her to work without her consent.

c. Regarding the wife's alimony: she loses her right to support if she is working and earning a regular salary equal to that of her husband.

d. Regarding the children's support and age of guardianship: both the husband and wife should share the children's expenses in relation to their salaries.

The children should be given the choice to live with either parent after the age of 15, if the custodian mother has not remarried in the meantime.

e. The marital home: this is a social problem related to the present housing problem. Therefore if the custodian does not have an independent residence, she should be allowed to remain in the home, unless she remarries. If the custodian is not the mother, the

father must provide a home for her and the children.

Upon divorce and if the wife is not the custodian of the children, the right to the marital home will be decided upon by the Court. Until such decision, the wife will remain in the marital home.

IV - Divorce

If the husband pronounces divorce without the consent of the wife, she is entitled to an adequate compensation to be estimated by the Cadi, over and above her other official rights.

The woman has the right to request divorce when:

a. her husband marries another woman. She is entitled to an adequate compensation to be estimated by the Cadi.

b. for psychological reasons and to refuse cohabitation based on her own judgement. Upon the wife's filing suit for divorce, the Cadi will at first try to reconcile the spouses but if the wife still insists he must grant her the divorce not later than six months from date of filing her suit. If the husband feels harmed, he must file another independent suit to compensate him for the harm.

Seeing the children is the right of both parties and the Court must organize these visits in places and conditions that will not cause any harm to the children.

The Committee proposes that this law have retroactive effect as from the date law 44/1979 was revoked, i.e. May 18, 1985.

Members of this committee are: Fatma Zaki, Shahira al-Baz, Fathia Shalaby, Afaf Morad, Soad Mansy, Hoda Badra, Nagwa Mahmood and Farida al-Nakkash.

This committee for the Defense of the Women and Family was formed following the meeting organized by the women's association, organizations, political parties and public authorities after the revocation of law 44/1979 which amended the law on Personal Status, dated 1929.

And What They Got....

A Partial Translation of the New Law

LAW 100/1985

Amending certain clauses in the law
of Personal Status *

In the Name of the People
The President of the Republic
The People's Assembly

ARTICLE I

To be added to law 25/1929 "Personal Status", new articles 5 bis, 11 bis, 11 bis ii, 18 bis, 18 bis ii, 18 bis iii, 23 bis, to read:

Article 5 bis.

The divorcer must notarise his divorce before the responsible Notary Public officer within 30 days of the divorce. The wife will be considered as duly informed of the divorce, if she is present at its notarisation. If she is not present, the Notary Public must inform her personally through the bailiff, who must deliver a copy of the notarised certificate of divorce to her or whoever represents her, in accordance with the measures to be issued by decree from the Minister of Justice. The divorce takes effect on the date it is pronounced, unless the husband has hidden the matter from his wife, when effect with respect to heritage and other financial rights will take effect on the date she is advised of same.

Article 11 bis.

The husband must state his civil status in the marriage certificate. If he is married, he must declare the name of the wife or wives to whom he is still married and their addresses, and the Notary Public must advise them by Registered letter of the new marriage. The wife whose husband has taken another wife, may request divorce if such marriage has caused her financial or psychological "harm" rendering it impossible to live with him, even if there was no condition in the marriage contract that he should not take another wife.

If the judge cannot reconcile them, he will grant her non-definite divorce. She loses the right to request divorce for this purpose after the elapse of



THE BRIDE IS READING THE PERSONAL STATUS LAW

one year from the date she is made aware of his marriage to another, unless she fully accepts this situation. This right to request divorce is renewed every time the husband takes a new wife.

If the new wife is not aware that her husband is married to another and suddenly discovers that her husband is married, she also has the right to request divorce.

Article 11 bis ii.

If the wife refuses to obey her husband without cause, payment of support is stopped from the date of disobedience. She is considered as disobedient without cause if she does not return to the conjugal home when her husband invites her personally or through her tutor to do so by official notice handed to her by the Summoning Officer. The husband must state on the notice the address of the home.

The wife has the right to protest before the Preliminary Court within 30 days of the notice. She must state in her protest the legal reasons on which she bases her refusal to obey him, otherwise her protest will not be accepted.

Payment of support will be stopped on the last day of the time allowed for the protest if she does not present such protest in its due time.

The Court, when reviewing the protest or the request presented by any of the spouses, must try to bring them together to live amicably. If the Court finds that the controversy is irrevocable, and the wife insists on divorce, it will take the necessary measures for arbitration, as clarified under Articles 7 to 11 of the present law.

Article 18 bis.

The wife who has already cohabited with her husband and whose husband has repudiated her without her consent or previous cause, deserves over and above her alimony an additional allowance for "mut'ah" equivalent to two years at least, taking into consideration the divorcee's financial status, conditions of divorce and period of marriage. The divorcee may be permitted to pay this "mut'ah" by installments.

Article 18 bis ii.
If the child has no money, the father is responsible for him financially.

The father will continue to spend on his children until the girl gets married or is able to earn sufficient money for her upkeep, and the boy becomes 15 years of age, thus able to earn an adequate amount for his upkeep. If he becomes of age and is incapable of earning money due to physical or mental inability, or because he is seeking to continue his studies similar to other boys of his social situation, or due to lack of opportunities, then it is incumbent on the father to continue supporting him.

The father is obliged to pay for his children's upkeep as well as to provide a house for them, to conform

with the same living conditions as their equals.

Alimony for the children becomes compulsory as from the date he stops supporting them.

Article 18 bis iii.

The divorcee must provide for the children of his divorcee and their guardian an independent suitable home. If he does not do so during the retirement period, they will continue to occupy the rented conjugal home, independently of him, all through the period of guardianship.

If the conjugal home is not rented, it becomes the right of the husband to live in it independently, on condition he provides them with a suitable independent home, after the period of retirement. The judge will give the guardian the choice between living independently in the conjugal home, or estimating an adequate amount of money for her to rent a suitable home for her and her ward.

If the period of guardianship is terminated, the divorcee will return to the house to live with his children, if it becomes legally his right.

The Public Prosecutor's Office must issue its decision with respect to any dispute regarding the conjugal home, to enable the Court to render its decision in this respect.

Article 23 bis.

The husband who divorces his wife is punished by imprisonment for a period not exceeding six months and a fine not exceeding LE 200, or one of these disciplinary measures, if he violates any of the provisions of Article 5 bis of this law.

The husband is subjected to the same disciplinary measures if he gives false information regarding his civil status, the address of his wife or wives or his divorcee, contrary to the provisions of Article 11 bis.

The Notary Public will be imprisoned for a period not exceeding six months and a fine not exceeding LE 50 if he does not fulfill the obligations dictated in the law. He may also be suspended from his work for a period not exceeding one year.

القصاص قاتلون الشقيقة للزوجة والأولاد



دلوقت وأنا مطمئن اقدر اظلمكم .. وأرميكموا في الشارع
Now I have no more worries, I can divorce you and throw you out into the street.



بعد وقف العمل بقانون الأحوال الشخصية الجديد



باشعر دلوقت وانا في بيت الزوجية . انى فلسطينية في بيروت الغربية

Since the revocation of the personal status law I feel exactly like a Palestinian in Western Beirut.

ARTICLE II

Article 1 of law 25/1920 regarding the provisions of payment for upkeep and other matters concerning Personal Status, to be replaced by the following text:

Article 1 (Not translated).

ARTICLE III

Articles 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 16, 20 of law 25/1929 concerning Personal Status to be replaced by the following:

Articles, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11 (not translated).

Article 16.

Alimony for the wife is estimated according to the husband's financial situation at the time, whether affluent or poor, on condition that if poor, the alimony should cover the basic requirements of the wife. If all the conditions are met, the Cadi must assess a temporary alimony to meet her basic requirements, to be paid within 15 days from the date the case was filed, for immediate execution, pending the Court's decision.

The husband must calculate (balance) the amounts paid on a temporary basis and the alimony decided by the Court, on condition that such payments cover the basic requirements of the wife and children.

Article 20

The period of guardianship is terminated when the boy attains the age of 10 and the girl 12. However in the interest of the children, the Cadi may decide to keep the boy with the guardian up to the age of 15 and the girl till she gets married, without payment to the guardian.

ARTICLE IV

Regarding the Courts that decide on Personal Status cases.

ARTICLE V

All other clauses contrary to the provisions of the present law are cancelled.

ARTICLE VI

The Minister of Justice must issue the necessary decree for the execution of this law within two months from date of its issuance.

ARTICLE VII

This law will be published in the Official Journal and will take effect as from the date of publication of the revocation of the Higher Constitutional Court regarding law 44/1979, all except Article 23 bis, which takes effect the day following the date of publication.

Issued on July 31, 1985. []

/9317

CSO: 4500/31

EGYPT

FORMER HIGH OFFICIAL GIVES WIDE-RANGING INTERVIEW

London AL-TADAMUN in Arabic 2-8 Nov 85 pp 22-23

[Interview with Dr Murad Ghalib by Hamidah Na'na' in Cairo: "Abd-al-Nasir's Ambassador to the Kremlin and al-Sadat's Former Foreign Minister, Dr Murad Ghalib, to AL-TADAMUN: Suspicious Movements in the Region; Whole World Going Through Critical Period"; date not specified]

[Text] Allow me to use the word "former" a lot because my questions will focus on your assessment of the Arab situation today and your appraisal of it in light of your long political experience. The second kind will focus on the past, your past experience, and your recollections of it. Throughout the many questions, you will hear the word "former" owing to the fact that you are a former foreign minister, a former ambassador, and also former director of the office of foreign affairs of late President Jamal 'Abd-al-Nasir.

As soon as I finished mentioning his last former capacity, a broad smile came over my interlocutor's face while he said: "Go ahead. It seems you like to talk about history."

Thus began this interview with Dr Murad Ghalib, Egypt's second ambassador to the Soviet Union after the revolution and later its foreign minister and then its ambassador-in-exile in Yugoslavia following his disagreement with President al-Sadat and his ensuing resignation from the foreign ministry. Then came his resignation from the diplomatic service following al-Sadat's visit to Jerusalem.

The interview lasted 1 and 1/2 hours. The first part was marked by the man's extreme caution until he felt at ease in the second half, an ease that gave me a chance to delve into his recollections about the Soviet Union, the post-Stalin era, his relations with President al-Sadat on the personal level and the disagreement between them, and his recollections of 'Abd-al-Nasir.

By the end of the session Dr Ghalib had said much, but as soon as I tried to collect my papers and leave, his critical sense was awakened, as was his diplomatic instinct, and he asked me with utmost politeness not to publish the personal matters. I was bound by professional ethics to publish only what Dr Ghalib wanted, noting that the deleted parts were the warm breath of air which could have given the interview its personal and human dimensions.

[Question] Those who ponder the Arab situation get the feeling of standing before a surrealist painting. It has become difficult to understand what is happening here and there. How do you assess this situation in your capacity as a former foreign minister and as a seasoned diplomat who never lacked vision, even in the darkest times?

[Answer] I do not think that we disagree on the fact that the situation has reached its lowest state of deterioration and fragmentation. The Arab world, unfortunately, is facing its worst period of history with regard to all dimensions: political, social, and economic. There are, however, a few positive phenomena scattered here and there. We must focus on these phenomena so as not to paint a dark picture. We must admit right off that the Arab world is being subjected to strong international pressures, pressures that do not wish it to realize its unity and stability. If we do not want this nation to sink to the bottom and if we want to see it able to take advantage of its civilizational human stock, its national resources, and its strategic and human position, if we want all this, we must make an effort to diagnose the situation honestly and objectively.

We must admit that the Arab regimes afford international forces and pressures the chance to achieve their purposes. I cannot hold the foreign forces fully responsible because the greatest part of this responsibility falls on the Arab regimes.

[Question] What about the people?

[Answer] The Arab people are in a state of total frustration as a result of a series of experiences they have suffered without salvation. Hopes were high but we must admit that we have not taken advantage of what we have in order to realize these hopes. A look at other peoples who began the growth and development journey at the same time we did (the Koreans, Japanese, and Indians) reveals the extent of our loss. The Korean people have attained a very high state of industrialization. Japan, which embarked on its development at the same time Egypt did during the Muhammad 'Ali era, leads the world in industrialization. And India, despite its problems, has succeeded in building a true democracy. What have we done? All the popular uprisings in the Arab world have been destined to immaturity, hence their failure to create a human being capable of meeting the challenges of the time. Moreover, these uprisings have not changed the Arab mentality nor have they armed the Arab people with the tool that can help them manage the conflict they are facing.

[Question] What are the basic issues facing the Arabs at this time?

[Answer] I always focus on three basic issues, which are:

1. The necessity to shed dependency. Unfortunately, we are still dependent on the West economically, politically, socially, and culturally.
2. Civilizational acceleration, by which I mean that the world is progressing industrially and technologically at an amazing pace which has carried it to the threshold of a new era while our societies have been left way behind.

3. Management of the conflict with Israel. We have not hitherto taken the necessary steps in this regard. Conversely, Israel is growing stronger, more radical, and much closer to the United States, so much so that it has been invited to participate in "Star Wars" as though the United States has taken it upon itself to take care of all of Israel's woes. The Arab regimes believe that they are in a better position. Indeed, every regime considers itself the best and most representative of Arabism, liberation, and struggle. But in the end, reality indicates that we are still in a state of backwardness compared to the rest of the world.

[Question] Egypt's departure from the Arab action scene for several years has contributed considerably to the present deterioration of the Arab situation. What are your thoughts in this regard?

[Answer] Undoubtedly Egypt's departure has upset the strategic equation between the Arabs and Israel and imperialism in general because Israel is the representative of imperialism. This departure gave Israel a free hand to be as contentious as it pleased and to try to impose the status quo. But the effect on Egypt was much more severe because its isolation turned it into a country totally bound to the United States economically, politically, and informationally. The forces who labored for this eventuality wanted to make Egypt's departure from the Arab consensus a permanent one whereby any government in Egypt would be forced to follow al-Sadat's path. To do otherwise would be to jeopardize the people's livelihood in a situation of total dependence on the United States.

Unfortunately, we in Egypt were hoping that the Arab countries would rise to the occasion by moving in to fill the void through their solidarity and unified positions, but the opposite happened. It is time for us to pause to reflect on the situation. It is not enough to lay all the problems and misfortunes on the Camp David "rack." We Arabs must admit our failure to find a substitute for Egypt.

This has been clearly manifested in the Iran-Iraq war, in the management of the conflict with Israel, and in the failure to find a minimum common denominator among the Arab countries to get out of the Arab dilemmas.

[Question] Let us call things by their true names. How do you perceive the form of Arab action following the Casablanca summit fiasco, and what will the Arab League's role be in the wake of rising voices everywhere announcing its death?

[Answer] We must not hold the Arab League responsible for Arab division because it reflects existing conditions. I am not one of the voices announcing its death. On the contrary, I believe that it must go on as our link with the world despite all the difficulties we are facing today. The Arab League has rendered outstanding services. We must be objectively aware of the nature of the differences between the Arab regimes and do our best to diagnose them. We must not overburden the Arab League because, although its presence is inadequate, its absence will have negative consequences. I maintain that many of its agencies and institutions are of great benefit to the Arab world.

[Question] The subject of Egypt's return to the Arab League has been raised persistently. The failure of the urgent Arab summit to deal with this matter was a great disappointment to Egypt on the official level. In light of your experience and expertise, how do you view these matters?

[Answer] At this stage, I do not think Egypt's return to the Arab League will be beneficial because it does not subscribe to the Arab League's charter. Egypt is a state that maintains diplomatic relations with Israel and is bound to a peace treaty. This is in total conflict with the principles and goals on which the Arab League was founded. However, the issue that must be raised today is how to deal with Egypt in its present situation. How do we go about giving the Egyptian regime a chance to change and rejoin the current strategic equation in the region?

[Question] How do you explain the current movement in the region? What is happening? Is there truly an American solution, or is it a matter of distracting the Arabs a little?

[Answer] I do not have enough information about the details of this movement, but it seems suspicious to me. I am trying to understand it, as I am trying to understand other suspicious world phenomena. What about the Soviet spy who defected to Great Britain? Why did Britain expell 31 Soviet diplomats at that particular time although it knew beforehand of the presence of the spy and the diplomats? Why did it not expel them in stages without provoking such a charged atmosphere? Why are all the Arabs moving toward the United States? Why does the United States flex its muscles by pushing Honduras to fight Nicaragua, then turn around to demonstrate a power of another sort by launching a satellite?

Why is all this happening now? It is a very big matter. The question is, what does Reagan hope to accomplish by this movement? Does he want, for instance, to get Nicaragua out of the way before starting his talks with the Soviets? By receiving all the Arab presidents who are racing to Washington, does he want to say during his simmut with Gorbachev: "I have the Middle East in my hand"? And why launch a new satellite at this time? Is it to demonstrate that he is strong technologically? It is in this framework that I perceive the Arab movement (Murphy left and Murphy returned) and in this framework I see the race in Washington's direction. The whole purpose of all these steps is to reinforce Reagan's meeting with Gorbachev. Regrettably, our movement is not meant to guarantee Palestinian rights because we have been turned into a tool of international confrontation.

[Question] Let us suppose that Murphy's just ended mission can be a basis for a new Murphy mission.

[Answer] All of them are pressure tactics prior to the Soviet-American encounter and we are nothing more than pawns. Therefore, when I speak of ending our dependency I mean that this is basic and vital.

[Question] Is it possible to have relations with the Soviet Union at this time in the wake of what has happened, particularly since you are most familiar with Moscow's situation?

[Answer] Our relations with the Soviets must be lasting because they are to the benefit of the Arabs and the Egyptian people. I have always said that if the Soviets did not exist, we would have had to invent them in order to confront the Israeli-American imperialist alliance, thus taking control of the management of the conflict with Israel and of our struggle to end our dependency. Taking all this into consideration, relations with the Soviets are a basic factor. This does not mean that our relations with the West and the United States have to be bad. Indeed not. The United States and the West are part of the advanced world, which we need. The problem, though, is that things are not going our way, for the West and the United States consider Israel an integral part of them.

[Question] Let me repeat to you all the excuses that have been used in the past years for severing relations with the Soviets and expelling their advisors overnight. Let me suppose that Egypt, by virtue of its close relations with the Soviet Union, became a superpower satellite with interests essentially different from those of Egypt as they are today. Consequently, it would be turned into a pawn. The commemoration of the death of 'Abd-al-Nasir, who steered the policy of this country, and practically the entire Arab world for more than 20 years, requires us to say something to clear up the past.

[Answer] The allegations that Egypt had been turned into a Soviet satellite are absolutely false. When realtions between us and the Soviet Union were severed, Egypt's economic situation did not suffer and the Egyptian people did not starve because the Egyptian economy was not completely linked to the Soviets. 'Abd-al-Nasir was aware of the dimensions of each step he took. He was a man of dignity and personal independence. I assure you that he was not a leader who accepted subordination.

[Question] When the decision was made to transfer you from your ambassadorial post in Moscow to Cairo to take the reins of Egyptian diplomacy, it was said that you left the Soviet capital within 24 hours without saying goodbye to anyone. Why did you leave in such a hurry?

[Answer] When President al-Sadat came to power, I realized, while I was in Moscow, that we were in for much trouble with regard specifically to Egyptian-Soviet relations. Accordingly, I accepted my appointment to the Foreign Ministry and left the Soviet capital in a hurry to avoid goodbyes and explanations.

[Question] Did you agree to be President al-Sadat's foreign minister from the perspective of disagreeing with him? Did you have a different vision? And why did you accept the post?

[Answer] There was a battle going on between us. I knew that we were headed for a battle and that al-Sadat was engaged in a battle between us and Israel. But disagreement between us started from my first days at the ministry. My work with him was a series of ongoing differences, not only because of our relations with the Soviets but also due to the nature of the national vision regarding the struggle.

[Answer] : Egyptian-Israeli relations have been facing resistance by the Egyptian people. Suffice it to say that the Egyptian ambassador is no longer in Tel Aviv, that normalization will not come to pass, and that the Taba problems are still under discussion. The Egyptian people's resistance is growing and so is their conviction that coexistence with present Israeli policy, which is based on expansion and settlement and the usurpation of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, is impossible. Furthermore, the Egyptian people have become aware of the creeping danger in the Arab region and of the attempts to divide it into factional mini-states through exhausting regional wars. I can say that the existing relationship is not the final picture.

[Question] Do you think that the balance of power currently in existence in the Middle East allows a solution to the West Bank and Gaza Strip problem?

[Answer] I do not think that the balance of power allows the regaining of the West Bank and Gaza. The present regime in Israel is based on sharing power between two political parties at odds with one another, hence the failure to adopt any positive decisions. Add to that the region's realities in general.

[Question] The Palestinians claim that they have no choice but to act because they cannot afford to remain silent since silence means the destruction of their cause.

[Answer] Any diplomatic side movement must serve the primary current as well as the fundamental cause for the sake of which they are struggling. Secondary concessions from the main line between us and Israel can lead to basic concessions. Accordingly, Arab circumstances which can tilt the balance of power in favor of any step we take must be created. We can concentrate, for example, on clearing the Arab air instead of causing polarization and fumbling.

[Question] Perhaps the most important manifestation of the upset in the balance of power is the unending war between Iraq and Iran. How do you view this war and what are your expectations?

[Answer] Unfortunately, we are entering the 6th year without any clear hope on the horizon for ending it. I believe that this war has become very dangerous because it has generated many interests that are bound to its continuation. It has also created new superpower balances which the superpowers are eager to maintain because ending the war may upset these balances.

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EGYPT

MEANS OF DEFRAUDING EXPATRIATES REVIEWED

London AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT in Arabic 18 Oct 85 p 6

[Article by Mahmud Sadiq and Siham 'Abd-al-'Al: "How Do the Egyptians Abroad Keep Their Savings from Being Lost?"]

[Text] Dr 'Ali Lutfi, the Egyptian prime minister, declared that there are to be no restrictions on the remittances of Egyptians working abroad and no rules on the remittance of their savings into the country. This measure constitutes part of a series of decrees the government has taken to encourage Egyptians to remit their savings through legitimate channels rather than exposing them to loss, when that is done other than through official banks and firm measures.

Security entities in Egypt have issued statistics which state that more than 25 percent of the crimes of fraud have occurred through advertising -- advertising for plots of land, companies investing money and so forth, projects which people rush into in the hope of winning the opportunities they dream of.

The statistics point out that more than half of the people who become the victims of fraud and deceit are Egyptians working abroad, because most of them want to invest the savings they have acquired at the highest yield, and when the illegality of some of these projects becomes apparent later, Egyptians become bewildered as to where to put their savings and how they should be remitted to their country.

In this report, AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT offers Egyptians working abroad a guide on means for protecting their savings from loss and from professionals in swindling and fraud.

Among the most prominent bodies Egyptians abroad have turned to in order to cultivate their savings have been financial investment companies advertising in the papers about the interest they give savers, which ranges from 20 to 40 percent. Suddenly one day, without advance notice, the Cairo morning papers came out with a declaration that these companies were fictitious and their owners were frauds; after that, the advertisements published in the papers concerning their activities were suspended. Egyptians at home and abroad have been asking how and why this happened.

Dr Husni Khalil, vice chairman of the Financial Market Authority, pointed out that the companies are not subject to Law 159 for 1981 on finance companies and consequently are not subject to oversight agencies in the government. The serious point in dealing with these companies does not just lie in the probability that they will speculate or deceive citizens or drive them bankrupt; rather, the basic danger lies in cases where the founder of the company dies or its activity is suspended for some reason.

He went on, "Perhaps the best proof of that is the case the Socialist Prosecutor's Agency investigated in recent months, where more than 250 citizens, most of them Egyptians abroad, filed suit against the owners of a company whose custom it was to receive citizens' money on the claim of investing it in an Islamic fashion. It obtained a total of 2.5 million pounds from them. The Socialist Prosecutor's Agency has suspended the investigation.

Counsellor Mahrus 'Abd-al-Halim, assistant socialist prosecutor, mentioned the reasons for suspending the case, stating that the relationship between the citizens and company owners was civil and that the contracts they had made were based on interest and thus had become personal debts to be repaid by ordinary judiciary measures, as long as no action harmful to the economic interests of the society is committed.

They Started on an Individual Basis

Dr Husni Khalil, vice chairman of the Financial Market Authority, said "These companies started when an individual project was established, as a result of expansion in its activities and an increase in its profits, by accepting money from the public in the context of Islamic participation. This was not hedged about by any negative features. Although ultimately the project would stop accepting further money, other companies would try to attract citizens' money by depositing it in specific accounts in certain bank branches in the name of the company or remitting the money directly to these projects. The money was offered in exchange for a contract of power of attorney and sometimes an Islamic check, or private company contract, post-dated checks or other methods which the owners of these projects had innovated.

"One should note that individuals or groups of people own all these projects; therefore, they are marked by simplicity in the procedures by which they are founded. Companies of this sort lie outside the scope of the law on finance companies and therefore they are not subject to the numerous measures, documents and steps the law demands and consequently are not subject to oversight by the competent bodies."

Dr Husni Khalil stressed that the legal regulation of companies set forth in Law 159 for 1981, which regulates the establishment of finance companies, will include companies owned by individuals, also, so that these loopholes will be eliminated in the new amendment to the law.

Suspension of Activity Means a Loss of Money

[Question] What happens if these companies are shut down? Will that result in a loss of money for Egyptians?

[Answer] If company owners cease activity for one reason or another, that will result in an unquestionable loss of depositors' money, since the receipts or papers in their possession will in the best of cases be valid only for establishing the existence of a "civil" debt, and the means for obtaining this are difficult.

The Central Bank Gives Warning

Owing to the serious nature of these companies' activity, the governor of the central bank, Mr 'Ali Najm, has issued a warning against the spread of the phenomenon of financial investment companies whose activities are not governed by specific rules. He asked savers not to deal with them, so that their savings would not be subject to loss in the event the company owners went bankrupt or fled the country.

The central bank governor stated that the rates of local savings in Egyptian pounds has exceeded the actual gross domestic growth rate, as a result of the rise in the interest rate on savings, and the rate of investment of these savings in the sectors of industry and agriculture has increased, thanks to the stipulation of a credit ceiling and encouragement of this sort of project. Therefore, Egyptians who want to cultivate their savings must choose one of these projects, in order to guarantee themselves against loss.

Muhammad Farid Ghunaym, chairman of the board of the National Development Bank, commenting on the absence of initiatives toward new savings activity subordinate to government supervision, pointed out: "The banking system can no longer sustain new savings instruments. The central bank, at present, does not give permission for the establishment of new banks or even new branches for existing banks. Therefore, the grant of permission to such companies will constitute a burden in excess of the capacity of the Central Bank or the other oversight agencies."

He went on, "The financial system in Egypt has become stabilized in its present form and there now are commercial and government, and indeed Islamic, banks, as well as corporations. Retreating from this system would be considered a regression. Therefore, the Financial Market Authority, in cooperation with other bodies, has now prepared a draft law to regulate the procedure for depositing citizens' savings with financial investment companies. The draft prohibits these companies from receiving subscriptions from citizens without reference to the Financial Market Authority."

Where Do Egyptians Deposit Their Money?

In response to this question, an official source in the Ministry of Economy stated that most new companies to which the minister of economy has given approval, be they investment companies or corporations, are oriented toward productive projects, their shares have been offered up for public subscription in the recent period and they are active in construction, housing, fish farms, dairy processing, children's food and pharmaceuticals. These companies benefit from the customs protection which it has been decided to impose on goods produced in Egypt, where the importation of similar goods has been forbidden.

In the opinion of Maj Gen Hasan al-Alfi, director of the General Department to Combat Crimes against Public Property in the Ministry of the Interior, the safest thing for Egyptian depositors working abroad is to turn directly toward government institutions (banks) because the Central Bank insures them, that is, savings in this case are subject to the guarantee of the government itself, not to intermediaries or middlemen. In the case of other companies operating in the field of attracting savings, some of these engage in illegitimate activity, such as speculating in gold and silver or currency trading, and thereby obtain profits which are distributed to the shareholders initially in order to attract their savings. The money of the depositors participating in them could be lost because of this, and also because there is no guarantee in the possession of shareholders or owners of savings, in spite of the immense profits that are announced.

A Warning against Foreign Currency Dealers

Maj Gen Hasan al-Alfi has issued a warning to Egyptians working abroad and savings depositors at home to beware of dealers in currency, speculators in gold and silver and people engaged in activities which are not clearly defined. Savings depositors must direct their savings to legitimate channels which the Ministry of Economy, the Central Bank and the Financial Market Authority guarantee, in order to protect their money against loss in the search for illusory declared profits.

Col 'Ala' 'Abbas, director of the struggle against currency crimes and smuggling in the Ministry of the Interior, considered "The protection of the savings of people working abroad and domestically is represented by the establishment of investment and productive projects to attract these savings, and the protection of savings is represented by having the Egyptian banks [holding] them grant a high interest rate to seek to attract savings. It is also necessary to establish corporations for Egyptians working abroad in order to attract their savings and to have the Central Bank and the Ministry of Economy intervene to adopt the necessary measures with respect to financial investment companies in order to protect depositors' money, review the legitimacy of these companies and prepare the necessary laws and bills for them. Savings depositors must also be wary of advertisements bearing on these companies, especially since the proposed draft law considers this to be criminal activity as it considers subscribing and requesting subscriptions in these projects without obtaining the agreement of the Financial Market Authority to be a crime."

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IRAQ

OBSERVERS SEE WAR ENTERING DECISIVE PERIOD

London AL-TADAMUN in Arabic 26 Oct 85 pp 10-11

[Article by Ibrahim al-Burjawi: "After the Iraqis Settled It Militarily and Economically, Will Guns of War Be Silenced with the Advent of the New Year?"]

[Text] Based on discussions in highly placed party circles known for their participation in and advise on the right to make crucial decisions and draw up general strategy in Iraq, political observers perceive that this is the year of decision with regard to determining the fate of the Iran-Iraq war, which has entered its 6th year.

These circles believe that the war has been decided militarily from the standpoint of establishing Iraqi superiority and the impossibility of any significant Iranian victory on any level that will enable it to stand up once again to the Iraqi forces. However, the desire to end the war has not yet been settled, be it at the Iranian internal level or at the Arab and international levels, notwithstanding the fact that some points and positive steps have been made in this regard, thus triggering a countdown for a final decision.

These circles attribute their belief that the next few months will be decisive from the standpoint of ending the war, specifically during the first 6 months of 1986, to the following factors:

1. The military victories the Iraqis have scored in the various fields, particularly in the field of aviation, which emanate basically from the first-rate experience, technology and combat skills of Iraqi fighters, not to mention, of course, a belief in their just cause, especially after the desire for peace and the determination to repel aggression have been affirmed.
2. The steady deterioration of the Iranian forces' capability, which in fact means that the Iraqi army has completed the process of crushing the Iranian military machine. Gen 'Adnan Khayrallah, the Iraqi minister of defense, said in this regard: "In the past, big battles used to be settled in Iraq's favor in weeks or several days. The East Basrah battle, for example, lasted 28 days and nights; the

East Tigris battle, 33 days; and al-Fakkah and al-Tayyib battle, 1 week. Recent battles in the northern regions have been settled in 1 or 2 days and, sometimes, a in a few hours." He added: "The Iranian fighters we are now facing at the front are different from those we faced 3 years ago."

3. The heavy loss of life on the Iranian side. American, Soviet and French intelligence reports say that Iranian losses amount to 700,000 killed and 3 million wounded, with many more to come!

4. The shortage of weapons on which the Iranians train, as well as the lack of spare parts for such weapons. In a recent interview with the Kuwaiti newspaper, AL-SIYASAH, Gen Khayrallah said: "At the beginning of the war, Iraq used to capture Western weapons from the Iranian forces. Now, 80 percent of the Iranian weapons Iraq captures are Eastern-made. Most of these weapons are not fit to use and some of them are junk which arms dealers sell to Iranian brokers whose only concern is to line their pockets and to officials in power who are profiteering from the war." Gen Khayrallah also said in this interview that it is rare to see an Iranian tank at the front nowadays. He disclosed a recent Iranian military operation in which 150 tanks on their way to Iran from some Arab countries were sunk or burned.

5. The increasing disintegration of the Iranian home front and growing popular displeasure with the regime and its rulers, specifically with Imam al-Khomeini. Pertinent information says that Iranian POW's, besides defectors and refugees, are volunteering to vilify Khomeini whereas during the first few years of the war, they refused to say anything bad about him. Displeasure is no longer confined to the anti-regime opposition, but now includes some members of the regime itself. The most recent example was when 99 of the 261 Shura Council members rejected Khomeini's recommendation to reelect Mir Husayn Musawi as prime minister, while 120 members supported the recommendation and more than 30 members did not attend the meeting which was held to ratify the recommendation. These figures in themselves are not important, even though they represent Iranian official data. The important thing is that Khomeini's orders no longer carry much weight. This is an extremely important development in a regime which looks upon Khomeini as the ultimate authority, never to be disobeyed.

The deteriorating situation on the home front is being aggravated and the will to fight is thus frustrated every time the Iranian regime dismisses members of the regular armed forces, which are thought to be unreliable and loyal to the shah, from key military missions. These missions are entrusted to the poorly qualified Revolutionary Guard.

6. The changes in the Arab and international positions toward this war, specifically toward the common position of weakening Iran and refraining from strengthening Iraq. The outstanding Iraqi steadfastness

and the skillful political efforts to exhibit Iraq's peaceful side are credited with some of these changes.

Things are totally different in the Iranian area, hence the emergence of an international and a common Arab view which has begun applying effective pressure on the respective rulers to support Iraq in its objective to end the war.

These changes will impose themselves on the Reagan-Gorbachev summit by forcing a discussion of the war and serious efforts to bring it to an end, particularly following the recommendations of the international conference which was held recently in Rome under the title "Oil for Peace." At this meeting, the Iraqi oil minister, Dr Samal Majid Faraj, succeeded in gaining international support and sympathy, particularly from the European countries, for Iraq's peaceful position which seeks to end the war so that the main artery of civilization, the oil pipeline, can start pumping again.

In this regard, it is also noted that some countries, including some Arab sisters, have been forced to reexamine their pro-Iranian position. They are searching for a way that will help them save face. A case in point is Syria, which finds itself in a difficult position which makes it incumbent upon it to secure collective Arab support for its situation and role in Lebanon and, in doing so, is forced to adjust many of its positions, particularly with regard to its support of Iran. This, of course, is in addition to the damage done to Syrian-Iranian relations because of conflicting interests in the Lebanese arena.

7. The stifling economic situation in Iran in the wake of attacks on the Kharj Island oil facilities. These attacks have crippled oil operations there, thus throwing the Iranian regime into a state of disarray due to its failure to take into account circumstances such as these when it once spent 75 percent of its income on the war effort without setting aside emergency funds to be used when the pumping of 1.5 million barrels a day would be stopped. This, of course, has influenced the positions of some of those who once helped Iran for its money, although they did not support its policy, which poses a threat to the security of the entire international community in particular, with regard to the national unity of its peoples, because, al-Khomeini's policy is based on factional and sectarian pleas.

Moreover, this situation has prompted Iran to ask its friends and allies to repay what it had offered them free, as was the case with Syria in particular which is required to pay Iran a price for oil it cannot afford, thus breaking up many self-serving friendships with Iran based on ulterior motives.

In light of all this, political observers find themselves wondering why the Iranians do not stop this war.

Iraqi party circles replay that this is the logical thing to do, but how can one expect logical behavior from people who do not understand or practice logic? Furthermore, how will Iranian officials face their people if they stopped the war, when they are asked about the causes of the war and about what it had achieved besides heavy losses after all the sacrifices the people offered in response to a demand by their rulers to accomplish slogans, none of which has been realized?

These circles' reply make it clear that the only way to stop the war is to force Iran into submission, an objective Iraq is trying to accomplish. Accordingly, highly placed party circles in Baghdad conclude their analyses by touching on the situation in the region in general, and in Lebanon in particular, underscoring their belief that the two crises are inextricably bound, but that Lebanon is heading for a period of truce in which it can catch its breath until such time as circumstances and endeavors to solve the region's problems are made clear. They expect Reagan and Gorbachev to approve this truce in their meetings following their agreement on the necessity to calm the situation in the region as a whole.

[Box on p 10]

[Text] "Prisoners and War"

In the presence of Arab and foreign correspondents, a press conference called by the Iraqi Cultural Center in London was held on 18 October 1985. It was attended by five Iraqi prisoners who were released from Iranian camps after spending from 17 to 37 months in the "Brandak," "Kujan" and "Da'udiyah" camps. The prisoners--1st Lt Talal Salim, Lt Ra'd Mahdi, Reserve Pvt Majid 'Alwan and Popular Army members Jasim 'Abdallah and Ahmad Yahya--talked about their experiences in captivity and about the treatment they received from the Iranian authorities. The prisoners, who are all disabled, appealed to international public opinion to pressure the Iranian government to allow the international Red Cross to visit Iraqi prisoners in the camps. The prisoners are scheduled to leave London for Paris as part of their tour of some European capitals to explain the plight of Iraqi prisoners in Iranian camps.

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IRAQ

PRIORITIES IN ECONOMIC PLANS VIEWED

Baghdad THE BAGHDAD OBSERVER in English 21 Oct 85 p 6

[Article by Dr B. Alak]

[Text] **Iraq's Foreign Trade Plan (FTP) for 1986 will be announced in time, especially now that all the plan's inputs, trends, allocations and objectives have been determined and approved by authorities concerned. Indeed, on September 23, final touches were put to the plan, when member of the Revolution Command Council (RCC) and First Deputy Prime Minister, Mr Taha Yassin Ramadhan, chaired an expanded meeting held by the Trade Board in cooperation with the Permanent Committee for the drawing up of the said plan.**

Certain top priorities in the Foreign Trade Plan will be given to the achievement of the following objectives:

1. Importing goods and materials that serve the war effort,
2. Securing and ensuring availability of basic commodities and consumer goods that have close relevance to the life and standard of living of all citizens. economic is also placed on forming a stockpile of basic goods and commodities for direct consumption and industrial use. Such commodities will be properly stored and distributed to avoid cases of temporary shortage and supply interruption;

3. Securing the requirements of all industrial and agricultural projects and establishments, for industrial and agricultural goods, spare parts, raw materials as well as expertise. Priority in goods and raw materials' allocations will be given to productive establishments in all sectors of the economy; projects that directly contribute to the war effort and those that directly help to enhance the structure and performance of the national economy, will receive the lion's share of allocations, in money and materials.

4. Raising the export potential of the Iraqi economy.

through export diversification, and especially the export of locally-manufactured goods. Every encouragement will be given to export-oriented establishments in all sectors of the economy, to enable them to have a strong and permanent position in international markets.

5. Making available at competitive prices all the requirements of export-oriented establishments, be they raw materials, spare parts, factories, or manpower. Financial incentives will be generously given to all export-oriented establishments.

6. Enhancing the role played by the public (socialist) sector of the economy in internal and external trade.

7. Fully supporting the cooperative sector of the economy, and allowing cooperatives to get involved in the importation process, so as to be able to contribute to the social and economic development process.

8. Making full use of the potentialities of the private sector of the economy, especially in export and import fields, and placing particular emphasis on the importation of the requirements of the private industrial and agricultural sectors.

It is also of interest to note that the 1986 Foreign Trade Plan will pay particular attention to satisfying the requirements of all great development projects as defined by the Law of Great Development No. 157 of 1973, as well as other strategic projects in all fields of the economy. These projects are included in the 1986 Investment Plan, which will be completely drawn up at the end of this month (October). Also, the Foreign Trade Plan will con-

centrate on the necessity to fully utilize port and transportation capacities to handle increasing volumes of imports. As the plan aims at boosting industrial productivity, a system of inventory control is included in the Plan.

Mr. Hassan Ali, Revolution Command Council Member, Minister of Trade told the London-based *Al-Tadamon* weekly magazine that the 1986 plan is the sixth plan to be made during the war imposed by Iran on Iraq, a war which entered its sixth year on September 4 last. The Minister made it clear that the Foreign Trade Plan for 1986 will be geared to developing the Iraqi economy and to raising rates of productivity in essential sectors of the economy, with special emphasis on sectors serving war efforts. Mr Hassan Ali added that the plan aims primarily at initiating drastic positive changes in the structure and performance of the national economy so as to limit the negative impacts of the war on the economy, through the wise and balanced exploitation of the country's resources, and economy's potentials, as well as sectors capacities.

It is worth mentioning that the first comprehensive national development plan (1970-1974) aimed at achieving basic economic and social gains, chief among them being the development and enhancement of the national income, full utilization and exploitation of mineral resources on a national basis, taking into consideration the interlink between planning for developing the country and the need for Arab economic integration, as well as paying special attention to

the provision of services to all citizens, achieving social justice, and coordinating and maintaining balance between the cities and rural areas from social and economic angles.

The trends of the five-year national development plan (1976-1980) stressed the need to continue with the process of creating the technical and material base for a well-balanced and developed economy, achieving speedy growth rates in all sectors on a permanent basis, raising productivity and work performance, as well as continuing with the process of infrastructure construction.

During the war, the development process continued, and investment in the various sectors of the economy witnessed a noticeable rise. Allocations in the 1981 investment plan totalled approximately 6743 million Iraqi Dinars, and for the 1982 investment plan allocations stood at ID.7,700 million. These amounts were allocated to major economic sectors in a balanced manner, with the aim of serving the conditions prevailing at the time so as to enhance Iraq's confrontation with the enemy.

A follow-up of national income and per capita income figures shows that there is a noticeable jump. National income rose by 21.4 per cent annually (current prices) during the period 1968-1982. In 1968 national income was 812.5 million Iraqi Dinars, and reached 12334.6 million Iraqi Dinars in 1982. Accordingly, per capita income rose by 17.5 per cent annually

(current prices) during the same period, to become 874.2 Iraqi Dinars in 1982, compared with ID. 91.1 in 1968.

The contribution of the socialist sector in gross domestic product (GDP) rose from 24.5 per cent in 1968 to 61.2 per cent in 1982. This sector managed, in the light of such developments, to play a leading role in the process of developing the national economy and the process of socialist construction. Also, a project plan for the period 1981-1985 was conducted, and the yearly plans for 1981, 1982, 1983 and 1984 were implemented despite war conditions. As 1985 is close to an end, all objectives embodied in this year's plan have been achieved. The remaining months of the year (October-December) will have their contributions as an extra input to the Plan.

Value added, which is an indicator reflecting in a direct way the level of economic activity, for the agricultural sector rose from 742 million I.D. in 1980 to 1393 million I.D. in 1983 (current prices)- i.e. an increase of 651 million I.D. and an annual growth rate of 23.4 per cent. Value added for transform industry sector rose from 709 million I.D. in 1980 to 1163 million I.D. in 1983, thus achieving an annual growth rate of 17.9 per cent. In general, gross value added for consuming goods sector, except crude oil, rose from 2689.1 million I.D. in 1980 to 4179.1 million ID in 1983 thus achieving an annual growth rate of 15.8 per cent

The standard of performance and level of progress and growth which include all sectors of the economy, was achieved primarily as a result of increased investments, as represented in gross capital formation, which rose from 3471 million I.D. in 1980 to 3997 million I.D. in 1983- i.e. a growth rate of 4.8 per cent. Improvement in the level of economic performance as a result of manpower awareness and their appreciation and understanding of current circumstances, were some of the factors leading to enhanced productivity.

As for other indicators, during the same period, public expenditure rose from 2390 million I.D. in 1980 to 6364 million I.D. in 1983 i.e. an annual growth rate of 38.6 per cent.

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ISRAEL

UNEMPLOYMENT FIGURES FOR SEPTEMBER GIVEN

Tel Aviv HADASHOT in Hebrew 3 Oct 85 p 20

[Text] By the end of the fiscal year the unemployment number is expected to reach 140,000, which constitutes about 10 percent of the total labor force. In September alone the number was 113,000, or 8 percent of the labor force. By the end of the year 20,000 more layoffs can be expected: about 12,500 in industry and construction, about 1,500 in the food and textile industries, approximately 4,500 in metals and electronics, in addition to 4,000 workers in municipal councils and 4,000 in government offices and factories. The total number of layoffs in the public sector is estimated to reach 17,500 by the end of 1984/85. Layoffs are expected in several plants in the Haifa area such as Israel Shipyards, Zim, Rafa'el and other plants associated with the construction industry such as the steelworks. The total number of layoffs is expected to reach 35,000.

Details were reported on 2 October by Labor and Welfare Minister Moshe Katzav in a news conference in Tel-Aviv.

The immediate solution is to release funds of the Investment Center in order to create jobs in the production sector. The prime minister promised, said the minister, that if the rate of unemployment surpasses 7.5 percent of the labor force, \$350 million would be released for investment and for job creation.

The \$450 million which were invested in 119 plants between September 1984 and June 1985 will create 6,000 jobs during 1986 and 1987. Therefore, incentives and tax credits should be created for plants which can create more jobs. Funds should also be released for vocational retraining. The ministry now trains 8,000 workers annually. The plan is to add 12,000 and reach 20,000.

Minister Katzav will object to raising the health insurance tax by .5 percent for employers to help the health system. This will increase their cost and will not contribute anything to resolving unemployment, he thinks. Instead he would like to see a minimum wage. The agreed upon figure is 40-45 of the average in the economy. After allowing for inflation of 32 percent in August and 30 percent in September, the minimum wage last month was about IS240,000. This brought about an increase in the number of those applying for minimum income.

[Box On p 20]

During September there was an increase of 3 percent in those unemployed 3 or more days. The number of unemployed was 22,400, compared with 21,700 in August. Figures were reported by the Employment Service. The number of those seeking jobs was 45,150 in September, compared with 45,400 in August, or a .5 percent drop.

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
CSO: 4423/22

ISRAEL

CARTOON COMMENTS ON PEACE PROCESS

Tel Aviv KOTERET RASHIT in Hebrew 23 Oct 85 p 4

[Cartoon]



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CSO: 4423/28

ISRAEL

ADVERTISING FIRM SETS UP JOINT VENTURE WITH CHINA

Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 28 Aug 85 p 4

[Text] The Peled advertising firm signed a memorandum of understanding with a government owned firm in the People's Republic of China regarding the establishment of a joint advertising firm. The offices of the new firm are to be opened shortly, immediately after the holidays, in the city of Shenzhen in southern China, 40 km away from Hong-Kong. This is the first officially announced joint project between Israel and the Republic of China.

Ha'im Peled, manager of the Israeli firm which bears his name, confirmed the announcement. According to him the new firm will advertise Chinese products in Western countries, Europe and the United States. The local offices in Israel maintain regular communications with the joint firm.

The Peled firm is one of the leading advertising firms in Israel. Among others it has the accounts of Carmel Carpets, Shikun 'Ovdim, Renault Cars, VISA, and the Migdal David and Rosh Indi'ani hotels.

The establishment of contacts between Peled and the Chinese firm and the acquisition of necessary documents to form the new firm were arranged by the American attorney David Buxbaum, who has been in China for the past 15 years. Buxbaum, of international reknown, came to China even before the establishment of official relations between Peking and the United States. He has been living there permanently since the early seventies. He represents many American investors and serves as their regular representative on many projects.

It is reported that it was Buxbaum who was instrumental in establishing contact between a large electronics firm in Israel and the Chinese Ministry of Industry. The Israeli firm denies all rumors to that effect, but it has reported that it will construct a plant for the production of sophisticated electronic systems in China.

There are other Israeli firms which have recently shown interest in doing business with the Chinese.

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CSO: 4423/17

ISRAEL

GAZA STRIP DEVELOPMENT PROGRESS REVIEWED

Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 2 Sep 85 p 9

[Text] For the first time ever the Gaza Strip population has surpassed the half million mark, when it reached 509,000. The fact is revealed in the annual report (84-85) which has just been published. In 1978 the size of the Gaza Strip population was 463,000 and although in the course of the years 37,000 al-'Arish and Rafah citizens "moved" to Egypt, not only is there no trend downward, but there is even an increase in the growth rate.

Thus, for example, in 1978 the birth rate was 16.9 percent, as compared with the recent figure of 20.4 percent. The balance of moving in and out of the Strip is negative, i.e., more left than moved in, or about 5,000 in the year covered by the report. Otherwise the growth rate would be even higher.

An interesting fact pointed out by the report is that pertaining to income and real estate taxes. During the last fiscal year IS4.24 billion were collected, compared with IS620 million in the previous year, or an increase of 684 percent. Another fact pointed out by the report notes that of the 38,400 workers in the Strip who worked in Israel -- about 44 percent of all those employed -- only 12,050 registered with the employment agency, which withholds taxes. As is well known, those who do not obtain employment through the agency do not always pay their full share of taxes.

The rise in the standard of living is a steady one, by any gauge. Thus, for example, the number of registered vehicles in the Strip was 3,841 in 1971, compared with 22,310 in 84-85, an increase of 480 percent. The number of those holding driver permits increased in the 14 years from 3,583 to 36,120. Is there anyone who remembers that in 1967 there was no electricity in the Gaza Strip, with the exception of a few very wealthy sections? Today 78 percent have television sets, 79 percent own refrigerators and 86 percent of the households have an electric or a gas stove. Washing machines can be found in 30 percent of the homes, compared with only 3 percent 10 years ago.

The rehabilitaion of refugees continues. It is a project requiring tremendous resources. At the beginning there were difficulties resulting from poor planning augmented by lack of cooperation by the citizens. They were afraid of losing their refugee status when they moved to their new homes. The type of housing, the size of the land and terms for acquiring them underwent

several iterations, until an acceptable solution was found, which was handing over the plots in new neighborhoods and helping, one way or another, in the construction of the homes. Since 1977, 1,750 families have thus been moved. At various stages they left their homes in the camps -- which thus became roomier for those remaining behind -- and moved to their new homes. For the most part they built those homes themselves.

The main problem is that the rate of rehabilitation is not keeping up with the birth rate of the refugee population. Any attempt to tackle the problem so as to solve it once and for all requires the help of a very well endowed international organization. The condition of African refugees does not lend anyone to believe that the case of the Gaza Strip refugees will be on the international agenda any time soon. The Israeli plan is being implemented gradually, as funds permit. A plan to relocate the 3,000 refugees of Jabaliyah is now being prepared. They are to move to a large new neighborhood which is intended to be a new town eventually.

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CSO: 4423/17

ISRAEL

TAX ON BLACK MARKET URGED

Tel Aviv MA'ARIV in Hebrew 27 Aug 85 Business Supplement p 15

[Article by Dr 'Imanu'el Levy: "War against Black Capital instead of Budget Cuts"]

[Text] No one disagrees that the government's financial deficit should be drastically reduced as a precondition to halting inflation and improving the balance of payments. The government's main efforts have thus far been directed at cutting expenditures, a policy which has been dictated to a large extent by the sharp continuing drop in real revenue from taxes and the relative freeze in net sales of government bonds to the public. Without regard for the constraints on budget income, some feel that it is necessary for structural economic reasons to lower considerably the level of government expenditures in order to reduce its real weight in total economic activity. In any case, the discussion is academic. The budget approved for next year shows that there will not be a real significant cut and the deficit in terms of dollars will actually grow.

There is no escaping the fact, then, that a cut large enough to arrive at a minimal balancing of the budget is not possible in the context of Israeli political reality. It is not possible to lower sufficiently the level of public services, let alone pay the price of the resulting unemployment. In 1966 cuts were effected in government spending which were much smaller than the ones needed today, and nevertheless unemployment soared in one year to 100,000, or 10.5 percent of the civilian labor force. Since then some 450,000 persons were added to the labor force. Cuts at the required level could lead in a matter of months to an unemployment level of 150,000 to 200,000 or even more. No wonder both the government and the Histadrut shy away from such cuts.

Under such circumstances there is no way out except a substantial increase in revenue from taxes. Even now, after a short artificial period of calm, there are already disturbing signs of a new increase in the public's buying power and an accumulation of hidden inflationary pressures that may erupt if the massive infusion of new means of payment by the treasury is not stopped.

Undoubtedly, income from existing sources can be augmented by closing loopholes and streamlining the processes of assessment and collection. The

recommendations of the Steinberg Commission will also make a contribution. But this is not enough. The only source that can close the gap is black capital. Collecting taxes from such capital will make a positive direct contribution to economic recovery. This capital is either smuggled abroad in large part or is used for wasteful spending on consumer goods which puts pressure on prices and imports.

There are no exact statistics on black capital in Israel, either its annual volume or accumulated value. A minimal estimate of black capital created each year can be based on the parallel data for Holland--20 to 30 percent of GNP. There is no way of estimating the accumulated value of such capital owned by the public, but everyone agrees the amounts are enormous.

Israel's GNP has fluctuated in recent years between \$22-23 billion. "Black" income, therefore, adds up to no less than \$4-5 billion. A large part of this income originates in the underworld, and cannot be included in any tax program. In the U.S., where black money is estimated at 10-20 percent of GNP, the share of the underworld is estimated at 25-35 percent of such activities. If we assume that in Israel the rate is even half of that, then we are left with \$2-2.5 billion, which constitute undeclared income stemming from legal activities. This is an additional potential source of \$1 billion in taxes a year--a sum which could totally change the economic situation.

At the same time, it should be clear that the goal will not be achieved through conventional methods. With due respect to the importance of police means and severe punishment by the tax system, this will not solve the problem all by itself. Nor would administrative procedures, such as filing shortened capital declarations each year. Amnesty will not help either. Under the present structure and tax rates the result will be, in the best of cases, a partial one-time legalization of existing black capital, followed immediately by hiding of capital. In actuality, even such partial success does not have a chance, since most of the concerned parties will avoid confessing to the authorities.

The root of the problem lies in the demand of the authorities that the citizen pay a high marginal tax, without any limit, on all of his income above a certain ceiling. This demand, although it is an integral part of income tax laws in most countries, contradicts human nature to such an extent that the phenomenon of hiding is widespread even in countries where the maximum tax applies to relatively low income, the motivation to avoid paying tax is much greater. There is no real solution, then, without moderating this demand.

It is preferable, therefore, to keep the present sliding scale, and at the same time introduce a partial ceiling for the top tax bracket as well. Income above the ceiling will be taxed at a reduced, uniform rate, possibly 25 to 30 percent. An interim period will be needed to allow the new rules to take hold and yield results.

Another advantage is the fact that there is no danger of serious loss of income from taxation in case the new rules fail. Before the 66 percent

marginal tax was put into effect, the tax at the top bracket at that time (marginal income taxed at 60 percent) represented 29 percent of the total tax received from individuals from all income brackets. The top 10 percent of the top bracket only contributed 10 percent of the total tax revenue from individuals. The average income of that 10 percent, totalling 14,500 individuals, was \$6500. The range of this average figure may be wide, but if the ceiling for the top income for these new rules were set close to this average (for example, \$5000-6000 a month), the possible loss of revenue from taxes would be limited to a few percentage points, compared to the high potential income for the treasury.

Government expenditures on civilian and military consumption and self investment totals an average of 37 percent of GNP, or 41 percent if we add the local governments. This seems to be a high rate, but it does not reflect the real weight of the government in total economic activity, since such weight is measured not only in terms of GNP but also in comparison to the total resources of the economy, namely, GNP plus imports. In most industrial countries imports do not exceed 20-30 percent of GNP, so the choice of basis does not greatly affect the outcome. Not so Israel, where imports total 55-60 percent of GNP, although a large part of the imports are military, which is included in government consumption. Compared to 37 percent of GNP, the cost of government consumption and self investment is only 23 percent of total resources. This rate is not unusual compared to other industrial countries.

It is necessary and permissible, then, to act intensively and without delay to exact the needed taxes from black capital so as to decrease government infusion of funds while maintaining a necessary minimal level of expenditure.

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ISRAEL

RELIGIOUS NATURE OF SOCIETY CALLED INTO QUESTION

Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 26 Aug 85 p 7

[Text] The war on the Saturday opening of the Ramat-Gan amusement park and stadium, which started in recent weeks, may renew the impression among thinking secularists that another step in religious coercion has just been taken. Anyone who needs further proof only had to listen to the prime minister's declaration, in a conversation with politicians representing the ultra-religious factions, that the observance of the Sabbath is not a coalitionary question but a national one. Apparently, the issue of the amusement park and the sports arena has been shifted from the secular sphere of municipal management to a higher level where it now resides with defense, revitalization of the economy, and the issue of peace.

But, one should be somewhat cautious before concluding that Israel is on the verge of becoming a theocracy, where clergymen decide the way of life. Actually, except for what the prime minister said, and he has a ready-made declaration for any occasion, the question of the amusement park could not have come up 20 or 30 years ago, when Israel's secular nature was not even in question. No one would have even thought of keeping a business open on the Sabbath or on a Jewish holiday. The real question today is: What is really new, or, in religious lingo, the desecration of the Sabbath, or the struggle, often violent, that the orthodox sectors are leading against the phenomenon.

The media often reports -- although less so than before -- about born-again Jews, or on collusion between leaders of the Alignment and Likud on the one hand, and religious leaders on the other hand, aimed at transferring large amounts to religious institutions or other open pockets of those who make a living out of religion. Much less is reported -- perhaps because it has become routine -- on open desecration of the Sabbath by the entertainment industry, on the open sale of pork, and in general, the secular atmosphere in the country, public nudity, etc. Although the reaction to religious coercion cannot be denied, the fact remains that Israeli society prefers to worship temporal pleasures, not God. In this respect it is not different from other Israeli societies which preceded it. Anyone who doubts this statement had better study the Bible.

There are those who point out the violence of the orthodox faction and the way they fight secular people, archeologists, girls whose clothes are not

considered modest enough, non-observers of the Sabbath, etc. Even that is nothing new. The ultra-orthodox, especially those who are organized around certain rabbis, have always been very violent. Altercations among various groups were an every day occurrence in Jewish communities in Eastern Europe. Stoning of cars travelling in Me'a She'arim on the Sabbath or demonstrations by young ultra-orthodox are not new to this decade. Violence, just like superstition, is the dark side of ultra-orthodoxy; they are just as zealous when it comes to worship. In any event, hooliganism should not be confused with religious belief, in spite of the impression created by some who maintain that the two go hand in hand with each other.

Today's Israeli society is rebellious, both against religion, which tries to set moral standards, and against social ideologies, which try to dictate social norms. The secular belief in a Jewish state and in a just and clean society no longer exists. People continue to attend synagogues and observe dietary laws but in their hearts they are sinners: the warmth, generosity, the real Jewish solidarity, so typical of the Jewish communities of Eastern Europe, can no longer be found in Israel. The secular majority (which can really be called pagan) does not even have the monopoly on emptiness.

The orthodox camp is basically empty, too. It is doubtful that anything creative has come out of it ever since the creation of Hasidism. Those of the orthodox camp -- in Israel, before the establishment of the state and even in the Zionist movement prior to that -- who embraced the Herzl philosophy, did what was popular in the secular camp too. They went to kibbutzim when the Labor movement set the tone -- even Agudat Israel members founded kibbutzim. Since 1967 the ultra-orthodox were the ones to find justifications, quoting the Talmud and other later scriptures (the Bible, according to them, is only for agnostics) for a nationalistic ideology, which is secular by its very nature! Even Jabotinsky would have been horrified at the sight of these orthodox young men, with their kalashnikovs along with huge religious symbols. This is true for Gush Emunim, too, and its message, which is a combination of Labor Movement ideas and the belief in the Greater Land of Israel. What they have contributed to the debate is a few quotations from some rabbi who died several hundred years ago and from several hundred of those implementing an ideology which is foreign to them.

It should be added that even this faction of religious Jewry, which in the seventies looked like the spearhead of the theocratical branch of Judaism which was in the process of taking over, has been weakening for years. Like other dying entities it can only raise scandals and commit some mischievous acts (the Jewish underground and "conquests" in the Hebron market are typical examples). This is what is left of their heyday. Then people were both surprised and petrified; now they yawn in boredom. This raw material, coupled with the secular society in Israel, cannot combine into a theocracy. As to the political influence of the religious parties--although, unfortunately, they do tip the coalitionary scale--they can be bought rather cheaply. Both the Labor Party and Likud spent more money on convincing or bribing their own voters than they spend on buying their religious partners. The religious camp is merchandise at bargain prices. Its leaders are willing to be content with promises that both sides know will not be kept. Why, then, should we complain about the religious parties, and why should we suspect them

of trying to force a theocracy on us? A paper tiger will remain a paper tiger, even with a skull-cap and black garb.

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ISRAEL

MEMBER OF KNESSET URGES CUTS IN GOVERNMENT BUREAUCRACY

Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 1 Sep 85 p 8

[Text] The public sector in Israel could, in terms of size, support a country of 20-30 million people, without reducing the level of services. It would be very difficult to increase the size of the population by 500-1000 percent. It is even more difficult to curtail the government bureaucracy by 3-5 percent. This huge body is built into our socialistic system, and it has developed its own ideology as well as a very astute and powerful political clout.

There are more than 200 local governments in Israel. Local independence was granted not only to cities like Tel Aviv, Haifa, and Jerusalem, but also to Menahamiye, Nahalat Yehuda and Ramat-Yishai. A small Tel Aviv neighborhood is much larger than Menahamiye. There are more people in a large apartment house in Haifa than there are in Migdal. Has anyone ever thought how much the public could benefit, what planning advantages there are, and how much money would be saved if, for example, the "republics" of Herzeliya, Ramat Hasharon, Hod Hasharon, Ra'anana and Kfar-Saba were to be united to the municipal "republic" of the Sharon? Does anyone realize the urban benefit from uniting Tirat Hakarmel, Haifa, Qiryat Motzkin, Qiryat Bialik, Qiryat Ata and Qiryat Yam to a Carmel authority by one name or another?

What would have happened if public services in all those municipalities were to join forces? The labor councils, the vocational schools and even party offices? Thousands of dollars could be saved, as well as manpower. Coordination could raise effectiveness and efficiency no end. Suffice it to examine such actions in other countries, some of which are the most democratic in the world, such as Great Britain and the United States in order to realize how irrelevant the arguments in favor of this splintering are, and what economic, social, and other benefits could be realized in creating large municipal bodies suitable to the needs of urban planning.

There are about 10 separate tax collection authorities in Israel: income tax, duty and value added taxes, National Insurance, real estate taxes, electricity levies, radio and television licenses, health insurance, and local tax authorities, as many as there are local governments. Israelis can be divided into those who pay taxes and those who collect them. It is difficult to estimate which group is larger. It would be more beneficial if all the

collection were done by one authority, through which a fairer system could be implemented.

There are at least five agencies in Israel which deal with handicapped people: National Insurance deals with job related accidents; the Defense Ministry is responsible for wartime handicapped; the Finance Ministry deals with rehabilitation of Nazi victims; the Health Ministry examines the degree of handicap related to discounts in vehicular taxes, while the Transportation Ministry provides special licenses to severely handicapped persons. Handicapped people have a lot of rights, but the way to implementing those rights is an administrative nightmare. How much suffering, frustration, alienation, anger and money could be saved if there were just one authority to deal with handicapped persons?

If this public tower were to shrink and be structured properly, functionally, our economic structure could undoubtedly be improved, too. More people could be diverted to production; more financial resources could be devoted to useful purposes, science, industry, exports, improved education, culture, literature and art. Workers could receive more equitable salaries, public services could be improved no end, its infrastructure could be widened. But? The proponents of the welfare state preclude any welfare by perpetuating this structure. Tens of thousands of academicians and other clerks, who benefit from this splintered, broken up structure, as well as several thousand politicians, heads of committees and advisers, have developed ideologies praising the existing system, which is social but not socialistic, in that it benefits the bureaucrat, not the worker.

Analyzing the structure of the party management one cannot fail to conclude that most of those who manage the parties are those who are the heads of this splintered system of pyramids. They are the ones who have the social status because of the large number of pyramids. The more pyramids there are, the more people are needed to head them.

Since the author's election to the Knesset 4 years ago, he has made five proposals to reduce the bureaucracy and improve it by joining like services: the tax collection authorities, the property management authorities, the systems dealing with traffic safety, uniting local governments that are in close proximity to each other, etc. All of the author's suggestions were accepted by the Knesset and were referred to committees, where they died a natural death. After all, members of Knesset are also among those who benefit from the system, and therefore it can hardly be expected of the Knesset to deal effectively with the issue.

Actually, everyone who wants to maintain some political insurance has to maintain good relations with the heads of his or her party. It is thus rather difficult to initiate a campaign against Israel's feudal structure. About 10,000, perhaps 20,000, reap the benefits from this structure. They have complete authority over the political structure of the country, the makeup of the Knesset and the coalition. Thus the circle is closed.

Economic solutions will have to be found, as in the past, in the United States. It is there that economic reforms will take place. It is there that

functional economic and administrative systems will be implemented. In his book "Today Is Tomorrow" Shimon Peres says that Israel's major challenge is in reducing this bureaucracy. When the book was written, in 1978, Peres was in the opposition. Now he serves as the prime minister. Will he be able to meet the challenge?

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CSO: 4423/17

ISRAEL

PROBLEMS AT ISRAEL SHIPYARDS REVIEWED

Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 14 Aug 85 p 9

[Article by Yehoshu'a Gilbo'a: "Shipyard on the Rocks; Each Ship Built at Israel Shipyards Loses \$5 Million for the Government; Abroad, Shipyards Are Subsidized by the Government"]

[Text] In the 50 years of its existence, a crucial problem has attended the government-owned Israel Shipyards: The shipyard was established to build merchant ships and repair them. But nearly all the ships acquired by Israel were built abroad. For several years Israeli companies have not been renovating their fleets. This applies to Zim, since other companies have so far only acquired old vessels.

Previously, during the German reparations period, the Israeli fleet grew at a very rapid pace, but without using the local shipyards. The foreign shipyards, where Israeli ships were ordered, as most shipyards around the world receive generous government subsidies, especially since many auxiliary industries develop around them. Israel did not subsidize its own shipyard, but preferred to take advantage of the subsidies given by other governments to their shipyards. As for the amounts involved, the difference in subsidies alone paid by those governments to their shipyards amounts to several millions of dollars per ship; which cost \$30 million each.

According to Transport Minister Hayim Corfu, the government can expect a loss of \$5 million for each ship built by the shipyard. Thus, during all the years of its existence, Israel Shipyards built seven merchant ships, and the factory accumulated a loss.

After the Cherbourg affair, Israel Shipyards became the place for building missile boats for the Israeli Navy. Those were years of prosperity for the shipyard, and for several years thereafter it continued to enjoy the bounty of that period, even after the defense orders nearly stopped.

Opinions were divided on the way the shipyard was run by Israel Libertovski, who built it, made it his home, and ruled it until a few years ago he was dismissed from his job. For some time now the shipyard has used up its profits, and in recent months had a difficult time paying workers' salaries. After the last crisis Finance Minister Yitzhak Moda'i said the shipyard had to be handed to a receiver and could no longer be supported by government

funds. Only 2 years ago the expansion of the shipyard was completed, with a government investment of \$15 million. This investment was approved so that the shipyard could handle the large vessels of the Israeli fleet, mainly Zim's (40 percent government-owned). But since the expansion project was completed hardly any ships have arrived of those counted on when the investment was approved.

Over the years the government did not have a clear policy regarding the shipyard. When the orders of the defense ministry stopped for lack of money and when the Sinai was returned, shortening Israel's maritime borders, the shipyard suffered from large-scale hidden unemployment that lasted for several years.

Earlier this year the shipyard received several orders that could provide work for half a year or perhaps longer. These orders included an extension of three or even four Zim ships at a price of \$1 million per ship. In addition, two tow boats at a total price of \$6.5 million were ordered by the harbor authority, as well as two tow boats for the Navy. The Dead Sea Company also placed a large order with the shipyard.

In addition to its 720 employees, the shipyard also provides work for subcontractors who employ several dozen workers, mostly Arabs, especially in welding, hoisting, and drafting. The problem of manpower utilization has to do with the relatively large number of service workers compared to direct production workers. This was also one of Ata's problems. Nevertheless, the [workers'] committees have already announced unequivocally that they oppose the government's decision to fire 250 workers, and will fight against attempts to reduce manpower. They point out that the shipyard has received orders. If the committees continue to resist, one may expect disruptive acts accompanied by violence. Meanwhile, a committee member says, they are waiting for the next Knesset elections. Considering the rising tension among the coalition partners, the shipyard committees have always been able to exploit coming Knesset or Histadrut elections to avoid dismissals of workers.

Despite the sword of dismissal hanging over the shipyard, it must be careful not to harm several dozen ship engineers (there may be 60 of them employed by the shipyard) who are without work part of the time. Those are professionals without whom the shipyard would become shops. The shipyard is now participating in a bid for building ships for Singapore worth several tens of millions of dollars.

It is known that in the early stage of this bid six countries participated and the finalists were a German shipyard and Israel Shipyards. If the Haifa shipyard wins the bid, it will not be able to perform the work without the engineers.

The work in the shipyard is difficult, dirty, and quite dangerous. Salaries are not high. It is hard to find a worker whose son continues in his father's job. The shipyard does not have trainees or training courses for workers. There is no connection between professional advancement and rank. Every additional promotion given a worker has to do with seniority.

Whenever there is a crisis in the Israel Shipyards someone suggest merging it with the Navy shipyard, which renovates and repairs Navy vessels. A merger of the two is possible, albeit problematic. But even in the Navy yard, which employs many more workers than Israel shipyards, there is hidden unemployment which is further complicated by red tape.

No wonder workers' morale in Israel Shipyards is down. Moda'i statement about closing down the shipyard, which means that the workers are expendable, certainly did not contribute to raising morale. The reports about building submarines and about American companies interested in partnership are so far unfounded. Even if it comes to pass, it won't happen before the end of the decade or the beginning of the next decade. Meanwhile, the shipyard must pay workers and meet its obligations. The government has promised a grant of \$6 million by the end of this year if the shipyard dismisses 250 of its workers.

What next? If the shipyard wins the Singapore bid conditions will improve. But even if it does not, talk about closing it down is unfounded. The Cherbourg affair has demonstrated the security value of the shipyard for Israel. Israel's merchant marine needs a home harbor base for repairs and maintenance for any possible emergency.

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ISRAEL

COMMENTARY CALLS FOR ISRAELI CONTROL OF TEMPLE MOUNT

'Ofra NEQUDA in Hebrew 26 Jul 85 pp 10-11

[Article by Yisra'el Me'dad: "The Mount Precedes the Temple; Temple Mount Does Not Appear in the Ministry of Religions' List of Holy Places; When It Comes to Arabs, Laws of Guarding Holy Places, Antiquities, or Construction and Supervision Laws Do Not Apply; Only after Israeli Law Is Applied to the Mount (Jerusalem Is an Inseparable Part of Israel?) and National Consensus Is Reached for Authorized and Orderly Jewish Presence, Will It Be Possible to Move from the Profane to the Holy"]

[Text] How wonderful is this era of the generation of rebirth, when, just as there are 3 weeks of Ben Hametzarim [before the Ninth of Av. Ed.], there is a similar period of time between 5 Iyar, our Independence Day, and 28 Iyar, Jerusalem Day. As we pass gradually--a kind of preparation--from 17 Tamuz to the day of destruction on 9 Av, so we rise from the day the state was declared to the day on which was declared, "the Temple Mount is ours."

During the first period we sharpen the sense of national mourning and memory with attending customs: fasting during the day, mourning customs, limiting food and drink, and then 25 hours of fast and other physical affliction. During the second we celebrate first the establishment of national sovereignty and the renewal of independent political life which signals the beginning of Hebrew rule over part of the Land of Israel, until we reach the day symbolizing the breakthrough into the expanses of the homeland we were too weak to conquer in 1948, and only in 1967 were circumstances created which allowed us to complete the process, at least militarily.

It seems, however, that there was a failure in 1967, as a result of which the Temple Mount has remained an open wound for 18 years. The problem is not external but rather internal, and relates to the spiritual condition of the nation. In 1967 the national foundation was strong enough to hold on to those areas we had liberated from strangers. On the other hand, the foundation of holiness is not yet complete, and the believer can draw the necessary conclusions.

In recent years the struggle for the Temple Mount in all its forms and transformations has suffered from several afflictions: the violence of a feeble-minded Goodman; the rush of yeshiva students who chose to go up

to the Temple Mount at night; the Lifta group; and recently the uncovering of plans and even preparations for what was called removing the Dome of the Rock and purifying the space on the Mount. All this, in varying degrees, shows the lack of necessary national discipline, which is the only way the people of Israel can make progress. Without unified thinking and a national consensus regarding goals, and without concerted guidance and action, no goal, even the most realistic, can be achieved, and is bound to remain beyond our reach.

The Temple Mount is a double challenge, spiritual and national. The unwillingness of the government, on the one hand, and the spiritual leadership--the Chief Rabbinate--on the other, to grapple with this subject, is the main obstacle in this regard. This unwillingness must be converted into guided expectation, and efforts must be directed in keeping with what is acceptable to the majority of the public. The public does not grasp simple answers (and for us simple and one-time solutions are not desirable), and unconventional acts by individuals. If Uri Tzvi Greenberg wrote "The mind grasps what the imagination grasps," he did not refer to conventional opinion, either when he wrote or now.

Based on the above broad outline, I propose adopting the following course of action: the Mount precedes the Temple in all that pertains to the humiliating and insulting state of the site of our glorious house, where foxes roam.

Let us remind ourselves of the current situation:

There is no expression of Jewish sovereignty on the Temple Mount. It is not recognized, in effect, as a Jewish holy place by the institutions of the state. For example, it does not appear in the list of holy places of the Ministry of Religions. There is no real possibility of identifying with it, since Jewish presence is considered a provocative violation of public order. The law of the State does not apply to the Mount, as befits a law-abiding democratic state. Neither the law of preserving the holy places, nor the law of antiquities, nor the laws and regulations of construction and supervision, etc.

The administration of the Mount, as a holy place, is reserved for the Muslim waqf, which is a Jordanian entity. This does not only affect national pride, but at the same time Jewish historical finds and archeological remains are systematically destroyed, pavement and gardening work is expanded, covering large areas of the Mount, new prayer platforms are built, and every day the status quo is eroded by a body which seeks to turn the Mount into an exclusive Muslim site.

Regretfully, the Chief Rabbinate is not dealing with clarification of and solutions to the religious questions related to the Mount. Rabbis who are attracted to the subject suffer a certain rejection, either religious or social. Even those who do not deny that the religious complexity is enormous recall the words of Tel Aviv's Chief Rabbi H.D. Halevi, that the solution belongs to the engineers more so than to the rabbis (and let us

not forget the negative example of the important rabbis who were taken via the Mount to the Wall at the end of the fighting in 1967).

The central pillar of Israeli diplomacy is the assertion that the Mount is not a barrier to peace, hence, Minister Rubinstein's words in...Japan should not surprise us. The Israeli communications minister said in Tokyo that one can reach a settlement even on Jerusalem, by taking into account the special interests of the Muslims in their holy places in the city. Rubinstein is correct in one respect: The obstacle to peace is not the settlements, but Jerusalem. Many proposals were made over the years: Arab flags in the city, a Jordanian flag over the Temple Mount, regional municipality, functional division, regulation, etc. The circle was closed. Excessive attention to the Western Wall and preventing any positive Jewish development on the Temple Mount are methods of taking the Mount away from Israel. And it is an Israeli method.

In my opinion, the Temple Mount has no real long-range significance except as the site for the future Third Temple: "In the end of days the mountain of the Lord's house will be established at the head of the mountains, and tower above the hills, and all nations shall flock to it," in the words of Isaiah. Still, I argue, the Mount precedes the Temple. The spiritual level of this generation is not ripe for the message of the Mount in all its depth and understanding. There is still a long way to go for the hearts to be ready. All we can do now, therefore, is to build holiness on a secular basis.

Our state is run according to an agreed system, with set rules. Therefore, the above mentioned problems have to be resolved within the state's framework, namely, through books of law rather than religious tracts. The idea of the "Mount precedes the Temple" can only be accomplished after Israel establishes its sovereignty over the Mount in the usual sense. Only on this secular basis can we proceed further. As sovereignty over the Mount, with all its implications, improves, we shall be able simultaneously to raise the spiritual and consensus level of the nation: in the Knesset, in the courts, at the Chief Rabbinate, as well as in the circles of the Temple and the gates of the Mount. With persuasion, lobbying, and creating public opinion, our status at the Mount will be strengthened and we shall have a strong foundation for the Temple.

The chance of success is based on the desire for orderly and authorized Jewish presence. Jewish presence, rather than the removal of the institutions of Islam, although they negate the final destiny of the Mount. Jewish presence will inevitably lead to neutralizing the waqf and doing away with its exclusive management of the Mount.

In order to promote the idea of "The Mount precedes the Temple," I propose to focus on the following objectives:

a. Establish an "authority for the administration of the Temple Mount" so that the waqf does not continue as the sole body on the Mount. In the new body Judaism will have no less rights than any other religion.

- b. Apply Israeli law fully. Those who attack Jewish sentiments will be put on trial and the attack will be stopped forthwith. This minimum action is owed us by the secular democracy and the supporters of "citizen's rights."
- c. Provide a proper expression for the Jewish character of the Temple Mount at all levels and in all forms.
- d. Engage in an information effort that will shift attention from the Wall to the Mount.
- e. Forbid "Palestinian" political activity (some may think that autonomy, if not independence, already exists on the Mount), and foil any attempt to take the Mount out of Israeli sovereignty for the sake of some future settlement.

I once wrote in NEQUDA that the foundation stone will be that rock against which the lie known as "Arab acceptance of Israel" will be dashed. Since Jerusalem is the last objective in this process, we have to make it the front-line. Therefore, only action along the lines I have mentioned can serve not just our status at the Mount, but also as a useful information weapon for the Jewish people as to the real intentions of the Arabs. Establishing Jewish facts on the Temple Mount will bring out the truth and the people will see the danger of looking for solutions. Let us not forget that Israeli sovereignty formally applies to all of Jerusalem, which apparently includes the Temple Mount. If such is the situation in annexed Jerusalem, what is in store for us in Judea and Samaria, where only "autonomy" is proposed?

When we secure the Mount politically and administratively, we shall be able to turn with great vigor to the next planning stage of the "Temple." Rabbi Kook of sainted memory said to Ge'ula Cohen in an interview immediately after the Six Day War: sovereignty, 'Amaleq, and the Temple. The Temple is the responsibility of all the people, and there is no abstaining from it. Consequently, it is our obligation to work together with the people, each at his own level at first, and raise it step by step, and in the end we will be able to continue the verse quoted from Isaiah: "Let us go up to the Mount of the Lord, to the House of the God of Jacob."

The Mount precedes the Temple.

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ISRAEL

MAJOR GENERAL YOSEF PELED PROFILED

Tel Aviv HADASHOT in Hebrew 13 Sep 85 pp 36-37

[Text] Yosi Peled wants to be a pilot. This creates a slight problem. Peled knows that he is already 44 and that in the course of his lifetime he managed to soar all the way to a height of 3 meters, in a tank turret, since this is his background. In addition to that, Peled is a major general in the IDF, heading the Training Command office. All of which means that it is too late to start a new career.

Not many in the IDF high command can say that they were officers in the Six Day War, the War of Attrition, the Yom Kippur War and the Lebanon War. This is Peled's career path. In the years after 1967 he was considered a child-wonder. Within 3 years he was promoted from first lieutenant to lieutenant colonel. At the same time he is controversial. His critics say that he is not intellectual, that there are numerous officers who surpass him easily, certainly when it comes to oral expression. But everyone admits that he is a self-made man. In the Chief of staff totem pole he is certainly a candidate for higher office than chief of the Training Command.

His parents fled Poland to Antwerp in Belgium prior to the Nazi invasion, in the fall of 1939. The father, Jacob, was a diamond cutter. The youngest boy was born in 1941. He was then called Jeffka, Jeffka Mandelewitz. Six months after he was born, his parents sensed the impending danger in Belgium. For a fee they gave away the baby and his two sisters, 10 and 12, to a Christian family in the small town of Vilreik, near Antwerp. A short time later the parents were shipped to Auschwitz. His father never returned.

He no longer recalls the name of his foster parents, but for him they were like real parents. His sisters never told him, even when he was grown up, that there were any other parents. "I grew up like a Christian boy." Now he only remembers Sunday church, the Christmas tree, Christmas presents and Santa Claus. "Before each meal we used to pray in Flemish. We then used to take a knife and make the sign of the cross over the bread." Peled skips over this quickly. Even his friends say that they have not heard much about this part of his life.

In 1945 his mother returned from Auschwitz. "It was like a meeting with a strange woman," says Peled. "It was my first contact with Judaism. The

family was willing to give up my sisters but refused to give me up. I, too, did not want to leave the people I considered to be my parents. Today I have an 8 year old boy. Sometimes I look at him and think, what would happen if he was told that another woman was his mother."

The mother came back sick from the concentration camp. Yosi and his sisters were first placed in a Jewish orphanage. Jeffka Mandelewitz had a hard time unlearning customs. He used to pray before going to sleep. Once his mother came and took him to a restaurant with a symbol of a Jewish Star. "I don't go to Jewish restaurants," he told her. At the age of 7 he came to Israel. It was 1948. His mother came 4 years later. Her brother, Yosi's uncle, took him to his home in Negba. "I never grew up with real parents, this is, perhaps, why I am so sensitive to children. To this day I cannot let a baby cry."

For 7 years he was considered a problem child. He preferred to catch birds and cook them; he used to break into the kibbutz warehouse and steal chocolate. In the fourth grade, when someone made him angry, he ignited a rag in the school cupboard and burned it. At the end of seventh grade the homeroom teacher called him in. "You cannot continue in this school," he was told. "We will have to send you to a school for problem children in Sarid." Peled remembers that he was stunned. "I then had a little hut I built on the schoolhouse roof, where I used to sleep in the summer. I went there one day and I finally understood that I had to shape up."

In November 1960 he joined the Paratroopers. "After a few days I was told I was under-weight, 49 kg." He was transferred to the Artillery unit. For someone who volunteered to be a paratrooper it seemed like the end of the world. "It took me a few months to get over it." He then went to officers school and graduated the first in his class.

Peled was then transferred to Division 9. At that time the division was notorious. Those who served in the unit were given derogatory names. One night, at midnight, Peled was called to the commander, Col Shlomo (Chich) Lahat. The commander of the May class had just been removed. "The unit does not function," he told Peled. "Of the 70 soldiers, 20 are AWOL. You are going to take over." Those who were there remember two officers -- Yosi Peled and Yosi Englander -- later Eldad, chief education officer, both of whom tried to make the Artillery Corps into a more serious outfit. Peled himself says that the unit finally managed to undertake a night operation 60 km away. When he was about to be discharged, his commander, Motke Tzipori asked him to stay on for another 6 months. Peled agreed. His kibbutz did not. "I was hurt. I offered to give them my whole salary." When they refused he removed his blanket and boots and left.

In the Six Day War Peled was with Division 7. He followed its route from Rafah to Jiradi, to al-'Arish, Rafidim, the Suez Canal. At the end of the fighting, for the first time ever, he started to think of a military career.

At the end of 1967 his unit was put along the Canal. Peled had then been a captain for 6 months. Gorodish, his commander, decided to put the area across from Isma'iliyah under his command. In 1973, when the IDF was to expel Gorodish, Peled was one of the few who maintained contact with him, in spite

of everything. His friends say that he makes no personal calculations, that he is a true friend. Talik says that Yosi Peled has always shown "integrity. He was always supportive of his friends. A rare quality."

Peled had two armored units, one tank unit and artillery. He named them "The Giv'on Unit." When his first son was born he called him Giv'on, too. After less than a year he was promoted to major. Six and a half years after enlisting he was a lieutenant colonel.

To date he considers the War of Attrition his most difficult experience. In the IDF it is the Yom Kippur War which is considered the most difficult. It is an unusual approach. On 8 July 1970, when the armistice became effective, Peled accomplished his mission. His unit occupied the northernmost section, from the Island of al-Balah to Port Sa'id. They had to go through marshes. There were days when water and food could not be brought in. Peled remembers 3 days, in the course of which casualties could not be removed. The dead had to be placed in stretchers which were hung from poles to keep the rats away. More than 50 soldiers were killed; 200 were injured. On each rotation the unit stayed on the front for 3 months and then was shipped back for 3 months of training in Bir-Tamada.

One day, when he was patrolling near Qantarrah, Peled was caught in a shelling. He then had with him MA'ARIV's military correspondent--now mayor of Herzeliyah--Eli Landau. The shelling sent them looking for cover. They found dirty posts and unshaved soldiers. "Within 6 hours," he told the commander, "I am coming back to see everything cleaned up and all soldiers clean shaven." "Are you crazy?" asked Landau when they left. "Why are you bothering?" Peled insisted. He believes that morale and the will to fight are hampered when soldiers are surrounded by filth. To date he is meticulous about discipline, although during Raful's tenure as chief of staff Peled was a harsh critic of Raful's rigid discipline of collecting empty shells. When an officer comes to a meeting with him, the secretary always whispers in his ear, reminding him to salute.

He once explained his philosophy with a known story: "A little bird landed on the road in bitter cold weather and was about to die. A passing cow deposited her "load" on the poor bird. That made the bird feel warm. It started to move and sing. Hearing the noise a fox came out and ate the bird. Conclusion: feeling warm is not necessarily a good reason to sing. And if we are sitting in the midst of it all singing, we can only pray that someone does not come to chop our heads off..Anyone who asks me if there is any danger that in the next wars against Syria we may not win gets an unequivocal answer: We shall win, but at a price. If we improve ourselves, if we become better organized, more disciplined, and if our weapons work properly, the price may be lower."

During the Yom Kippur War Peled was in the Reserves. His commander, Maj Gen Musa Peled, instructed Yosi Peled's unit to head the main thrust of the attack in the Golan Heights. From here on Yosi Peled drew attention to himself: "Everyone loses something under pressure, fear, that awful battle fatigue," Musa Peled explains. "I saw many who were brilliant in peacetime, and less

than that during war. With Yosi, whatever you see in peace time is there during war, also."

The unit was veteran, its commander, very young, 4 months on the job. The officers under him were older than he. Musa Peled remembers that they were all very highly thought of. There was a reason why they had been the best officers of the Six Day War. "Although he was younger, they accepted his command unquestioningly. They followed him with closed eyes. They had a high respect for him on the military arena."

Peled led the counterattack until Wednesday night, when the Golan Heights were retaken. When they reached Tal Juhdar, one unit encountered heavy Syrian fire. Musa Peled could not fail to notice Yosi Peled's quick reaction. "He read the situation exceptionally well. He assessed his fire power, and considered the situation from his vantage point inside the tank. He never issued a command without sensing the situation first hand. This is why his commands were always so clear and accurate. The sum total is leadership." Many believe that Peled is one of the IDF's best field commanders.

Peled did not hesitate to intervene in the debate between his commander and Raful, who was a commander of a regular unit in the Golan. Raful did not remember that very favorably later on. Years later, when Raful was appointed chief of staff, Peled did not hide his opinion on what was going on in the IDF. In private conversations he used to say that Raful was introducing the wrong norms: "He worries about collecting empty shells rather than how to conduct a war and run an army. When the day of reckoning comes, this will all surface." People close to him believe that the Lebanon War was proof how correct his criticism was.

In the late seventies Raful appointed him tank commander in the Sinai. "This was a true army," Peled recalls nostalgically. "I have never seen one of my soldiers on leave without a proper uniform." The tense relations with Raful continued. After two exercises, the chief of staff decided that things looked too good. One day he came to visit unannounced. It was 6 a.m. Raful showed up with a map. "At 11 a.m. you are to conduct a live exercise," he told Peled. He admitted that he came to find out whether the previous exercises were not just show. The test was successful. Those who participated recall that in one of the discussions, held in front of many officers, the chief of staff reprimanded Peled: "If you speak like this once more, I will demote you to a clerk." Silence fell in the room. Later Peled told his friends that during the break he told Raful that young officers might conclude from the incident that it is not a very good idea to voice their opinion.

In June 1982, when the Lebanon War broke out, Peled found himself in what is referred to as a "cross-section" position: he was deputy commander of the Institute for National Security. At night, when he came home, his son Giv'on said: "All fathers have been taken to the war and you came home..." Peled, who never enjoys sitting doing nothing, decided to go to Yanush Ben-Gal, the commander of the Eastern Front, and volunteer.

Ben-Gal decided to send him to resolve a difficult problem which came up during the battle on 'Ayn al-Tinah, southwest of the Qir'awn lake. On

Thursday, at dawn, Peled landed there in a helicopter. From here on he organized what became to be known as "Yosi's Force." The next 33 hours, until the ceasefire went into effect, Peled headed the force, which grew without any central command.

Research conducted by the Training Command singles out the activities of this force as the most brilliant of the war. These 33 hours changed Rafal's opinion, too. After the war he called Peled in and said: "Whatever has been between us was because you intervened where it was none of your business to do so. You proved to be one of the War's best commanders." Right there and then he promised him a promotion to major general.

When the battle at 'Ayn al-Tinah was over, Peled received two more battalions and an engineering unit. He moved north, along the Shabaton axis west of Qir'awn. At 8:30 a.m. he was ready for the battle on Mash'arah. In the village he was met by 11 Syrian tanks, 3 anti-tank units and 2 paratroop units. A later investigation of the Training Command assesses this battle as a rather cautious one: observation, artillery, air force. Not a blind assault. The Mash'arah battle was over in 2 hours with no casualties. The ceasefire, too, was to find Yosi with no casualties.

At 4 p.m., on the way north, he received more units and overcame a Syrian anti-tank force at the Kafariyah junction. From here on his was an independent force, directly under the command of Yanush Ben-Gal. Yanush instructed him to continue northward. "You will be the first one to arrive. You understand what I mean." He meant the point where the Beirut-Damascus road reaches the al-Biqa' Valley. The Syrians were retreating already, but occasionally there were still clashes with Syrian tanks. Peled continued moving at night. He reached the region between al-Sa'luq and Qub' Ilyas. This is the northernmost point that the IDF reached in that area. Within about 42 hours, the force moved 30 km deep into Syrian territory. The distance to the Beirut-Damascus road was 7 km.

At this point Peled received an order to retreat somewhat so as to form a straight line with other IDF forces on either side of him. There was news of a Syrian division approaching the area fast. A battle was expected by morning. The Yosi Force lined up in the village of 'Amiq in an "L" shape, one side at the foot of Jabl Barukh, along the Shabaton axis, the other along the valley.

In the morning, when the first Syrian tanks showed up, they were fired upon from the forces along the valley. The Syrians were not quite sure who was attacking them. Thus 20 to 30 tanks were hit. A little before noon, when the ceasefire was going into effect, another phase started: the first--and last--battle with T-72 tanks. At 12:01 p.m., when the fire stopped, there were 14 demolished tanks there. "If not for the ceasefire," says Peled today, "We could have destroyed half the division."

Those close to him say that after the war Peled was very critical of some of the units. Musa Peled says: "In this war Yosi faced his utmost challenge, and succeeded." From that point he could afford to be critical. He did not hide his opinion in military forums. Many, he knows, do not like him because

of his sharp tongue. He believes that it is necessary to be very critical and then go out together for coffee. But Peled--and his friends admit it, too--can sometimes create the impression of being impatient, blunt and even rude. This does not help him much. "It is impossible that a senior officer show up to a poorly conducted exercise without anybody stopping that exercise," he says. "We cannot afford to be content, lest we become mediocre."

Peled was promoted to major general 26 months ago and was appointed chief of the Training Command. When the Field Command was formed, the Training Command was no longer in charge of teaching warfare to the lower ranks. It was now in charge of teaching warfare on a more senior level and coordination between the various forces. "The Training Command does not justify a major general as its commander," says Yosi Peled. "I would have it headed by a brigadier general and I said so a year ago."

He supported the establishment of the Field Command. According to him it should bring about a reorganization of the chief of staff's office. "It is conceivable that one day, because of the Field Command, the chief of staff may come from the Navy or the Air Force. True, ours will not be the Joint Chiefs of Staff as in the United States, but the fact that a joint command deals in overall issues can bring that about. It does not worry me."

Even today his opinions are somewhat unorthodox. In his opinion the IDF has to be a smaller army because of economic considerations. The commands have to be smaller, less cumbersome. They can be reduced without endangering their efficiency, perhaps even improving it. "The Air Force is our strongest force. Therefore it should be the one least hurt." Peled is not sure that problem youths should be drafted, as they are today.

Those close to him say that the restrictions on the Training Command have frustrated him. His temperament is not suitable for the job. Even Peled would probably prefer to head a force, but he himself admits that the Training Command was an interesting period for him. For the first time he got to know the joint command from the inside and be challenged by problems he had not encountered in the past.

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ISRAEL

IDF 'DRY STORAGE' SYSTEM FOR EQUIPMENT REVIEWED

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[Article: "Anyone Taking Care of Them?"]

[Text] Not long ago there was a story in the papers about a German, who decided in 1967, after the birth of his first grandchild, to buy the child a present--a Volkswagon with a convertible roof. The happy grandfather was left with one small problem: it would take 18 years for the newborn to get his driver's license. In his great ingenuity, the grandfather took the car to a company offering "dry storage conditions." The Volkswagon was put into a kind of huge "plastic bag," in which the air had been dried.

Recently the same grandson reached age 18 and came along with his grandfather to the storerooms of the company to receive his car. When the plastic cover was removed from the car, the young driver sat at the wheel, turned the key, doubtingly, and lightly pressed the gas pedal. The roar of the motor echoed in the air. Another light press on the pedal and the car started moving toward the door of the storeroom.

The same youth today drives a 1967 model Volkswagon, but it is in effect a totally new car, which did not age despite its advanced years.

This story demonstrates the application of dry storage in the civilian sector. This article deals with uses and military aspects of the system, but the principle is the same: storage in optimum humidity conditions. In the IDF, in recent years, the dry storage method has replaced the traditional storage methods for armoured battle vehicles, which was continuous treatment in units for emergency storage [UES]. Routine maintenance of such equipment at UES requires many personnel, at a high professional level, because the various systems combined in this equipment are many and complex.

Take for example the tank: in order to continue functioning as it should, it requires mechanics to examine the motorized systems, electricians to check the turret mechanisms, equipment specialists to examine the optic mechanisms, weapons, their ammunition, technicians from the signal corps, etc.

The personnel available to UES, prior to introduction of the dry storage method, barely came to 60% of that required to carry out standard maintenance.

Amortization from Wear

In addition, maintenance of tools in UES at full readiness was dependent upon very frequent treatments for repair, improvement, and maintenance. Every 2 weeks a simple inspection was carried out by the equipment team, which lasted 40 minutes; every month an examination was made by professionals which took an hour and a half; every 4 months, an in-depth inspection, including a test course, taking 2 weeks (about 40 working hours); and every 6 years--Treatment "Gimel", which was even more thorough. About 10 engine hours per year per tank were used for these inspections. The cost per engine-hour of a tank is \$600.

If we perform the right calculations, we reach an amount of millions of dollars per year spent just on engine hours for purposes of inspection. Also the equipment parked under the roofs of the UES's was very available to officers, and rather than most of it remaining in storage in UES units and units practicing with a small amount of equipment, wide use was being made of all the equipment. In the case of armoured combat vehicles, amortization as a result of wear during maneuvers was great and the cost of parts sky high.

The UES collapsed under the burden, principally due to the deficit in personnel resources and financing. During the Yom Kippur War hundreds of pieces of equipment were found to have problems at critical moments. A large portion of them did not make it to the battlefield.

If you park your personal car in a garage for a few months in order to save gasoline expenses, it is reasonable to assume you will not save money, but rather will waste it. The logic is simple: the chances that the car will remain in operating condition are small and the repairs it will require will cost you more than the gasoline you save.

The same is true of tanks, armoured personnel carriers and all other war materiel: if they stand unused, without being inspected and repaired regularly, they will fall into disrepair. This is the principal reason for the Yom Kippur breakdowns; the UES's did not have the personnel and means to deal with the thousands of pieces of equipment they had stored. The equipment stood untouched. Serious danger could arise that if the situation continued or worsened, the UES's would become graveyards of steel or junkyards.

The idea of dry storage, which came up in 1967 immediately after the Six Day War, really took off after the Yom Kippur War. In 1974 a team was sent to investigate how foreign armies deal with the matter. In 1975 the first experiments commenced, with a scope of tens of pieces of equipment. Since then, the system has been applied more and more, and the war in Lebanon gave the project an additional push. Today a large portion of the IDF's armoured battle vehicles are in dry storage.

A Cover for Each Tank

What is the system based on? Research pointed to three principal reasons for the wear and destruction of equipment:

1. Unsuitable humidity level in air. Humidity can cause corrosion (oxidation of metals), especially rust. Humidity also causes electric power losses. On the other hand, exaggerated dryness also is undesirable: It causes some materials such as rubber to disintegrate.

2. Ultraviolet radiation is destructive, principally to plastics.

3. Dust. Particles penetrate and stick to composite materials causing wear and sticking.

A system preventing breakdowns by neutralizing these three factors together, mitigates the need for repairs, or at least a good portion of them. The IDF Research and Development people checked tens of methods, most of them based on various types of coverings.

Finally, the "personal cover" system was adopted. The Bureau Head in the Ordnance Corps, Colonel A: "Every piece of equipment, be it a tank, an armoured personnel carrier, a DC-9 tractor, or a piece of artillery, has a cover envelope made of insulating material which almost hermetically seals it. Underneath the cover is an electric air-dryer, which automatically is activated the moment the air humidity under the cover rises above the desired level. The covered equipment is not parked in garages because the coverings are durable against rain, wind, and sun." The dry storage method completely neutralizes the equipment against the three destructive factors.

A few details about the covers: the cover is comprised of 2 parts, the lower and the upper. The lower part is spread beneath the piece of equipment, and the upper part is "dressed" on it, and the 2 parts are connected to each other by a zipper. The weight of the entire cover is 120 kg. Since the covered war equipment abounds with various protrusions and parts which stick out, such as antennae, artillery barrels, machine guns and so forth, the cover is liable to be torn by them. As soon as a hole is created in the cover, there is no point in continuing storage, since the equipment is no longer insulated and humidity conditions change. Therefore, prior to wrapping the equipment in the principal cover it is covered with an absorbent inner cover which creates a "rounding" effect and prevents the tearing of the cover by the sharp protrusions.

The PVC outer cover does an excellent job of insulating the equipment, but is not totally hermetic. Some air penetration occurs which is taken into account and the drying device also is intended to dry the air which penetrates to the optimal level of 40 percent humidity.

Warming Equipment

Dry storage is not only executed under covers. Hermetically sealed storerooms which employ a central drying mechanism are used. This system is used by the IDF for storing small replacement parts. But when dealing with thousands of tanks, armoured personnel carriers, mechanical and engineering equipment, and so forth, the storeroom method is impractical, at least for the IDF, due to the tremendously expensive building costs involved.

The method of storage in covers, on the other hand, is extremely cheap. All the equipment is produced in Israel: the covers are made by Nimoplast and Arkhidotex and the dryer is produced by Amqor. The required base is simple: preparation of ramparts of styrofoam, and on them special wooden platforms placed as bases on which the equipment sits. The cost of preparation of these bases is \$40,000 per piece of equipment. Cost of the cover, with the addition of the drying equipment, is another \$4,000.

This is a relatively small expense, because every such cover wears out only about once in 7 years, and at present is saving hundreds of thousands of dollars.

The savings the IDF records show as a result of use of dry storage are much higher. Most of the tasks which were placed on the shoulders of the UES staff were eliminated. All they have to do is warm the equipment when its storage comes to an end. Each month each UES takes a few pieces of equipment that have been in storage for several years and puts them through the same treatment routine that in the past was performed every 4 months.

"Gimel" treatment, previously carried out every 6 years, is now performed every 8 years. At the end of treatment, the equipment is placed in dry storage again for 2-5 years. Equipment already in its "sleeping bag" no longer requires any routine maintenance and required personnel is negligible: one man per UES, whose job it is to guard to be sure that none of the covers loosens and to perform routine battery charges. Today, instead of several tens of people per UES, there is one third the previous number of staff.

The Covers Method

Use of dry storage in the IDF has spread beyond large equipment. Today, smaller equipment is also stored under covers, such as battle jeeps, ammunition, missiles, ambulances, generators, important replacement parts such as tank artillery barrels.

Objects are put into dry storage when completely prepared for us. Tank engines, for example, are placed in their entirety including the screws, so that they can be immediately assembled: they are removed from dry storage, thrown into the tank, and that is it. Since this equipment is not large, each piece does not require a separate cover, but rather group storage is carried out in "caves" that are arched, made of PVC covers that are stretched. The length of each such cave is 15 meters and width 3 meters. Electric driers operate in the caves.

A problem the Ordnance Corps has met when it came to store arms in "caves" was the inability to count them daily as required by army regulations. Accordingly, an alternative system was found: the weapons are stored in a transparent plastic structure and thus can be counted as required.

The dry storage solution is amazing in its simplicity but this ideal formula has within it not a small amount of danger and thus it has met great

skepticism. Those against it claim that theoretically it is perfect, but there is no practical possibility of leaving an instrument like a tank, with all its sophisticated systems, for 2 years without touching it and then expect it to come out in working shape. Since we are talking about weapons being in a state of readiness for war, the opponents of dry storage claimed, chances must not be taken.

Despite the opposition, the Ordnance Corps has gradually been introducing the system. The fears were not realized. It became clear that if tools are properly prepared from the start, filled with fuel, and good oil, with careful mounting of all component systems, and they are examined prior to being placed into the dry storage, the probability of breakdowns or failures is quite small. The armoured battle vehicle is placed under cover when ready for war: all the equipment, ammunition, and even battle rations are already inside. All that remains for the staff to do, when the order is given, is to remove the cover (this is an action which takes 7 minutes), get in with their personal weapons, and turn the starter key.

The war in Lebanon proved beyond a doubt the efficiency of the system. The readiness of the equipment was not affected: tanks and armoured personnel carriers were "thawed" and sent quickly northward. Officers stated that they had never received such clean, organized equipment in such good shape. The traumas of the UES in the Yom Kippur War were erased.

Colonel A. says: Equipment failures in the war were only 1.5 percent of all the equipment thawed. This is a negligible percentage. We overcame all the disfunctions within an hour or an hour and a half. Examination revealed that all the problems stemmed from errors in preparation of the equipment prior to placement in storage and not from a problem which occurred while in storage. Therefore, the Ordnance Corps now makes sure that not everyone is permitted to store, but only professionals trained to a superior level in the profession, who have acquired at least 3 years' experience in the profession, are graduates of an examiner's course and have passed a test certifying them in dry storage.

The dry storage method in the IDF is used primarily for war equipment for the ground forces. Colonel A. says: "There is no law which says that this system cannot be employed for the navy or air force. With the exception of human beings, everything can be put into dry storage." But for the air force and navy the problem is much more difficult than for the land forces. The principal sea and air weapons--missile boats and planes--have many mechanisms much larger and more sophisticated than those in a tank or armoured personnel carrier. The possibility, for example, of taking a 15-meter long missile carrier and putting it in dry storage, sounds illogical. The Navy Commander General Ben-Shoshan, said recently that grounding a missile boat is not possible, since storing it means, in effect, neutralizing it, as its many sophisticated systems require almost daily intensive care.

Another aspect is that of quantity: if a tank or 10 tanks are broken, it is possible to fight without them. But if 10 planes or missile boats are neutralized, we are in trouble. As to the readiness problem, the air force and navy of the IDF have not placed missile carriers in dry storage, but other countries' air forces and navies, who can allow themselves a looser state of readiness in some of their planes and missile carriers, have also placed such equipment in dry storage. In the U.S. army for example, the system for helicopter dry storage is almost identical to that used by the IDF for tanks.

ISRAEL

BRIEFS

DRUZE DEMAND LOCAL GOVERNMENTAL OFFICE--The Druze in the Golan are demanding the establishment of a permanent office for the aide to the prime minister's director general for Druze affairs which would deal with their continuing problems. The Druze, among whom are those who oppose the Golan law, believe that there is a need for a permanent governmental representative in the area in order to solve the problems, particularly those of a civil and budgetary nature, which are not currently being handled. The Druze maintain that since the appointment of the prime minister's director general, Avraham Tamir, as the official responsible for Druze affairs in the Golan, he has been in the area only once and his representative, who was appointed a few months previously, Avi Kafir, has not visited the region. In response to this, Avi Kafir told our reporter that he is treating the Druze in the Golan as full citizens of Israel and, just as there is no governmental representative in the cities in Israel, there is no need for an Israeli representative to stay in the Golan for any fixed period of time because this is not occupied territory. According to him, he deals with Druze concerns as a part of his broader responsibility as an adviser for Arab affairs in the office of Minister Weizmann. Israeli elements in the Golan claim, in contrast to this, that despite the new appointment, negligence on the Druze issue in the Golan continues and one of its results has been the establishment of a sabotage network and escalation in attacks against Israel. Israeli elements in the Golan are initiating meetings with local Druze officials in order to explain to them the grave implications for Jewish-Druze relations if these hostile actions against the Israeli authorities continue. Druze officials in the Golan expressed satisfaction at the uncovering of the sabotage network which has removed, for their part, suspicion from the entire community. They added that it was a small group, while the majority of Druze obey the law, even if they do not openly identify with the State of Israel. [Text] [Tel Aviv 'AL HAMISHMAR in Hebrew 3 Sep 85 p 15] /9599

CSO: 4423/47

KUWAIT

BRIEF

KFAND LOAN TO PAKISTAN--Kuwait, 14 Nov. (WAKH)--The Kuwait Fund for Arab Economic Development (KFAND) Thursday extended a KD six million loan to Pakistan to help finance a railway modernization project. Execution of the project commencing this year and involving a current programme for replacement and improvement of old diesel locomotives together with the necessary spare-parts, is expected to be completed by the end of June 1986 at an estimate total cost of KD 48.18 million of which 12.4 percent will be covered by the fund. The loan agreement was signed today by Minister of Finance and Economy of Kuwait and KFAND Board Chairman Jasir al-Kharafi and the ambassador of Pakistan on behalf of his government. [Text] [Moname WAKH in English 14 Nov GMT 14 Nov 85 GP]

/12929

CSO: 4400/41

LEBANON

LEBANESE FORCES TAKE OVER PHALANGIST PAPERS

Forces Seize AL-'AMAL

NC241019 (Clandestine) Voice of the Mountain in Arabic to Lebanon 1000 GMT
24 Oct 85

[Text] AFP reports that the Phalangist forces (Lebanese Forces) last night seized the offices of AL-'AMAL newspaper, the mouthpiece of the Phalangist party, and banned its publication until further notice. The Lebanese Forces detained the newspaper director, Joseph Abu Khalid, and took him to an unknown destination.

Forces Ban LE REVEIL

NC291048 (Clandestine) Voice of the Mountain in Arabic to Lebanon 1000 GMT
29 Oct 85

[Text] Serious political disputes among the various factions in the eastern areas are being translated into practical activities. While the Phalangist Party has resorted to publishing the AL-'AMAL newspaper in the form of a four-page leaflet, the Phalangist Forces stormed the offices of LE REVEIL newspaper today and suspended its publication. It is known that this paper is privately owned by President Amin al-Jumayyil.

It is worth remembering that the Phalangist Forces suspended the publication of AL-'AMAL newspaper a few days ago and placed its editor in chief, Joseph Abu Khalil, under house arrest.

The measures coincide with the Phalangist Forces' construction of a roadblock in the Al-Salumi area today to search cars and to check pedestrians' identities. According to reports, additional roadblocks set up by the Phalangist Forces have appeared in other locations in the eastern area.

Two Editions of AL-'AMAL Published

NC311043 (Clandestine) Voice of the Mountain in Arabic to Lebanon 1000 GMT
31 Oct 85

[Text] The Phalangist AL-'AMAL newspaper appeared today in two different editions: The first was published by the Phalangist [Lebanese] Forces and

consisted of eight pages, while second four-page version was published by the Phalangist Party. AFP reported that the Phalangist party version republished the four articles that aroused the anger of the forces by accusing them of monopolizing representation of the country's Christians. The "From the Day's Harvest" corner, which was previously written by Joseph Abu Khalil, who is still under house arrest, discussed the reappearance of AL-'AMAL, rejecting the notion that the paper should serve any longer as the state's mouthpiece.

AL-'AMAL Reappears

NC310741 Beirut Domestic Service in Arabic 0530 GMT 31 Oct 85

[Excerpts] The AL-'AMAL newspaper has reappeared this morning after its publication had been suspended for several days. Meanwhile, the paper's former chief editor remains under house arrest in Ballunah.

It should be recalled that the Lebanese Forces have appointed Saj'an al-Gazzi as the new chief editor of the newspaper.

In its first issue today, the paper published reports about wide-scale support for the actions of the Lebanese Forces. The paper also highlighted Elie Hubayqah's activities under a banner headline.

AL-'AMAL Chief Editor Released

NC010722 Beirut Domestic Service in Arabic 0530 GMT 1 Nov 85

[Excerpts] While the Phalangist Party was meeting under Dr Elie Karamah yesterday and making as yet undisclosed decisions, the Lebanese Forces terminated their order placing Joseph Abu Khalil, former chief editor of the AL-'AMAL newspaper, under house arrest. Sources from the Lebanese Forces said that Abu Khalil has regained his freedom and that his private telephone line, which was cut a week ago, has been restored.

Phalangist Party sources said that tension exists between the party and the Lebanese Forces. Both groups have placed their members on alert in the Al-Jummayzah area, particularly after an RPG was fired at the AL-'AMAL offices and a bomb went off in the offices of the AL-JUMHURIYAH newspaper yesterday.

It has been reported that gunmen have diverted traffic in the Al-Sayfi area and set up roadblocks there. It is believed that the Lebanese Forces, which oppose the Phalangist Party leaders, are seeking to take control of the main party headquarters in Al-Sayfi. Reports indicate that they have demanded that the building be evacuated and handed over in the next few hours.

/12913

CSO: 4400/34

OMAN

BRIEFS

REFINERY EXPANSION AGREEMENT--Petroleum and Minerals Minister Sa'id Ahmad Al-Shanfari has signed an agreement with the Japanese Mitsui Company to increase the capacity of the oil refinery at al-Fahl Port from 50,000 to 80,000 barrels per day. The Japanese company, which built the refinery, will make alterations to it, according to the agreement. This will take 22 months at a cost of \$18.9 million. [Summary] [Muscat 'UMAN in Arabic 8 Nov 85 p 1 GF]

OIL REFINERY AGREEMENT--Muscat, 15 Nov (QNA)--The Omani Ministry of Petroleum and Minerals today signed an agreement with the Japanese Company Mitsui to establish oil refinery units to increase production from 50,000 to 80,000 barrels per day. The agreement, which must be implemented within 18 months, is worth \$18.9 million. [Excerpt] [Doha QNA in Arabic 1200 GMT 15 Nov 85 GF]

/12929

CSO: 4400/47

PALESTINIAN AFFAIRS

AL-MUSAWWAR REPORTS PLO-EGYPTIAN DIALOGUE

PM171946 Cairo AL-MUSAWWAR in Arabic 15 Nov 85 pp 14-18, 60-61

[Dialogue attended on the Palestinian side by PLO Executive Committee Chairman Yasir 'Arafat, also identified by his nom de guerre Abu'Ammar; Fatah Central Committee Member Salah Khalaf, also identified by his nom de guerre Abu Iyad; Fatah Central Committee Member Hayil 'Abd al-Hamid, identified by his nom de guerre Abu al-Hawl; PNC Member Sa'id Kamal; PNC Member and 'Arafat's Political Adviser Dr Nabil Sha'ath; PLO representative in Cairo Zuhdi al-Qadrah; Revolutionary Council Member Tayyib 'Abd al-Rahman; and PLO Official Spokesman Ahmad 'Abd al-Rahman; and on the Egyptian side by Presidential Office Director for Political Affairs and Foreign Ministry First Under Secretary Dr Usamah al-Baz; intellectual Dr Yahya al-Jamal; Political Science Professor Dr Sa'd al-Din Ibrahim; NPUG Representative Muhammad Sayyid Ahmad; and Socialist Labor Party Representative 'Abd al-Qadir Shuhayb. AL-MUSAWWAR was represented by Salwa Abu Sa'dah, Yusuf al-Qa'id, Muhammad al-Shakill, 'Abd al-Khayr, Sulayman 'Abd al-'Azim, Badawi Shahin, and Sayyid Zaki -- in Cairo: date not given]

[Excerpts] [AL-MUSAWWAR:] Brother Abu 'Ammar: Let us begin by saying that one of the achievements of your visit to Cairo is what you have called the "Cairo Declaration." We, however, were surprised by the U.S. and Western Reactions, which included the following question: How capable is 'Arafat of controlling his factions and implementing that declaration? He promised to do that before but it never happened.

The second question which concerns us as Egyptians and Arabs is this: What is the difference between military action and violence and terrorism? This matter has been very confusing and we feel that we need an explanation in order to be able to distinguish between military action and terrorism.

[Abu 'Ammar:] How capable is 'Arafat of controlling the PLO factions? I think that is a strange question and I answer it with a question. How capable was President Reagan, leader of a superpower, of controlling the man who opened fire on him, and how capable was President Kennedy of controlling the man who assassinated him? I am talking about the superpower which has reached the moon and sent space ships to the solar system. Alex 'Awdah, the Palestinian American who was an official of an American committee headed by former Senator James Abu Riqq, was assassinated last week. A Jewish group assassinated

'Awdah with a hand grenade, wounding five Americans in the process, but nobody was arrested. Nobody has said anything from the time of Kennedy's assassination to the time of the attempt on President Reagan. The talk about the capability of 'Arafat, who has no homeland, no police force, no prisons, and no state security investigation, is unacceptable. When 'Arafat is in his own homeland and has his own state then it becomes everyone's right to question him about capabilities but nobody should question the revolution about its ability to control the Palestinians.

[AL-MUSAWWAR:] When can an act be described as revolutionary and when can it be described as an act of terrorism?

[Abu 'Ammar:] I do not want to dwell on such details because I do not want to fall into the clutches of the Western media octopus. I believe that my work and the work of my brother strugglers is legitimate under UN laws, resolutions, and Charter as long as we are facing Zionist colonialism.

[AL-MUSAWWAR:] Is that legitimacy not linked to any particular place or time, say to the occupied territory or anywhere else?

[Abu 'Ammar:] We struggle against Israeli occupation on Palestinian territory but you cannot overlook the fact that PLO Paris Representative Al-Hamshari was killed by the Mossad. The Israeli Mossad also killed 69 Algerian, Moroccan, and Tunisian strugglers who had worked with the Palestinian revolution in Europe. Their latest victim was Isma'il Darwish, brother of Nabil Darwish who works for Monte Carlo radio. They assassinated him in Rome. Furthermore, what can you say about the Israeli raid on the PLO headquarters in Hammam el-Shatt? If we had aircraft we would have retaliated with a raid but I have no aircraft and therefore I retaliate with my limited means in the occupied territory, but we must not forget that [Israeli Defense Minister] Rabin and [Israeli Prime Minister] Peres have declared that there is no immunity for any PLO office anywhere in the world. Is that not a violation of the law? We have an office at the United Nations. Does he have no immunity? We have an information office in Washington and an embassy in Moscow. Do they have no immunity? I cannot provide the answer to that. The answer should come from the world public opinion but regrettably it has not been given.

[AL-MUSAWWAR:] Abu 'Ammar, in the Cairo Declaration you committed yourself to struggle in the occupied territory.

[Abu 'Ammar:] Yes but I also requested a commitment from others. I called on the international community and the world public opinion to commit Israel to do the same thing.

[Abu Iyad:] I fully agree with Abu 'Ammar.

[Sha'ath:] The declaration did not mention the word violence even once. It discussed terrorism. Violence is a matter open to interpretation because there is violence in every armed action. That is why the declaration only spoke of a clearly defined about terrorism. The targets of terrorism are

given as innocent and unarmed people. There are mossad agents who may be unarmed at this moment, but they are by no means innocent. I believe the declaration is quite clear and does not confuse matters.

[Muhammad Sayyid Ahmad:] The Cairo Declaration is specifically a Palestinian public commitment which enables Egypt to defend the PLO on the question of negotiations and eliminates the old excuses for opposing such negotiations. Is there some kind of Egyptian commitment in this connection in return for the declaration?

[AL-MUSAWWAR:] We would like to add the following question to that of Muhammad Sayyid Ahmad: Despite the changes in the Arab and Western worlds, does Cairo still adhere to its firm stand that the PLO is a main partner without whom there can be no settlement under an international umbrella or in any other way?

[Al-Baz:] Of course, we do not think about anything happening outside the international umbrella. There is complete agreement between us and the Palestinian revolution and Jordan that negotiations should be held within a real international conference with the effective participation of all parties. The use of the word umbrella distorts the meaning of an international conference. Some Americans call for international support, that is direct negotiations outside the framework of an international conference but with international support. We, the PLO, Jordan, and, I believe, all the Arab sides interested in joining the peace process, are committed. If Syria chooses to join the peace process we will have the same commitment with it. The commitment is to an essential precondition, which is that the PLO should participate directly, effectively, and equally with the other parties. In other words the PLO's role is not less important, not even by one iota, than the other parties. On the contrary, we know that the PLO is the main party to be addressed and the PLO cause is the main cause. We all have causes but there are priorities and degrees in this matter. The PLO comes first while all of us have auxiliary and supporting roles.

To answer Muhammad Sayyid Ahmad's question, yes, in return for that Palestinian commitment there is an Egyptian commitment to support the PLO in such a settlement.

[AL-MUSAWWAR:] I will not say that we are now faced with a new situation but Dr Al-Baz has shed more light on the Egyptian position. He says that an international conference should not simply be an umbrella but the only real place in which and through which negotiations should be held. In other words, what is required of an international conference is not mere guarantees or approval of negotiations held outside its framework.

[Al-Baz:] We only conceive of negotiations inside the conference. There will be no negotiations before the conference is held. Contacts may be held to pave the way for the conference and to convince certain parties of certain attitudes, in other words contacts to agree on proceedings and the legal framework. Will it be the same legal framework as the Geneva conference or will it be a new legal framework? All these points could be covered in

contacts between now and such a time when the conference is held. The conference itself, however, must be a conference in the full meaning of the word. Negotiations should be held in it, not outside it. As in any other conference, lateral contacts may be held. There is nothing against that, and the decisions do not necessarily have to be made inside the conference hall. They could be made outside it once the conference is held and its framework and participants identified. That is the main basis of negotiations. Subcommittees may be formed and contacts easily held inside the conference. Everything, however, must be under the conference umbrella and within the framework, not outside it.

[AL-MUSAWWAR:] After its recent attitude Cairo was perhaps very indignant following the statements made by some Palestinian leaders belittling, at the least, the role played by Egypt in connection with the Italian ship incident and subsequent events. Can we say that your talks with President Mubarak ended all that estrangement, if that is the right word, which occurred between Cairo and certain Palestinian leaders as a result of the statements made after the hijacking of the Egyptian airliner? Did the meeting with President Mubarak end that estrangement and what guarantee is there that such estrangement would not recur, particularly since we know that there were many occasions when the Palestinian leadership had to speak with various leaders. Important as they are, how could Egyptian-Palestinian relations reach anything in the future?

[Abu 'Ammar:] Will brother Abu Iyad please answer that?

[AL-MUSAWWAR:] We also ask Abu Iyad if there was a session of personal remonstrance between you and President Mubarak?

[Abu Iyad:] The president's words were not as heavy as yours. What I want to say is that we must stick to the essence, which is Egyptian-Palestinian relations, which are historic relations greater than and above casual estrangement and statements. Some Egyptian attitudes and some Palestinian attitudes are sometimes misunderstood. That is a result of distance and lack of contact. Addressing one another through the press and the media is not the same as doing it through direct contact. The first certainly produces mistakes and some distortion. I want to say that recently I felt that there is unprecedented Egyptian-Palestinian cooperation, especially in connection with the problem of the Italian liner. It reached a point where I appealed in my own voice to the Italian ship to go to Egypt so that the matter could be resolved peacefully. After that how could any Palestinian leader hate Egypt? How could that be? I believe that my statements were largely distorted. The point is that communication should be through contact and not through the media. If rebuke was my intention I would have raised the many insulting words which appeared in the Egyptian press and which I condemned. Before this visit I read painful and severe words and if I had taken them into consideration I would not be among you now and I would have issued the visit. We have surmounted these things because Egyptian-Palestinian relations are much greater than these peripheral matters.

[AL-MUSAWWAR:] We see all the Palestinian leaders here on this visit except [PLO Political Department Chief] Faruq Qaddumi. Why did he not come?

[Abu 'Ammar:] He was at the United Nations and now he is on a visit to the OOR and will be joining us for a meeting of the Palestinian leadership soon then he will return to the United Nations because 29 November is the day of solidarity with the Palestinian people.

[Al-MUSAWWAR:] Do you consider good relations between Egypt and the United States to be in the interest of the Palestinian cause or against it?

[Abu 'Ammar:] I will not answer that question.

[Abu Iyad:] I will answer it. Good relations between Egypt and the United States are in the interest of the cause, but that superpower is tackling the Palestinian question with Israeli logic and it has adopted the Israeli positions regardless of whether they are right or wrong. It is the United States which is trying to ignore the many things which the Palestinian revolution and the PLO have offered in order to deal with it, including the Jordanian-Palestinian agreement. Quite frankly, one of the aims of that agreement was to address the United States as a major power and as a superpower. However, that superpower with all its means and satellites is still ignorant about the Palestinian cause, does not know the truth about the Arab people, and does not know the meaning of the Palestinian people's right to their homeland and to self-determination.

[Al-MUSAWWAR:] When a crisis occurred in U.S.-Egyptian relations as a result of the complications of the Achille Lauro incident and the hijacking of the Egyptian civilian airliner, how did the Palestinians view the Egyptian stand?

[Abu Iyad:] It was a good stand.

[Al-MUSAWWAR:] Do you not take into political consideration the fact that Egypt has a peace treaty with Israel? The point, brother Yasir, is that Egypt does not believe that Camp David can abolish Egypt's pan-Arab role or stand in the way of its adopting nationalist stands. My precise question is why approach Egypt now? Why are you effecting a reconciliation with Egypt at this particular time?

[Abu 'Ammar:] What do you mean? Let me say that this is a big question and you are forcing me to talk frankly, but I do not want to dig up the past. You are trying to open old wounds.

[Al-MUSAWWAR:] We are talking peace.

[Abu 'Ammar:] And I am happy about that, but you act from the position of the luxury enjoyed by the press while I act from a position of responsibility. That is why I cannot talk about certain things, because by talking about this matter we would be opening old wounds and would therefore achieve nothing.

[Abu Iyad:] Regarding the question why Egypt does not make peace with Israel, I raised a few issues in days before the 29th. These issues were of great importance since the boycott began. When the boycott began the question arose in our

winds: How can we arrive at a common view with Egypt? Many people were of the opinion that the Egyptian stance against Egypt's return to the Arab and the Arabs' return to Egypt. From time to time we supported the boycott did not mean it as a punishment. Their thinking was about the idea of how could the Egyptian role be quickly revised because the essence of the Egyptian role had meant the absence of a real factor which can activate many things in the Arab world. The truth is that if we want to change the meeting on the basis of who was right we would never be able to. We should not ask who was right. Egypt had its own circumstances, regardless of whether they were real or not. even in the opinion of some Egyptians who rejected Camp David in official documents, Camp David was a great step forward in what was "possible" in circumstances where war was inevitable. However, to not ask me as a Palestinian to support an agreement that was not possible but which did not give me my rights.

For years we have been asking ourselves: Should we remain the victims of Camp David and stay away from Egypt or should we overcome our differences over it -- be it right or wrong -- and proceed to human practical matters. Now, when the president of Egypt declares that the PLO is the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people, that, in my view, is a victory for the Palestinian cause. Perhaps Camp David was surpassed and meant to separate Egypt from the Arab. To Arab leaders it was said we were isolated and kept away from Egypt. Now, we are back to Egypt and established contact with it. I am sure that through contact we can find a way and a joint solution in the interest of the Arab nation. It is not for me to say who was right because in certain circumstances the Egyptian position might have been right from a certain viewpoint, but to me as a Palestinian it perhaps was not right, and vice versa.

AL-MUHAMMAD: What is the nature of Palestinian commitment to Jordan in the coming phase, not only in Jordan's commitment to the Palestinians?

AL-MUHAMMAD: The Jordanian commitment is what we agreed upon.

AL-MUHAMMAD: What other role Jordan has in the Jordanian-Palestinian relationship?

AL-MUHAMMAD: The Jordanian role is not representation of the Arab summit -- PLO's position about Jordan was very atmosphere. That was in the air of the Jordanian leaders. They were there but Syria's aim is to try to keep Jordan away from the PLO. That is the Jordanian aim but Jordanian-Palestinian relations are far above to be affected by the meeting. That is all to say that the Syrians will continue to try to drive a wedge between Jordan and the PLO.

AL-MUHAMMAD: Speaker of Jordanian-Palestinian relations, are there any joint agreement or joint work between you and the United Nations about accepting direct negotiations within the framework of an international conference?

AL-MUHAMMAD: Usually I do not discuss that with me. It is for me to tell you about it and you discuss it with him.

[AL-MUSAWWAR:] We do not all believe that he contradicted the Jordanian-Palestinian agreement. What he said was that he agrees to direct negotiations within the framework of an international conference.

[Abu 'Amr:] The Jordanian-Palestinian agreement stipulates that any dialogue should be through an international conference attended by the Security Council member states.

[AL-MUSAWWAR:] Did your recent talks with him not end in agreement that Jordan would not take any unilateral steps without the Palestinians?

[Abu 'Amr:] Of course.

[AL-MUSAWWAR:] In your talks with King Husayn did you sense a continuation of Jordan's commitment?

[Abu 'Amr:] Yes, that is what he told me officially.

[AL-MUSAWWAR:] Is the Palestinian presence in Jordan in accordance with an agreement, or what?

[Abu 'Amr:] We are present there in very limited administrative forms -- only the PNC presidency and the Palestinian National Fund. As regards the military forces, they were there before. They are the Badr forces, which remained there and did not leave when we did.

[Muhammad Sayid Ahmad:] On the question of international relations, in less than a week a major international conference will be held between Reagan and Gorbachev. Surely one idea will be that the United States should not monopolize the region. It insists on excluding the Middle East even when it talks about regional issues. The NEW YORK TIMES has reported that Egypt and Jordan have asked the Soviet Union to consider the question of restoring relations with Israel. What are the views on this matter -- not necessarily that there should be prior recognition but that the issue be used as a negotiating card?

[Al-Haq:] That is not true. We have not contacted the Soviet Union at all on this matter and we did not ask anything of it in this connection.

[Abu 'Amr:] As far as we are concerned this matter is still under discussion between us and them. We have only heard from them what was said in the Warsaw Declaration issued by the Warsaw Pact leaders, which was magnificent in its commitment to the Palestinian people and rights and to the PLO as its sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people, and also to an independent Palestinian state. Therefore, I consider anything else said to be media fabrication. So far our Soviet allies and friends have said nothing about this matter. What I want to say is that the attempts by Syria and some Arab communist parties which are compelled to go along with Syria because their headquarters are there contributed to a distortion of the PLO image. But now we and our Soviet friends have managed to restore warmth to our relations.

[Al-Haq:]
[Abu 'Amr:]

PALESTINIAN AFFAIRS

PLO RADIO COMMENTS ON JORDANIAN-SYRIAN RAPPROCHEMENT

JN142051 Baghdad Voice of PLO in Arabic 1703 GMT 14 Nov 85

[Station Commentary]

[Text] Brothers, some people insist on affirming their conviction that the improvement in relations between Jordan and Syria will undoubtedly be at the expense of the PLO and that consequently the PLO fears this improvement and the Jordanian-Syrian rapprochement. Let us be objective in assessing the reasons for this belief by saying that it is unfounded [words indistinct]. Moreover, there are various reasons for this belief which are principally dependent on the nature of the opportunistic and excuse-seeking policy of most Arab leaders. However, all this does not give the impression that this belief is simple or that it will ultimately prove to be correct.

In fact, the matter is not related to the desire, actions, or intentions of the Syrian or Jordanian sides. It is related to the nature of the overall current Arab situation and the inter-Arab relations of the two sides and most importantly to the PLO's stand on [words indistinct] the subject. The PLO's stand is more than clear in this regard since the PLO has been exerting its utmost to remove Arab differences, or at least contain them and has been calling for restoring inter-Arab relations to normal. It has even been calling on the Arab countries to show more amity and understanding and embark on joint action to build a unified Arab stand to serve the nation's various fateful issues, foremost of which is the Palestine question, and confront the current challenges and the escalating U.S.-Israeli arrogance at this stage against the entire Arab nation.

Undoubtedly, the PLO, which clearly realizes the nature of its relationship with Jordan and the nature of the special historical relations between the Jordanian and Palestinian peoples, realizes that these relations cannot be bargained with in the market of political settlements. More importantly, the PLO, with its extensive experience and its sincere endeavors to achieve sound inter-Arab relations, is not prepared to deal with convulsive reactions to the improvement of brotherly relations between any two Arab countries. The PLO has actually overcome the phase of dealing with convulsive reactions in its relations with Arab countries. The PLO is confident of its power, which principally stems from the Palestinian people's support for and comprehensive rallying around the PLO, and of its ability to always place its relations

with the Arab countries in the right context. Moreover, the PLO realizes that it is too strong for the fate of its relations to be dictated by this or that Arab side's unilateral desire or specific conditions to settle certain differences between any two Arab sides.

There may be differences in opinion regarding a specific course in inter-Arab relations and the solution of differences that should these relations. However, as far as the PLO is concerned, this will always be an incentive for it to bolster its relations with the Arab countries as long as these relations continue to be based on mutual respect for viewpoints and equal concern for these relations. Very briefly and clearly, we say that we give our blessing to this Jordanian-Syrian rapprochement and call for further progress in this regard. We are absolutely not displeased with this rapprochement because, as we have previously affirmed, we are confident of our ability and strength and of the nature of our relations. We are not in anyone's pocket to be presented as a price and offering for the sake of settling differences. We will never be this. We will not need to always explain the reasons because since the PLO succeeded in strongly anchoring its right to represent the Palestinian people it has no longer been just a figure in the calculations of some parties. Moreover, since the PLO entrenched the reality of the difficult Palestinian figure and the impossibility of overstepping it, similar to the Arab world, or attempting its representation of the Palestinian people, it has become a difficult figure to liquidate, to be bargained with, or to control for the sake of securing the policy of this or that Arab country. This gives the PLO more confidence in its ability and more strength such that it will always affirm that it is not in anyone's pocket to be bargained with.

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220: 4400/47

PALESTINIAN AFFAIRS

'ARAFAT ON CAIRO DECLARATION, EGYPT, ISRAEL

GE171914 London AL-MAJALIS in Arabic 16 Nov 81, pp 21, 22

[Interview with PLO leader 'Arafat, alias Abu 'Ammar, by AL-MAJALIS correspondent Yustafa al-Bakri "During 'Arafat's recent visit to Cairo" -- (date not given)]

[Text] [AL-MAJALIS:] At the beginning, we are anxious for more information explaining your point of view on the Cairo declaration, which you made not very long ago. What about this declaration? What do you want from it?

['Arafat:] The Cairo declaration is the PLO's stand; it defines the method of armed struggle in the occupied territories, where Israel is occupying the Arab Palestinian lands. This is the Palestinian revolution's stand. We have never at any time supported acts of terrorism. We condemn terrorism because we are the first to suffer from it inside and outside the occupied territories.

[AL-MAJALIS:] Abu 'Ammar, do you not agree with me that the Zionist-imperialist campaign has intensified all over the world? This campaign brands you as terrorists at a time when you, the revolution, are suffering from wars resulting from terrorism.

['Arafat:] The media are controlled by the Zionist enemy. This campaign describes the PLO as terrorists. They believe that struggle against those who occupied our land and made our people homeless is terrorism.

[AL-MAJALIS:] Then you are still committed to armed struggle against the Zionist enemy?

['Arafat:] Yes. Our struggle is legitimate, so long as our Arab Palestinian people are suffering from the wars of occupation. The UN Charter supports the right of oppressed people to resist occupation by all means.

[AL-MAJALIS:] But imperialist forces still do not believe that this declaration can control the situation outside occupied Palestine.

['Arafat:] About 60 percent of the Palestinian people are living outside the occupied territories. The PLO is the only party to represent those who are

inside and outside these territories. No party can control the situation as required. However, the PLO is against terrorism. Its stand is that it has not used terrorism, nor will it use it. It is only practicing its legitimate right of liberating the occupied territories and resisting occupation forces.

[AL-MAJALIS:] What about Zionist terrorism? It is ever-increasing and is now being directed "against you," particularly after the aggression against the PLO headquarters in Tunis and the attempt to assassinate you there.

[Arafat:] As I have said more than once, our people are suffering from Zionist occupation, persistent oppression and terrorism, and the expulsion of their representatives from the occupied territories. Therefore, I call on the world community to make united efforts in order to stop this terrorism, which is threatening the future of world peace and which undermines all peace opportunities in the region. I believe that the PLO is an important factor in fighting terrorism and in controlling things. Imagine what happened after our forces left Lebanon. The PLO's practices and its principled stand have shown all people that we are against terrorism, with all its forms and types. This helped us in evacuating a great number of civilians, including Americans, from Lebanon when they asked us to. Yet there are so many people who still ignore this stand.

[AL-MAJALIS:] Abu 'Ammar, your recent visit to Cairo gave a new dimension to Palestinian-Egyptian relations and pushed these relations forward. What about these relations?

[Arafat:] The Egyptian-Palestinian relations are strategic and accidental developments do not affect these relations. We agree with Egypt that any future negotiations should be conducted through an international conference in which all the concerned parties will participate, stemming from the basis of the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people. We have formed an Egyptian-Palestinian committee to coordinate our stands.

[AL-MAJALIS:] But what about the partially dissimilar positions toward the hijacking of the Egyptian plane?

[Arafat:] Egypt and the PLO played a big role in ending the crisis of the Italian ship, but the United States, which was supposed to thank the two parties for this marvelous humanitarian deed, hijacked the Egyptian civilian plane and forced it to land in one of the NATO airports and began to launch an expanded campaign against the PLO. A short while after declaring that the PLO has the right to try the hijackers of the ship, Reagan retreated from this declaration, because it would mean recognition of the PLO.

[AL-MAJALIS:] What about Egypt's return to the Arab arena? You have previously announced support for this return. What is your position now? For you expect Egypt to return to the Arab arena?

[Arafat:] Yes, the PLO had previously demanded action for the return of Egypt to its Arab nation. We had also opposed the transfer of popular institutions from Egypt. Therefore, we stress the need for Egypt's immediate

return to the Arab arena. We also call on the Arabs to shoulder their responsibility toward the Camp David accords. This problem should not be the problem of Egypt alone.

[AL-MAJALIS:] What about the rebellion which tried to influence and harm the national Palestinian unity for the benefit of those who are trying to cancel the Palestinian figure from the equation?

[Arafat:] All Palestinian people are rallying around the PLO. The national Palestinian unity is currently being crystallized inside and outside occupied Palestine, in all the organizations of the Palestinian revolution and in the PLO which is considered to be the sole and legitimate framework gathering the Palestinian people despite political differences with some parties.

[AL-MAJALIS:] Hence, what is your view on Peres' proposals?

[Arafat:] Any solutions that ignore the PLO and the rights of the Palestinian people are rejected. Peres' proposals ignore all these rights. We should not forget that Peres pursues a terrorist policy inside and outside the occupied territories. We should not forget the chasing by the Mossad of the strugglers even outside the occupied territories and the martyrdom of many strugglers, such as Issa'il Farhat in Rome and Abu Dia' in France, and many others.

[AL-MAJALIS:] What about the Jordanian-Palestinian agreement, especially after the events the Palestinian revolution has witnessed recently?

[Arafat:] The Jordanian-Palestinian agreement will remain. There is no loophole between us and Jordan. The joint Jordanian-Palestinian move was approved by the PNC in its 14th session. The PNC stressed the distinguished relationship with Jordan. We agreed with the Jordanian side to move forward with the slogan of land in return for peace, but the Israeli and U.S. sides announced their rejection of the principles of this move, a matter which shows the facts of the U.S.-Israeli role which harbors hostility toward the rights of the Palestinian people and the PLO.

[AL-MAJALIS:] What about the Soviet-Palestinian relations at present?

[Arafat:] Soviet-Palestinian relations are good and developing. We consider the Soviet Union as a natural ally of the Palestinian revolution. There are continuous contacts between us and them.

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200: 1400/47

PALESTINIAN AFFAIRS

'ARAFAT INTERVIEWED ON RECENT ISSUES

London AL-DUSTUR in Arabic 28 Oct 85 pp 13-14

[Interview with Yas 'Arafat by 'Abd-al-Wahhab al-Qaysi: "I Call upon the Dissidents To Turn over a New Leaf"; date not specified]

[Text] Conversations with Abu 'Ammar need to be updated from time to time. This interview reexamines a number of crucial issues in light of sudden givens that have already come or will come to light in the Arab and Palestinian situation within the next few days, or indeed a few hours. AL-DUSTUR met with the PLO leader in Baghdad where he revealed for the first time that the PLO headquarters will remain in Tunis and that the hurricane will not hit the Palestinians this time, but will sweep away American interests in this region, adding that this is not a threat but a prophecy and that he called upon the dissidents through AL-DUSTUR to turn over a new leaf.

[Question] What happens after the aggression on Tunis and what is the strategy for the next phase? Will the PLO change its policy? Will it transfer its headquarters? And what is the future of the Jordanian-Palestinian accord in the shadow of current events?

[Answer] We regard the aggression against Tunis aimed at our headquarters and on Yasser Arafat not as an ordinary military operation but as an American-Israeli operation to assassinate the Palestinian leadership and out of the signatories of the Jordanian-Palestinian accord, or, more specifically, to finish off Yasser Arafat at a time when his branch and President Hafez Assad were discussing with American President Ronald Reagan peace initiatives, initiating the Jordanian-Palestinian accord which got the Arabs' backing at the London summit. The aim behind the aggression, then, or the basis of the American failure to give an answer, America engaged in laying an ambush to the Jordanian-Palestinian initiative to establish a joint and comprehensive peace in the region, hence the attempt to get rid of this accord by assassinating one of its signatories. It cannot be claimed under any circumstances that the American administration did not know about it. It had a certain knowledge of all the details and it gave American support this aggression. On the 1st of this month, David Hoff admitted that Israel had informed the American administration of its intention to remove Arafat on Saturday against the 30 and its leader Yasser Arafat. American collaboration has been established, as far as we are concerned, by the presence of American

[Question] What are your comments on the murder of U.S. citizens Leon [Klinghoffer] and Alex 'Awdah and on the disparate American positions on these murders?

[Answer] This is a very important point. First of all, we condemn the assassination of U.S. citizen Leon. However, I ask the American people, and specifically President Reagan, why he offered a several-million-dollar reward for any information about the identity of the Italian ship hijackers while he overlooked and forgot about the murder of Alex 'Awdah, a Palestinian-born U.S. citizen, who was killed by a hand grenade in the United States. This reveals without a doubt America's ugly and loathsome racist face. I accuse the Reagan government openly of prejudice, noting that both victims were U.S. citizens. Why did Reagan fail to post a quarter of a million-dollar reward for the arrest of Alex 'Awdah's murderer? Is it because he was of Palestinian extraction? Is it because Reagan himself was an accessory to this murder? These events are a new lesson for the Arab nation. I say: "O Arabs, I have not received any promises from Reagan. Reagan made promises to you but he reneged on these promises." He reneged on all the promises he made to the Arab leaders. I ask the Arab leaders to adopt a firm position. I also salute the Egyptian Pharmacists Union's decision to boycott American pharmaceutical products. It was a great decision and I hope other Arab unions will follow suit.

[He added, smiling] It is not necessary to smoke American filter cigarettes. We can smoke home-made cigarettes as our fathers and grandfathers did.

They do not want a just peace. What they want is capitulation, but they are in for a long wait because they will not find a single Palestinian willing to bow to the American and Zionist will.

[Question] You mentioned that contacts have been made with some Palestinian sides. What exactly are they required to do?

[Answer] I have invited them not to assess the Jordanian-Palestinian accord, but rather to reassess Jordanian-Palestinian endeavors, not the accord.

[Question] Following the operation to transport Falasha Jews via Sudan during Numayri's regime, there were news reports about an airlift between Moscow and Tel-Aviv to transport Soviet Jews. What can you tell us about that and what are your comments in this regard?

[Answer] I do not think this is true because we would at least have heard about it. Our relations with our friends, the Soviets, are strong and firm. Therefore, such a thing could not have happened without our knowledge and that of other Arab countries who maintain special relations with the Soviets.

[Question] You have said that the next 2 months will witness serious events. Can you talk about such events or about what you consider possible expectations?

[Answer] The hurricane has passed over us and we have become used to storms and hurricanes. Our life has been a series of storms and hurricanes and the

same hurricane will not hit us this time. It will sweep away American interests in the region. This is not a threat but a prophecy.

[Question] America and Israel label the Palestinians and Arabs who defend their rights as insane, as terrorists and saboteurs. They recently accused the Egyptian fighter, soldier Sulayman 'Abd-al-Hamid, who killed seven Zionists, of insanity. What are your comments on the incident and the accusation?

[Answer] This is the beginning of the Arab hurricane. The heroic action by the Egyptian fighter was an act of reprisal and honor. Those Zionists who were on Egyptian soil tried to spit on the Egyptian flag, claiming that it was Israeli soil. The Egyptian hero who killed them was one of the students who had witnessed the tragedy of the Israeli raid on Bahr al-Baqr School. This noble soldier had witnessed how the Zionists killed his young innocent brothers when the Israeli planes fired their missiles on the school during the late President 'Abd-al-Nasir's regime. The village of the Egyptian soldier has decided to build a monument to this fighter, and a monument to this Egyptian hero, Sulayman 'Abd-al-Hamid, has been erected in our hearts as well as in the heart of every Arab.

As for the current turbulence in the Egyptian street, it is a reaction to immoral American and Israeli acts against Egypt and the PLO and to the inexcusable treatment President Husni Mubarak received. I say that the first signs of the Arab hurricane which will soon hit America and Israel can be seen all over the Arab world. I noticed this developing hurricane for the first time during my recent visit to Sudan. It was the first time that the various Sudanese political parties gathered in Martyrs Square in support of Palestine and the PLO and its legitimate leadership. When I stepped up to the podium, I saw waves of people, estimated at 400,000 Sudanese citizens, lining the streets farther than the eye could see. I was filled with joy and delight. The Arab hurricane will include the entire Arab world. I salute the Arab people of Sudan and say that the Arab fire is still under ashes but will flare up some day, the bad Arab times in which we are living notwithstanding. The Arab volcano, which erupted in Beirut and the Arab Gulf all the way to Morocco, will continue. The raid on the PLO headquarters, like the one against the Iraqi reactor in June 1982, was not directed at the PLO alone or Tunis alone, although Tunis is a friend of the United States. This aggression is a violation of Tunisian sovereignty. It is an aggression directed at the Arab nation from the Gulf to the ocean. They failed, even though we lost some of our fighters, and so did three subsequent raids by Israeli airplanes in an attempt to penetrate Iraqi borders.

[Question] Will Palestinian armed struggle be stepped up in the wake of the Hammam al-Shat massacre?

[Answer] Resistance will continue and intensify. A decision has been made to step up all means of struggle, including armed resistance, and Israel has acknowledged this development. What our people in the occupied territory are doing is a vehement uprising which is the beginning of more things to come. International law and the UN charter uphold the right of

any people to use any means to resist occupation. We are bound to international law in letter and spirit and to the UN charter provisions which have been acknowledged by the peoples of the world. We are neither saboteurs nor terrorists. We are fighters fighting to regain our occupied homeland. The terrorist charge is part of an American-Israeli conspiracy in which America and Israel have shown their ugly faces as enemies of the Arab nation. Nonetheless, we are ready to talk with all democratic forces, including the ones in Israel. This is a decision adopted by the PNC in all things related to the PLO. President Reagan should remember that the Arab volcano no doubt is on the way and that the Arabs are as patient as their camels and when the camel's patience runs out, it will pounce on its prey with force and vengeance.

[Question] How do you assess the international position following the raid on the PLO headquarters?

[Answer] I have received over 10,000 cables and telexes from all parts of the world, all condemning and denouncing the American and Israeli stance. Some friendly organizations have placed themselves at our disposal and I thank them very much. At the same time, however, I deeply regret Damascus' decision to receive Elie Hubayqah, Israel's ally and the Sabra and Shatila butcher. I challenge Hubayqah and his allies to stop Palestinian operations against Israel. And to Hafiz al-Asad who decided in "Camp Murphy" to guarantee Israel's so-called security, I say: "Birds of a feather flock together."

[Question] How many times has Yasir 'Arafat been subjected to attempts on his life by Syria, Libya, and Israel?

[Answer] (In a Palestinian accent) I have stopped counting. Attempts are still being made to assassinate me. I have asked the American administration through the various media if it was still planning to assassinate Yasir 'Arafat. The American administration has not replied to my question. It is planning to hijack my airplane.

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PALESTINIAN AFFAIRS

PLO DISSIDENTS EXPLAIN VIEWS ON 'ARAFAT

PM141607 [Editorial Report] Rome LA REPUBBLICA in Italian 12 November 1985 carries on page 11 a Guido Barendson Damascus dispatch totalling 2,000 words and consisting of an introduction to the breakaway Palestinian groups now based in Syria and interviews with Fatah leader Abu Musa, Popular Front leader Abu 'Ali Mustafa, and Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine leader Nayif Hawatimah.

Abu Musa is quoted as saying that "Arafat's practices are in fact very similar to Al-Sadat's when he wanted to make peace with Israel" and that "Husayn has tried to gain from 'Arafat authorization to represent our rights in order to destroy our cause."

According to Mustafa, "Husayn is seeking an understanding with Israel that has Reagan's blessing. He has set himself three objectives: The most satisfactory for him would be granted Gaza and the West Bank; then, in decreasing order of preference, to gain the administrative autonomy envisaged by the Camp David accords; or, at the very least, to salvage his regime in Jordan." He adds that "Arafat cannot gain anything in any of these three cases: To exchange territory for peace means destroying the Palestinian resistance." Questioned about the warrant issued in Italy for the arrest of Abu Al-Abbas, Mustafa says: "The crazy hijacking of the 'Achille Lauro' was an act directed against the Palestinian people, more than against the Italians. So Al-'Abbas must be judged by the Palestinians."

According to Hawatimah, "all the principal Palestinian resistance forces are struggling for unity on the basis of a policy line that will guarantee the Palestinian people's right to an independent state and representation, to avoid this representation from being delegated to Husayn and to guarantee the introduction of democratic reforms within the context of the PLO's institutions." Asked about the future of the PLO leadership, Hawatimah says: "There must no longer be a single chairman. Instead there must be a collective leadership composed of five or six people who will jointly make all the political, military, and financial decisions. This command will be composed of representatives of Fatah, the Democratic Front, Habbash's Popular Front, Al-Sai'qah, and perhaps one or two independents."

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CSO: 4400/47

PALESTINIAN AFFAIRS

PARIS PAPER VIEWS PLO ROLE ON WEST BANK

PM141631 Paris LE MONDE in French 13 Nov 85 pp 1, 6

[Jean-Pierre Langellier dispatch: "West Bank Loyal to Mr 'Arafat, But..."]

[Text] Jerusalem--The PLO, or how to get rid of it--seen from Nabulus or Bethlehem this Israeli diplomatic challenge seems very bold. The Jewish state can curse Yasir 'Arafat and his friends day after day, but the "internal Palestinians" refuse to go along with it. Excommunication does not necessarily win people over. And the loud statements made in Jerusalem excluding the PLO from any process seem to get lost in the desert of Judea. Out of fear, calculation, or conviction, none of the "men who count" on the West Bank or in Gaza is now prepared to "drop" the PLO for direct negotiations with Shimon Peres. What is more, the few officials who have given allegiance to Syria, like former Nabulus Mayor Bassam al-Shak'ah, are clearly even less prepared to negotiate with Jerusalem.

In his municipal office opposite the Church of the Nativity, Bethlehem's Christian Mayor Ilyas Frayj constantly tells his many passing guests that time is running out, that it is working against the Arabs in the occupied territories. "The countdown nearing its end," he told us. "There will soon be nothing to negotiate. Israel is continuing its policy of creeping annexation and fait accompli. The Jewish state already owns or controls more than half the land on the West Bank. There are now 52,000 colonists. How many will there be in future? What if the Soviet Jews arrive en masse? The colonists are brandishing the threat of civil war if there is any territorial compromise. The government is containing them, but for how long? Where are we heading? Where are we heading?"

Mr Frayj, who has long been openly in favor of a political association with Jordan, is rightly regarded as the most "moderate" -- or most realistic, if you like -- of the West Bank local government officials. He is the only influential elected representative spared by the wave of repression between 1980 and 1982 in which most of his nationalist colleagues were sacked or expelled, and he has often criticized the PLO's strategy, which he regards as too rigid, and its methods, which he regards as too violent. The series of misfortunes and sudden drop in prestige suffered during this "Black October" by the Palestinian federation have been grist to his mill. He is franker than any other official in the territories, and he expects the PLO to change, and change quickly.

"I have said it more than once to Arab officials," he continued. "The PLO leaders must openly state what they admit in private -- that Israel is a reality and that it is necessary to adapt to that, that it is impossible to destroy one of the world's 10 leading military powers. They must unequivocally accept (UN) Resolutions 242 and 338!"

Ilyas Frayj thinks that the PLO's recent setbacks are disastrous.

[Langellier] What about the Larnaca attack and the hijacking of the "Achille Lauro"?

[Frayj] They are crimes.

[Langellier] What about the cancellation of the London meeting?

[Frayj] That was a blunder which ruined years of efforts in which I participated by meeting with Geoffrey Howe. And meanwhile Israel has deported Palestinians, who are innocent until proven guilty, without trial. That is not really likely to calm things down. Yes, the PLO leaders must do something. They are underestimating the suffering of the population in the territories."

And yet neither the feeling of urgency he has nor the grievances expressed against the PLO prompt Ilyas Frayj to disown it. The mayor of Bethlehem, who is a practical man, observes that the federation, despite its mistakes, still has legitimacy in the eyes of the "internal Palestinians." "Of course," he said, "people here wonder about its weaknesses. But the vast majority of inhabitants identify with it."

The results of this is that, if it is to be effective and credible, any local political initiative must be "backed" by the PLO. "It alone," Mr Frayj notes, "can choose possible candidates for a Jordanian-Palestinian delegation with a view to negotiating. For my part, I would only view such participation favorably if the PLO clearly asked me to do so. It would not be enough for it to give its 'go-ahead.' I would need an explicit mandate." What the mayor of Bethlehem does not say is that his reputation as a conservative official, who is not very sensitive to the virtues of the Palestinian "revolution," makes him an unlikely messenger for the PLO.

It is presumptuous to try to paint too accurate a picture of the political scene in the occupied territories. However, it is estimated that roughly two out of three inhabitants on the West Bank now support the "loyalist" faction in the PLO and its leader Yasir 'Arafat. The remaining one-third is divided at the two extremes between those loyal to the Hashemite kingdom and those who support the left-wing opposition (Fatah dissidents, PFLP, DFLP). The majority of "internal Palestinians" recognize the PLO leadership's right to speak on their behalf. In their view 'Arafat is still "Mr Palestine." "If one day we must accept a compromise on our historic rights at the end of negotiation," Raduan Abu 'Ayyash, chief editor of the PALESTINIAN PRESS SERVICE, the Palestinian agency in Jerusalem, says, "Arafat alone will have enough authority to convince us that this solution is justified."

Such a balance of forces, on the Palestinian side -- where the PLO still has control -- rules out anything but the distant future, the emergence in the occupied territories of an alternative nationalist team which is respected enough to dare to stand up to Yasser 'Arafat's' omnipotence. Whether you replace the East or welcome it, no Israeli fear or machine, working to undermine the PLO, is in a position to place any rival team out of obscurity for the time being.

Moreover, the Jewish state is hardly paying for its past mistakes. By dint of methodically fighting all those who supported the nationalist movement to varying degrees, especially in Likud's column, and by dint of allowing local elected representatives, who were asked or expected for their sympathies with the PLO, Israel undermined the authority of men or women who, when the time came, could have neutralized the Palestinian Organization, or at least counterbalanced it. The "bird cove" is no longer threatened.

A New Generation

This does not mean that the Palestinian movement in the occupied territories cannot be changed at all. At this time, when the Labor-dominated Israeli Government is expressing a desire to change things by allowing the use of "authentic" and "realistic" local leaders, whom it is unwilling to face over whom the local authorities have been ousted, some circumstances are emerging which could quickly come to the fore. In Nabulus, for instance. In the heart of this city, the most densely populated city on the West Bank -- 150,000 inhabitants -- a white stone building houses the Chamber of Commerce. Since the ousting of Mr al-Shak'at in 1969, gradually weakened by and isolated by his unwavering alignment with Israel, the city's new "strong man" Tahir al-Masri is now in charge.

This technician, heir to the most powerful clan in Nabulus, and situated at the American University in Beirut, could at the end of it be the prototype of a new generation of pragmatic and local Palestinians. His sober and direct realism contrasts with both the feverish rhetoric of campus militants and the rather bewildered placidness of the older officials. Is he pro-Jordanian? Yes. How could he fail to be when Tahir, his nephew, is foreign minister in Amman, and Hikmat, himself, is deputy speaker of the Senate? But he does not really like labels, and he expressed his respect for the PLO.

What is his aim? To lift the West Bank out of the depression into which it was recently plunged by the economic crisis in the occupying country. To achieve this he is taking some risks. Tahir al-Masri, the promoter of the project to reopen an Arab bank in Nabulus -- which is now coming up against some Jordanian reservations -- stated in a matter-of-fact tone: "The Chamber of Commerce is prepared to take immediate control of the City Hall for 1 year." It will do that alone or in association with Basil and Sa'id Yan'an, the leaders of another clan, who were late in declaring their candidacy. Mr al-Masri, former deputy mayor, has handed "his" municipal list to the military governor. The ball is now in Israel's court.

The scope of these half-secret, half-public negotiations is much wider than the framework of Nabulus. If the PLO government, with Amman's silent

blessing, success is in installing a pro-Jordanian and popular municipal team, even if it is only temporary. In the West Bank's main city, the maneuver could serve as a precedent and make a dent in the PLO's omnipotence. The latter has crumpled the danger. For a few days the "loyalist" Arab press in Jerusalem has been warning against the dangers while the "father of compromise" is creating for "national unity." And Faruq Badameh himself has just announced that "the Palestinian resistance will fight against negotiations." This is a matter which is worth following.

Nonetheless there is a precedent which gives rise to skepticism. Last July 29 prominent figures in the territories -- including Mr Faysal, Mr al-Murri, and Hashad al-Shawwa, former mayor of Gaza -- announced the formation of a new party. Its mission was to fully support the plan for a Jordanian-Palestinian confederation drawn up by King Hussein and Yasser 'Arafat. This party, which is clearly pro-Jordanian, proposed to "revive" the administrative and economic infrastructure which existed before the occupation -- thus undermining the PLO's role -- and, among other rather clumsy requests which did not really confirm to the federation's line, demanded "an end to the politicization of the universities."

The PLO immediately stifled this party, which was too obviously inspired by Amman and was, moreover, undermined by some internal disagreements. Not only does the Palestinian organization still have a position of strength on the West Bank and in Gaza, but it is anxious to preserve its virtual monopoly by neutralizing any rivalry, if possible. Jerusalem and Amman will have to take account of this.

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CSO: 4400/47

PALESTINIAN AFFAIRS

BRIEFS

COMMITMENT TO PNC RESOLUTIONS--Tunis, 17 Nov (QNA)--Fatah Central Committee member Khalid al-Hasan has affirmed that the Palestinian leadership at this stage is acting in complete harmony and coordination to confront the fierce attack aimed at undermining the PLO by all means, [word indistinct]. In a statement to QNA correspondent in Tunis he said that the members of the Fatah Central Committee and the PLO Executive Committee are committed to the constant grounds adopted by the PNC, including the rejection of the UN Resolution No 242. Unless this resolution deals with the cause of the Palestinian people as an issue on self-determination-Hasan reiterated the PLO's position toward the peace efforts aimed settling the Palestinian issue on the basis of Israel's withdrawal from all territories occupied in 1967, including Jerusalem, and negotiations within the context of an international conference to be attended by all concerned countries, to establish a Palestinian state in confederation with Jordan. He affirmed that these constant grounds constitute the basis of the Jordanian-Palestinian agreement and that any other explanation of the PLO position toward the cause of the people it is representing is merely false claims on advocating the cause. [Text] [Doha QNA in Arabic 1400 GMT 17 Nov 85 GF]

PLO NEAR BANKRUPTCY--PLO Executive Committee member Jamal al-Surani said that the PLO is on the verge of bankruptcy because certain Arab nations have failed to honor their pledge. Al-Surani said that the PLO spends \$250 million a year while its income from a 5 percent tax levied on Palestinian workers is no more than \$30 million. He added: "Our expenses go up year after year due to the increase in the number of martyrs." [Text] [Kuwait AL-QABAS in Arabic 14 Oct 85 p 1] 12502/7687

CSO: 4404/55

QATAR

EXPORTS INCREASE TO NEW ZEALAND

Doha WEEKLY GULF TIMES in English 7, 8 Nov 85 p 24

[Text]

NEW Zealand's exports to Qatar for 1984 totalled QR5,770,000 — mainly meat and dairy products, while imports from Qatar for the same period came to QR1,158,000, respectively a drop and an increase over 1983.

Biggest single earner for New Zealand in Qatar was boned beef (QR1,892,918 — down even so from its 1981-82 peak of QR3,220,646). The second-largest single earner, lamb carcasses has been steadily increasing to take a QR1,733,920 share of 1983-84 figures.

Meat made up QR3,736,732 of the export total. Dairy products came second (QR1,047,076) — largest earner here being butter. At

QR461,444 it was nevertheless well down on the 1982-83 total of QR1,292,414.

Overall, New Zealand lost seven export sectors over 1982-83 including supply of fish (QR39,632 previously), perfume materials, artificial resins and plastics, and cork and wood products. It gained four sectors, including electrical machinery and appliances, and footwear.

Only two sectors showed rises over the previous year. Apparel and accessories jumped from QR4,794 to QR162,516. Metal products rose from QR25,546 to QR34,926. The biggest losses were both recorded in the two main earning sectors, meat and dairy products.

Imports to New Zealand from Qatar rose from QR364,000 in 1983 to QR1,158,000 last year.

/8309

CSO: 4400/49

SAUDI ARABIA

BRIEFS

PETROCHEMICALS REVENUE--'Abd al-'Aziz al-Zamil, minister of industry and electricity, stated that the kingdom's revenues from the export of basic petrochemical products in the past 10 months totaled 2 billion riyals. He said this constitutes 70 percent of production; the remaining 30 percent is marketed locally. He said the kingdom's production is good and is marketed in a good way. In a press statement following the opening in al-Khubar last night of the second exhibition of chemical, petrochemical, and plastics industries, al-Zamil said that the kingdom endeavors to cooperate technically with big companies in chemical and petrochemical industries, because such cooperation contributes to the growth and development of Saudi industries and increases Saudi experience in this field. He affirmed that at present the kingdom is proceeding in stable and ambitious steps. This was seen by the large number of Saudi factories participating in the national industries' exhibitions. He noted that the effect of industry on Saudi economy has become obvious, as the number of national factories reached 2,000 factories and wholesale sales are more than 21 billion riyals. [Text] [Riyadh Television Service in Arabic 1800 GMT 4 Nov 85 GF] /8918

CSO: 4400/33

UNITED ARAB EMIRATES

BRIEFS

BLACKLIST UPDATE--Manama, 15 Oct (WAKH)--Israel boycott office in Dubayy issued a number of decrees blacklisting 22 foreign companies and lifting the ban on 3 big companies, in addition to a number of other companies. The office also blacklisted and lifted the ban on 17 ships. The following companies were blacklisted by the office. American companies J.A.N. Corporation and its branches, Zamelo International, Emerald Trading, and Armstrong Machines, British companies International Electronics Group Ltd, its branches, and its mother company, which is Primer P.L.S. and (Raymond Sharmock AERO Limited). A partial ban was imposed on the British company Blackson Crowley and Partners. Other companies that were put on the blacklist are: Belgian companies Rixford International Inc. and its branches, Belgian (Axtic) computers N.F. and the Belgian (Athod) Insurance Company and agencies, in addition to three Spanish companies, two Indian companies, French company (Cousu D'enfant), and FRG, Cypriot, and Spanish companies. The Israel Boycott Office also issued a decree lifting the ban on a number of big companies: Ford Motors and its branch companies, the German Bayer Company and its branches; and the U.S. Colgate Palmolive Company and its branch companies, in addition to Indian, New Zealand, and Tunisian companies. [Summary] [Manama WAKH in Arabic 1445 GMT 15 Oct 85 GF] /8918

NEW FOREIGN MINISTRY OFFICIAL--Abu Dhabi, 16 Oct (QNA)--UAE President Shaykh Zayid ibn Sultan al Nuhayyan issued a federal decree today appointing Shaykh Hamdan ibn Zayid Foreign Ministry under secretary. Shaykh Hamdan ibn Zayid earned a bachelor degree in law and economics from the UAE university last year. [Summary] [Doha QNA in Arabic 0950 GMT 16 Oct 85 GF] /8918

LABOR LAW VIOLATORS ARRESTED--The search campaign organized yesterday by the Directorate of Labor Inspection at the Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs in coordination with the police of the capital resulted in the arrest of 162 workers who violated labor and immigration laws. [Excerpt] [AL-Shariqah AL-KHALIJ in Arabic 30 Oct 85 p 1 GF] /8918

INFILTRATORS ARRESTED--The Dubayy police have captured 5 Iranian infiltrators. [Excerpt] [Dubayy AL-BAYAN in Arabic 28 Oct 85 p 1 GF] /8918

JOINT COOPERATION COMMITTEES--(WAM)--The UAE has established joint committees with 20 Arab, Islamic and other countries since the formation of the federation in 1971, a report issued by the Foreign Ministry shows. The report, prepared

by the Economic and International Cooperation Department of the Ministry, said the committees were established to strengthen the UAE's economic, political, technical and educational cooperation with those countries. In 1974, seven such committees were set up with Sudan, Pakistan, Gabon, Tanzania, Tunis, France and India, the report said. It added that four other joint committees with the Democratic Republic of Yemen, the United Kingdom, Senegal and Malaysia were established in 1975. Three joint committees were set up in 1976. These were with Austria, Greece and Iran. Other joint committees were established with Iraq in 1977, Japan in 1978, Bangladesh in 1979, Finland in 1982, Algeria in 1983 and Turkey in 1984. [Text] [Dubayy Khaleej TIMES in English 19 Oct 85 p 3 GF] /8918

INFILTRATORS APPREHENDED--The 'Ajman Police have arrested 14 Iranian infiltrates trying to reach the country via 'Ajman shores. [Excerpt] [AL-Shariqah AL-KHALIJ in Arabic 17 Oct 85 p 1 GF] /8918

AIDS FUNDS ALLOCATED--Al-Shariqah, 26 Oct (WAKH)--Shaykh Khalifah ibn Zayid, Abu Dhabi heir apparent and deputy supreme commander of the UAE Armed Forces, has donated 10 million dirhams, or about \$2.7 million, to measures to ward off AIDS and to face any situations resulting from any possible AIDS cases. [Excerpt] [Manama WAKH in Arabic 0925 GMT 26 Oct 85 GF] /8918

CABINET APPROVES DRAFT BUDGET--The UAE Cabinet today approved the draft budget for 1985. The budget general expenses amount to 16,633,700,000 dirhams, while the budget revenues amount to 12,977,000,000. The deficit amounts to 3,636,700,000 dirhams. [Summary] [Abu Dhabi Domestic Service in Arabic 0930 GMT 28 Oct 85 GF] /8918

CSO: 4400/33

PEOPLE'S DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF YEMEN

BRIEFS

ECONOMIC-TECHNICAL PACT WITH USSR--An agreement on economic and technical cooperation between our country and the Soviet Union was signed today at the Ministry of Finance. The agreement was signed for Yemen by brother Jum'an ibn Sa'ad, deputy minister of finance, and for the Soviet Union by Comrade (Peoter Jerov), trade representative of the USSR Ministry of Foreign Trade. [Text] [Aden Domestic Service in Arabic 1630 GMT 7 Nov 85 GF]

PROTOCOL OFFICIAL DIES--The cabinet secretariat announced the death of 'and al-Salam Ahmad Farid, chief of protocol at the cabinet secretariat, who died in the USSR on 7 November following an injury in a tragic accident, which took place in the PDRY on 23 October. [Summary] [Aden Domestic Service in Arabic 1230 GMT 9 Nov 85 GF]

LOAN TO EXPAND PORT--Brother 'Ali Nasir Muhammad, secretary general of the YSP Central Committee and chairman of the Supreme People's Council Presidium, issued a decree of the Supreme People's Council Presidium ratifying the loan to our country by the Kuwait Arab Economic Development Fund to develop and expand the Port of Aden. [Excerpt] [Aden Domestic Service in Arabic 1500 GMT 22 Oct 85 GF]

/12929

CSO: 4400/48

YEMEN ARAB REPUBLIC

BRIEFS

YAR-FRENCH PROTOCOL SIGNED--A YAR-French protocol for financial cooperation was signed in Paris today. According to the Protocol, the French government will lend 130 million francs to finance cable and wireless communications projects. This will be followed by another loan of 110 million francs in 1987 designed to develop the communications network in the YAR. The protocol also states that France will contribute 110 million francs to finance electrical installation projects, land survey projects, and Health Ministry projects. The French Government agreed to reduce the rate of interest on the loans to our country from 3 percent to 2.76 percent as received by other developing countries. [Excerpt] [Sanaa Domestic Service in Arabic 1830 GMT 15 Nov 85 GF]

INTERIOR MINISTRY REORGANIZED--Brother Colonel 'Ali 'Abdallah Salih, president of the republic, commander in chief of the armed forces, and secretary general of the General people's Congress, today approved Law No 28 for 1985 on the reorganization of the Ministry of Interior. [Summary] [Sanaa Domestic Service in Arabic 1830 GMT 6 nov 85 GF]

EARTHQUAKE LOAN APPROVED--During its regular meeting today under 'Abd al-Aziz 'Abd al-Ghani, prime minister and member of the standing committee, the cabinet approved a loan agreement to set up an earthquake monitoring unit to cover the entire republic to reduce the dangers of earthquakes. This agreement, worth 600,000 Kuwaiti dinars, was signed between our country and the Arab economic and social development fund. [Summary] [Sanaa Domestic Service in Arabic 1830 GMT 6 Nov 85 GF]

LAW RATIFIED--Brother Colonel 'Ali 'Abdallah Salih, president of the republic, commander in chief of the armed forces, and secretary general of the General People's Congress, has issued a decree ratifying the law of administrative unit No 27 for 1985. The decree spells out and explains the provisions of the law which governs the organization of administrative units in the various provinces of the republic and defines the authority and responsibilities of the governors of the provinces. [Summary] [Sanaa Domestic Service in Arabic 2000 GMT 5 Nov 85 GF]

OPEC OIL STORAGE LOAN--The cabinet today approved a \$4 million loan from the OPEC international development fund for increasing oil storage capacity and for training cadres in the fields of oil and mineral resources. [Summary] [Sanaa Domestic Service in Arabic 1200 GMT 23 Oct 85 GF]

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CSO: 4400/48

. INDIA

NAXALITES' THREAT TO MADHYA PRADESH DISCUSSED

Bombay THE TIMES OF INDIA in English 30 Sep 85 p 9

[Text] Jagdalpur, September 29--Walking through the streets this district town of Bastar, one hardly sees any sign of Naxalite menace or any tribal at various weekly markets looking intimidated. In fact, tribals merrily walk along the roadside deep in the forest oblivious of the "Naxalite menace" about which one hears so much in the cities.

The Madhya Pradesh government had also said in the last budget session of the assembly that the Naxalite problem had become "serious" in the Bastar region.

The problem is serious, not for the tribals but for the state administration, and that too mainly the forest and the police departments.

In fact, Mr Nahar Singh Bhil, conservator of forests (South and West Bastar) says: "The situation is grave. The employees of my department are assaulted, roughed up and intimidated. They are so demoralised that there are many requests for transfer."

In May last, the jeep of Mr K. Ansari, DFO, was reportedly detained by the Naxalites. The forest ranger sitting with him was allegedly dragged out and beaten up. During the current year, 51 such cases have been recorded. There may be more such cases but the forest employees are afraid of complaining to the police for fear of reprisal.

'Tribals' Avarice

At the root of the Naxalite problem is the tribals' "lust for land," says Mr Bhil, himself a tribal and the first graduate among Jhabua Bhils. "The tribals want land for cultivation and for this they resort to felling of trees in the forest. The Naxalites tell them that everything in the forest--trees, land and minerals--belongs to them. Go ahead and take them. If the forest officers come in the meantime, they will take care of them. That is why they are popular among the tribals and we are not. If we ignore the destruction of forests, there would be no problem at all."

Another factor responsible for the strained relations between the tribals and the forest department is the rate of daily wages paid to the tribals engaged in forest work. Last year the department paid for 52 lakhs man-days at Rs 10.75 per day. The Naxalites instigate the tribals to demand more wages and stop work if the demand is not met. This works effectively when it comes to the collection of tendu leaves, which is big business and stoppage of work will have political repercussions in Bhopal. Here also the tribals demand higher wages every year.

The inspector-general of police, Mr P.N. Chaturvedi, refutes the allegation of the forest officials that the police have not done anything to contain the problem. According to him, on Independence Day the police had an encounter with a Naxalite gang at Gumarka village in West Bastar near the M.P.-Maharashtra border. None was injured but the Naxalites left behind one 12-bore gun, some cartridges, hand grenades and a large quantity of medicines and injections. In a similar encounter in March last, one Naxalite was killed.

In all, five gangs from across the Andhra Pradesh border operate in Bastar. The gangs include three women.

Problem of Logistics

The major problem for the police is that of logistics. Bastar district, which is as big as Kerala, has only 30 police stations and a police force of 1,200 and four companies of the SAF, says Mr C.P.G. Unni, superintendent of police. He points out that sometimes a policeman has to walk up to 40 km to reach the nearest police station. It has been decided to connect police stations with wireless sets.

The police have decided to launch a major counter-offensive next month against the Naxalites, says Mr Chaturvedi and adds: "This is not a purely law and order problem. The police propose to organise, in collaboration with the forest and other departments, "motivation camps" for tribals where they would counter the Naxalite propaganda through talks and persuasion. Village defence societies, on the lines of those in Dacoit-infested areas will also be set up. If necessary, weapons would be supplied and training given for using them."

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CSO: 5660/0019

INDIA

BANGLADESH ALLEGED TO ENCOURAGE TNV REBELS

Calcutta THE STATESMAN in English 1 Oct 85 p 9

[Text] Agartala, Sept 30--The Tripura Chief Minister, Mr Nripen Chakraborty, today told the State Assembly that Bangladesh was encouraging underground TNV extremists and was also creating tension in Muhuri Char, in south Tripura, by "taking advantage of our friendship," reports PTI.

Replying to a question, the Chief Minister said the State Government had furnished detailed evidence of the TNV's presence in Bangladesh territory to the Centre.

He, however, did not say whether any attempt was made by the State Government for ensuring the return of the State Health Department nurse, Miss Prajapati Debbarma, kidnapped by TNV extremists from Baijalbari, in West Tripura on February 20. It was futile to try for her release from the TNV hideout as Bangladesh persistently denied the presence of TNV extremists in its territory, he said in reply to another question.

Mr Chakraborty said the MNF leader, Mr Laldenga, had also told him recently that the TNV guerrillas were based in Bangladesh and had earlier received arms training from MNF instructors. The training was discontinued after resumption of MNF-Centre peace talks last year.

Mr Chakraborty alleged that the Centre was not doing its bit to implement the recommendations of the Tamar Committee set up by the Home Ministry last year to suggest suitable counter-insurgency measures. The two battalions of Assam Rifles promised by the Centre were yet to be deployed, he said.

The Chief Minister said the extremists menace in Tripura was a "regional problem with national dimensions." Three hundred and five extremists, including 37 TNV activists, have so far surrendered to the State Government and Rs 14.71 lakhs were spent for their rehabilitation.

/9317
CSO: 5650/0020

IRAN

RECONCILIATION SAID SERVING U.S.

GF180715 Tehran International Service in Arabic 1730 GMT 17 Nov 85

[Unattributed commentary]

[Text] The goals of the Arab reconciliation plan that was decided by the Casablanca summit are clear and their results are known. The Arab world has been divided into two camps--those who know about the results of this plan and their meanings and who put themselves forward to serve that plan in the hope of achieving their goals, and those who are not yet aware of the intentions and basic goals behind the plan and were dazzled by the concept of reconciliation.

We have always agreed with everyone that reconciliation is a good thing and becomes a necessity in difficult circumstances, such as those through which the Islamic world is currently passing. The important question is reconciliation, agreement, and cooperation with whom? Here lies the point of difference between the two groups of regimes in the Islamic world. There are regimes that have adopted slogans of peace, fraternity, and reconciliation without considering the other side with which they are to reconcile. Those regimes have reached the point of implementing their slogans even with the Zionist enemy. They are the same regimes that raised the slogan demanding that the Islamic republic reach a reconciliation with the Ba'thist regime

Everyone loves peace, but peace with whom and for what purpose? This is an important matter than none should forget. It is important to remember that following the Camp David accords the Arab regimes were divided into two groups. One group followed the line of Camp David and reconciliation with Israel. Thus, it was on the U.S. line, while another group stood against Camp David. The emergence of this difference between the two groups was normal.

Those who are surprised about the existence of numerous differences within the Arab arena should instead be surprised when there are no such differences. The division of the Arab world into two wings is a normal thing imposed by the way the Arab countries deal with the Palestinian issue. There are those who bargain with the rights of the Palestinian people, and there are those who defend those rights. The elimination of the differences between the two sides will not be regarded as normal unless the capitulatory alliance regimes withdraw from the circle of Camp David and return to the right line of defend-

ing the rights of the Palestinian people, instead of raising the slogan of reconciliation with the Zionist enemy, which has not happened yet. The Camp David regimes are still insisting on their stance by supporting settlement plans and projects. They continue to turn their backs on the Islamic nation's rights in their holy land, Palestine. As long as there is a group that bargains with Israel, the existence of political and ideological obstacles between the feeble wing and the progressive wing is normal and necessary in this decisive phase. This requires, in the first place, the total confrontation of the intruding U.S. existence in the Islamic world.

But if we look at the bottom line of this plan aimed at eliminating all the obstacles between the two wings, and if we go a little deeper into the objectives of the plan, we find that the line of interests will end in a reconciliation with the Egyptian regime and then an agreement on the political solution of the Palestinian problem. This is what the United States wants and has been endeavoring to achieve for a long time. This is the main point of danger in this plan.

The efforts to clear the Arab atmosphere are only the beginning of a long road that will only end in the circle of the U.S. target. If we add to these efforts the determination of some countries to restore their relations with Mubarak, as well as the secret decision adopted by the Gulf summit in Muscat to restore diplomatic relations with the Egyptian regime, if we sum-up these decisions and the reconciliation plan, we will discover the hidden corners of the plan aimed at linking all the Arab countries to one axis, which is capitulation to the United States, obeying its will, and establishing direct and indirect links with it. Herein lies the importance of knowing that the concept of reconciliation with the regimes following the U.S. wagon, such as Saddam's regime, means reconciliation with the United States because it will only be a first step on this thorny path. Will the righteous accept this destiny?

/8918

CSO: 4640/7

IRAN

KHOMAYNI'S FIRST PRIME MINISTER IN EUROPE

Bazargan's Activities Cited

London KEYHAN in Persian 26 Sep 85 pp 1-2

[London KEYHAN weekly in Persian; founder and publisher Dr Mesbahzadeh]

[Text] Engineer Bazargan in his first speech in Wurzburg used his efforts to reject what the Western world blames Islam for, calling it unjustifiable and innaccurate. A group of German educational, scientific and political personalities were present to hear Bazargan's speech. At this gathering, Bazargan stated that Islam is a religion of kindness, generosity and reconstruction. If there are those, who, in the name of Islam, publicize harshness and destruction, it is these people's fault and not Islam's. The Iran Freedom Movement leader, who spoke in French at the conclusion of his speech, answered questions, but refused to answer any question which was directly related to the policies of the Islamic Republic.

Based on published rumours about Bazargan's trip to West Germany as a representative of the moderate cleric front, he is preparing the grounds for the return to power of--many who supported the Islamic regime at the beginning of the revolution and who have either remained aloof or have been put aside--in the event of Khomeyni's death. Bazargan and those close to him have strongly denied this rumour. The spokesman of the Iran Freedom Movement office in Tehran announced on Saturday that they did not know the reason for Bazargan's trip to West Germany and in a telephone conversation with a KEYHAN reporter with regard to the probable negotiations of the Iran Freedom Movement leader with some of the opposition leaders stated: "As far as I know, the decision of the Iran Freedom Movement leader is that neither in the past nor today does he have any intentions of carrying out negotiations with the opposition leaders stated: "As far as I know, the decision of the Iran Freedom Movement leader is that neither in the past nor today does he have any intentions of carrying out negotiations with the opposition groups."

It is worth mentioning that one of the close friends of Engineer Bazargan who is travelling with him to Germany has said "The Iran Freedom Movement leader does not find it necessary to express his views about the existing situation in Iran outside the country since he has always expressed his views inside Iran. Any opposing expression about the ruling government in Iran outside of

the country will be interpreted differently and might cause difficulties for the continuation of the Freedom Movement activities."

In any case, the Islamic Republic mass media has not mentioned anything about Bazargan's trip. The trip was so secret that even some of the former Prime Minister's friends in Tehran indicated that they were uninformed about his trip.

With regard to the meetings of Bazargan with foreign personalities, there was a rumour about his visit with Hans-Dietrich Genscher, West German Foreign Minister, but this rumor was dismissed by those close to Bazargan. At any rate, political observers refer to the point that the trip of the West German Foreign Minister to Tehran six months ago had been interpreted in such a way as if he had been appointed by the United States to negotiate with the officials of the Islamic Republic.

The different opposition groups have dismissed the strong rumour about last week's meeting between their leaders and Bazargan and stated that even if such a meeting ever took place, it would be so secret that the circulation of any report about it would be practically impossible.

In this regard, Admiral Ahmad Madani, who it was said that he would visit Bazargan during his trip, stated: "Under present conditions there is no need for such a visit since this visit might give an excuse to the ruling government to condemn Bazargan and the Iran Freedom Movement." Admiral Madani added: "Bazargan follows a nationalistic line which has our approval and certainly the spiritual tie between us will never break off."

Cautious Attitude Toward Cleric Regime

London KEYHAN in Persian 26 Sep 85 p 6

[London KEYHAN weekly in Persian; founder and publisher Dr Mesbahzadeh]

[Text] In a visit to Cologne, Mehdi Bazargan, the first Prime Minister of Ayatollah Khomeyni, cited his trip to West Germany as a sign of adjustment and accommodation of the policies of the Islamic Republic. In direct and indirect contacts with his former colleagues who presently live in exile, Bazargan also claimed that for a softening of conditions they must wait until the death of Khomeyni.

The former colleague of Khomeyni calls himself an optimist and claims that it is possible to reform the Islamic Republic. The 82 year old Bazargan was not willing to meet some of his friends and humbly confessed that his trip to Europe had been granted on the basis of specific conditions. Before an exit permit was granted, in a letter to Ayatollah Mohammad Musavi Khoeini, the Islamic Republic Prosecutor, he promised not to meet with the opposition. Except for a daughter who resides in Brussels, Bazargan's family members remain in Tehran as hostages so that the Iran Freedom Movement leader does not dream of staying abroad.

Those who have met Bazargan recently describe him as a mixture of sweet dreams and vain illusions. Honestly, what a destiny! Iran was destined to be destroyed, one million people had to perish, and three million Iranians had to become homeless wanderers in order for Mr Bazargan to obtain what was never denied him during the Shah's reign, namely a trip abroad--and now he expresses optimism!

The founder of the so-called Human Rights Society in Iran has realized that now, even travel, the ordinary right of any human being, has become a conditional, privilege in the Islamic Republic. During the Shah's reign, he was able to travel abroad, appear on television, and say the biggest lies against the existing regime. But today, he travels semi-secretly and takes the midnight train to Brussels in a situation where the Hezbollah guerillas watch his slightest movement. He does not even dare to speak over the telephone without the presence of these guerillas, yet he talks about positive change and transformation. The old disciple of the ayatollah has reached a state where he wishes the death of his master but he does not have the moral courage to admit his deadly mistakes in front of the Iranian people and the world. Instead of wishing Khomeyni's death, he does not have the guts to accept that the Islamic revolution is based on lies, deceitfulness, prevarication and terror and that it will never be able to be the future way for the oppressed and suffering nation of Iran. From the very beginning Khomeyni stated that human rights is an invention of Jews and gentiles and Islam will never accept the equality of all human beings except for religion, sect and gender.

In any case, Bazargan and his ambitious and hypocrite friends established the Human Rights Society under Khomeyni's name. All the founders of that deceitful and hypocritical show are living in exile now and Bazargan, their leader, does not even dare to call them over the phone. Truly, the world is the place for retaliation.

12929/9815
CSO: 4640/2

IRAN

CRITERIA FOR ADMISSION, EXCLUSION OF UNIVERSITIES ANNOUNCED

Tehran KEYHAN in Persian 4 Aug 85, p 18

[Excerpts] KEYHAN Educational Service--New ethical selection criteria for admission of candidates to universities and institutions of higher education have been compiled by the Supreme Council of Cultural Revolution. Applicants who have been excluded from entrance examinations because of ethical reasons can mail their applications again within a month for a renewed investigation and at the latest, will receive an answer the next month. The files will be investigated by qualified judges on the selection board. These were the main subjects outlined by a member of the Central Board for the Selection of Applicants to a KEYHAN reporter along with detailed criteria for the selection of university applicants for the new academic year.

The text of the questions and answers is as follows:

Question: "What are the basis, criteria and methods for selection?"

Answer: "Prior to the formation of the Supreme Council of Cultural Revolution, the criteria for admission to the universities were based on information collected and furnished by the Supreme Admission Board to the Central Selection Board. After the formation of the Supreme Council of Cultural Revolution, a committee was formed in order to select applicants for admission to universities according to criteria determined by the Supreme Council of Cultural Revolution. It is reflected in the approved laws of the Supreme Council of Cultural Revolution, that those with anti-Islamic revolution beliefs, or those with renowned immoral behaviour, the unrestrained--like prostitutes and the unveiled, drug addicts, alcoholics, etc. are not to be admitted to the universities. Therefore, for the fighting mini-groups whose organizational dependency is confirmed according to the reports of the inquiry sources or other reliable sources, or those whose repentance is unproven, and it is interpreted that they are fighting against the Islamic Republic of Iran will be excluded from admission to the universities. Besides the above cases, those applicants without any record of anti-regime activities or renowned moral corruption and those with minor wrong doings are acceptable from the viewpoint of the selection procedures. It is worth mentioning that in the current year, after investigating the files of the applicants with negative points by the Selection Board, a decision will be made by a qualified judge and therefore there is no point

worrying about neglecting the previous criteria. In order to precisely execute the above procedures, to attend to the demands, expectations and continuous written and telephone contacts by the Hezbollah Nation, the need to establish healthy contact with the Central Board of Selection to discuss questions and problems in regard to the criteria for admission of the students to the universities, and to prevent ensuing confusion in correspondence, we hereby announce PO Box 15815/1537. Clearly, the mailed information and statements about adverse political and moral conduct of the applicants for admission to the universities and institutions of higher learning will be determined and followed up based on observance of the following procedures:

- 1 - Full first and family name with the precise mailing address of the sender (if possible, a telephone number should also be included).
- 2 - The disclosed information must be documented and the names of reliable sources are essential for follow-up.
- 3 - Information about participants in the state-wide entrance examination of the current year must be delivered as soon as possible.

Meanwhile, any correspondence without name, signature, and a specific address will not be investigated and God forbid, in case of any false accusations against the candidates, and accuser will be legally prosecuted."

As regards the reasons for the delay in studying the files of those objecting the examination and suspended students he explained: "This question really has two parts: the latter part is related to students who were attending university before they were closed and who, for some reason or another, were not readmitted again after they were reopened. The Central Board for Student Selection is not responsible for these students at all and they must refer to the proper authorities themselves. But in regard to the first part, namely those students who have objections about the examination, the Central Board for Student Selection has been reinforced in 1984-85 and a new board has been formed. They started their work about two months ago. In order to study the files remaining from the previous years, the new board has formed two special centers. The supervisor of each of these centers is an experienced judge. These centers are working quickly and using their best efforts in order to clear up all the files and announce the results in the near future."

The Central Selection Board member was asked: "How many groups have the files being studied been divided into? What years do they belong to? Do they include all phases such as sending students abroad and suspended or expelled students? Are entrance examination candidates for all the years covered within the range of you and your coworkers' responsibilities?"

He answered: "On the whole, the files under study are divided into two groups. One group consists of those files without ill-disposed or ill-natured records, namely they do not contain any information or reports about anti-Islamic revolution activities or extreme mental or moral deviation and these files are acceptable. The second group are those files with negative

points based on acquired information from reliable inquiry sources. These kinds of files are sent for investigation. After collecting more precise and comprehensive information, they will be studied again. The main duty of the new board of selection, which started its activities two months ago, is to study the general qualifications of the applicants taking the statewide university entrance examinations of the current year. Certainly, investigation of the complaints related to some of the files of previous years' entrance examinations is still continuing and with newly enacted programs they will be acted upon rapidly and are going to be finished soon. As we have mentioned before, the condition of the suspended students, namely those students who were not accepted or were expelled or suspended due to political or moral deviation, is not within the range of responsibility of this board. Except for the above-mentioned cases, the ethical selection of applicants for post graduate study and medical residency, applicants for studying abroad, and educational scholarships within the framework of the approved laws of the Supreme Council of Cultural Revolution would be the duty of the related selection centers and will be implemented under the supervision of the Central Selection Board."

Question: "How many complaints have been identified and announced up to now?"

Answer: "Of the total complaints related to the student selection of previous years, less than 500 files remain. These files are still under study and investigation and a definite decision has not yet been made. God willing, we hope with the necessary action taken, they will be finished within two or three coming months."

Question: "Where should applicants who have been rejected by this authority refer to?"

Answer: "The results of ethical selection of those students whose qualifications is not confirmed for university admission will be sent to them directly. This decision could be revised and it will be announced after a certain grace period and it can be objected to. Evidently, these objections will be studied by review boards and after necessary investigations, the final decision will be issued."

Question: "When will this year's selection results be announced?"

Answer: "The Central Selection Board intended to announce the final results of the examination at the end of Shahrivar (Sept 22) in order for the new students to be able to attend classes on the first of Mehr (Sept 23) and preparations were made by the board accordingly and at present, sufficient readiness exists. Certainly, executing the plans on time depends on the cooperation and coordination of the scientific and ethical board. Although these two phases are studied separately based on their specific criteria, they must coordinate their workload and even cooperate closely with each other. Cooperation examples include handing over the names and qualification forms of the applicants to the Central Student Selection Board which must be performed by the executive

examination headquarters. At the start of the work, some agreements were made with these brothers and it was agreed that the above cases be delivered in due time but so far, this has been delayed. This delay has created some difficulties for our deadline and has caused about three weeks holdup, which naturally affects the final announcement of the results of the entrance examinations. Certainly, the Supreme Council of Cultural Revolution regards this affair with great importance and with the guidance of this council, it has been agreed that the scientific division of the examination undertake the necessary cooperation and we will also use our efforts to decrease the existing delay through proper planning and more active participation as far as possible."

Then he referred to the time period of investigation of the complaints and said: "As we have mentioned before, in the current year, those whose general qualifications have not been approved will be informed by mail. Then a one month deadline will be set for sending complaints. In this case, all the complaints must be sent by registered mail to the specified post office box which will be duly announced and the complainants must save the receipt of the registered letter. The received complaints will be investigated and we hope that within two months--at the latest--from the date of receipt of the complaint letter, the final written result will be mailed to the applicant's address. Certainly, it is anticipated that some of the files which enjoy a more clear status will be decided upon sooner. Anyway, all our efforts will be used so that in cases where the qualification of some applicants is approved by the reviewing board, the students will be able to start classes in the second term of the school year."

In the conclusion, he was asked: "What means exist for the complainants to refer to in person to find out about his or her status?"

Dr Mo'in pointed out: "Since all complaints must be sent by registered mail there is no need to present the complaint in person or to inquire about the results in person and applicants must refrain from doing so. Applicants should only refer in person in cases where they have not received a final answer by mail two months after the date the complaint was mailed. The complaint office located in the main building of the Ministry of Culture and Nature. Certainly, we hope that there will be no need to refer in person for the results of the current year examinations (except in exceptional cases)."

9815/12899
CSO: 4640/703

IRAN

TAX IDENTIFICATION PERMIT REQUIRED OF ALL WORK UNITS

Tehran KEYHAN in Persian 4 Aug 85 p 2

[Excerpts] Single Article--Beginning Dey 1, 1364 (22 December 1985), any services offered by the Ministries of Commerce, Industries, Heavy Industries, Mines and Metals and their dependent corporations and institutions, production and distribution centers affiliated with the Ministry of Commerce and the Islamic Republic of Iran Central Bank, business units falling under Articles 59 and 63 of the Direct Taxation law approved in Esfand 1345 (February 20-March 20, 1967) and its subsequent amendments, and production and distribution cooperative quote recipients must possess a tax identification permit and are required to display it. Likewise, the Telecommunication Company of the Islamic Republic of Iran and the regional water and power and oil and gas companies are required to discontinue their service--within 15 days from the announced date by the Ministry of Economic Affairs and Finance--to business units falling under the above-stated articles which have failed to comply with the procedures of Amendment one of this article.

Amendment 1--The Ministry of Economic Affairs and Finance is required to issue and deliver tax identification permits to taxpayers subject to this article who will follow the pertinent procedures set below until the end of Azar 1364 (December 21, 1986).

A - Final 1362 [21 Mar 1983-20 Mar 1984] taxes of revenue-producing operations must be paid or arrangements are made for the payment of the assessed taxes.

B - Fifty percent of non-finalized claimed 1362 taxes of revenue-producing operations must be paid as partial payment, taking into account previous payments or by making arrangements for their payment.

Amendment 2--Responsible authorities who according to the announcement of the Ministry of Economic Affairs and Finance have refrained from executing the prescribed duties in this law will fall either under the law of investigation of the administrative offences and will be punished accordingly, or otherwise they will be convicted and punished according to the findings and decisions of the judicial authorities. In either case, if a loss is incurred by the government, the party in question will have to pay for any and all damages.

Amendment 3--The Ministry of Economic Affairs and Finance can determine the yearly tax payments of those businesses which are not required by law to keep legal books for each annual revenue-producing operation since 1360 [21 Mar 1981-20 Mar 1982] provided that until the approval of this law, they have not reached the final payment stages. If the taxpayer of these businesses belongs to a union or guild, the tax amount will be determined by consultation with the union, otherwise a fixed amount would be charged and collected. In cases where it can be proved that the taxpayer has not been active in business for part of the year and it is approved by the three-member board of Article 9 of the legal bill of the Direct Tax Reform approved by the Revolution Council of the Islamic Republic of Iran in May 1980, the pertinent tax assessment will be charged based on the duration of the active business and calculation of the relevant exemption as allowed by law.

Amendment 4--The grace period for submitting tax forms and payment of these taxes for revenue-producing operations during 1363 [21 Mar 1984-20 Mar 1985], by taxpayers subject to Article 63 of the Direct Tax Law approved in March 1966 and subsequent amendments is hereby extended for one month.

9815/12899

CSO: 4640/703

IRAN

PAPER INTERVIEWS EXILED ADMIRAL

PM140958 Rome LA REPUBBLICA in Italian 9 Nov 85 p 14

[Interview with former Iranian Defense Minister Admiral Ahmad Madani by Vladimiro Odinzov in Rome--date not given]

[Text] Rome--"There is no way out of the Iran-Iraq conflict, it is a ruinous war for both countries and is doomed to end without victors or vanquished because neither Khomeyni nor Saddam Husayn can afford to lose it."

Ahmad Madani spoke calmly without getting carried away. He is 56 years old and has behind him a long military and political career started under the Shah of Persia, influenced by Muhammad Mossadeq and continued under the new Khomeyni regime, and he is now more active than ever in the ranks of an opposition to a revolution which has betrayed its ideals.

He was minister for the merchant navy until 1970 and in Bazargan's provisional government Admiral Madani became defense minister, head of the Navy, governor of Khuzistan, candidate for the presidency, and parliamentary deputy. Then came exile in France and Germany at the head of the main opposition movement to Khomeyni-style fundamentalism.

[Odinzov] Admiral, if you were in power in Tehran, how would you end this war?

[Madani] There are two essential factors to be taken into consideration. We certainly do not intend to interfere in Iraq's internal affairs. However, we want full compensation for the damage done by a conflict which was started by Baghdad. As far as I am concerned, I will therefore try to reach a peace settlement on the basis of these two points. Unlike Khomeyni, we are prepared to negotiate with Saddam Husayn without aspiring to overthrow a government.

[Odinzov] With regard to the territorial dispute, the cessation of the conflict would imply confirmation of the 1975 Algiers agreements which delimited the Shatt al-Arab.

[Madani] Certainly. The contacts we have now had with the representatives of some moderate Arab governments, and even with the people with political influence in Iraq have confirmed to me that there is agreement on my positions and on the conditions for peace between Iran and Iraq: recognition of Saddam

Husayn's regime, readiness by the Iraqis to pay compensation for the damage, and confirmation of the Algiers agreements.

However, since I am now neither Iranian Government chief nor head of its Armed Forces I have so far merely called for intervention and mediation by all the European and international socialist parties to end the war. The PSI has given a favorable response to my request too.

[Odinzov] Admiral Madani, what precisely do you represent, what kind of opposition are you leading?

[Madani] The Iranian revolution was to give the country freedom, democracy, and equality. We did not want either extremism or religious fundamentalism; political and religious dictatorship are exactly the same thing for us. In all the posts I held in Iran I tried, in direct contacts with Khomeyni and with the advocates of fundamentalism close to him, to explain that the new regime's policies did not coincide with the revolution's objectives and with the people's aspirations and that the powers Khomeyni had assumed were not those laid down in the constitution. I now represent the moderation of all Iranians. It is not true that everybody in Iran is a fundamentalist or extremist. There are people in the Iranian Government itself, religious people, civilians, and members of the military, whose objective is freedom, independence, and equidistance from the East and the West.

[Odinzov] Can you paint a picture of this opposition for me?

[Madani] There is a group of moderate republicans who belong to our movement and who are taking action both abroad and in Iran. There are the fundamentalist and extremist mojahedin with whom we have no contact. Moreover we cannot cooperate with the representatives of the old regime whose figurehead is the shah's son. I would like to point out that 90 percent of Iranians have a tradition of moderation, and democracy, unlike the present fundamentalist and extremist situation.

[Odinzov] So what is the real force which supports Khomeyni and Khomeyni-ism? Who are the 10 percent who, according to you, are enough to keep the regime in power?

[Madani] I do not intend to level accusations wither at the Western bloc or the Eastern bloc: We want to be friends of both. In Iran, however, under cover of fundamentalism, there are some people who ultimately serve the interests of the communist bloc even if they support an independent ideology. Another group realizes how many personal advantages and privileges they have obtained from the regime. A third group comprises those who fear retaliation for supporting Khomeyni. And of course there are naive and simple people who honestly believe they belong to God's party and are therefore the repositories of a religious truth.

[Oginov] How do you think you can change the situation in Iran?

[Madani] When I left Iran I mentioned contact with the moderate forces inside the regime. I continued to work with them for a gradual and painless change in the system. I am afraid of a sudden overthrow which would produce a civil war and a political vacuum. In other words I do not believe in cooperation among all the moderate forces which exist in Iran and want to change the existing political order, I say political and not Islamic. But the church which must live in a democratic society must be separate from political power.

[Odinzov] Is all this possible while Khomeyni is there?

[Madani] While the Imam is in power there are great problems. Khomeyni is inflexible, and stubborn, and is holding his course unconcerned by anything. But Khomeyni-ism as such has no future without Khomeyni. There is no figure who can replace his charisma. But before he dies we must succeed in organizing the moderate national force to avoid a violent explosion, and a political imbalance. Foreign countries too want the creation of a moderate regime, which is politically predictable and supported by technocrats who know how to run a state.

/8918

CSO: 4628/1

IRAN

CLANDESTINE RADIO REPORTS ON ANTI-REGIME ACTIVITIES

GF040527 (Clandestine) Radio Iran in Persian 1330 GMT 3 Nov 85

[Text] We now invite you to listen to a few short reports sent to us by nationalist elements concerning events which have occurred in Iran over the past few days.

On 6 October at 0920 [0550 GMT] a car bomb exploded on Hafez Street in Tabriz leaving 17 dead or wounded.

On the same day the Friday Imam of Shahrud, was attacked with rocks and bricks as he left his home. He was severely injured and hospitalized.

On 29 October two Iranian soldiers sought asylum in Iraq on the Huwayzah Fronts.

At 1440 [1110 GMT] on the same day, during their shift change, the guards in charge of security at the Karaj Dam, became involved in heavy clashes with new guards who were Hezbollahis. As a result, seven people were wounded.

Earlier the same day, at 1130 [0700], on Kashan's Mobarezan Street, two mobilization members were shot dead by an unknown assailant riding a motorcycle.

On 30 October, the workers at the jeep factory went on strike to protest management discrimination.

On 22 October, five policemen were arrested on the orders of the Armed Forces' ideological/political office. The identity of the arrested men is unknown and the reason for their arrest is not clear.

At 1140 [0710 GMT] on 21 October the Bank Saderat branch on Tehran's Gandhi Street was robbed by three armed men riding motorcycles. About 7 million rials [\$70,000] was stolen.

According to reports, the small clashes that occur in the towns are mostly due to differences of opinion between the various factions, especially those favoring and those opposing Prime Minister Mir Hoseyn Musavi.

According to nationalist sources the pipelines that bring crude oil to the Tehran and Tabriz refineries, which are called "build" pipelines in oil terminology, have been damaged by Iraqi bombardment. The same sources indicate that if the bombing of the pipes continues, the gasoline and kerosene situation inside the country would become very critical.

Finally, tires and spare car parts have become extremely scarce in Iran. For a set of tires for a Peykan car, priced at 2000 rials [\$20] by the government, one has to pay 15,000 rials [\$150], but for an inferior brand manufactured by the Islamic Republic.

/12712

CSO: 4640/64

IRAN

COUNTRY'S 'DEFEAT IN WAR, DEFEAT IN PEACE' STATUS EXAMINED

London KEYHAN in Persian 26 Sep 85 p 1

[London KEYHAN weekly in Persian; founder and publisher Dr Mesbahzadeh]

[Text] The latest letter from Ali Akbar Velayati, the Islamic Republic's minister of foreign affairs to the UN secretary general clearly indicates two points. First, the Islamic Republic confesses that it is not able to defend the country and hopes that an invisible hand will come out and protect the cities of Iran from the cowardly attacks of the Iraqi air force. Velayati humbly begged Xavier Perez de Cuellar (UN Secretary General) to take action in this regard. Second, discussion about peace continues among the Islamic Republic leadership and contrary to the past, at least when the leaders are talking in private, there is no mention of 'war until victory.'

Well, how can Mr de Cuellar take responsibility for defending the cities of Iran? The United Nations has neither fighter planes to send to fight the Iraqi air force nor anti-aircraft artillery to place at the disposal of Iran. The United Nations is only able to issue resolutions, provided that its members, especially the five principal members of the Security Council with veto power, do not oppose the resolution. The Security Council can warn Iraq that if it attacks Iranian cities, it will be faced with an economic boycott and other international punishments. But is there any reason for the USSR, United States, France, Great Britain, China, and other members of the council to agree to make such a decision? The Ayatollah's Republic is hated so much by international public opinion that even its so-called friends, Libya and Syria, don't dare to discuss these ideas in the United Nations. Besides, the United Nations is a mechanism for political and diplomatic transactions to solve differences and disputes among its member nations. Therefore, if the United Nations agreed to stop the renewal of Iraqi air attacks against non-military regions of Iran, naturally, the Ayatollah's Republic must also be prepared to present something in exchange. But what?

In fact, the Republic leaders are saying: "The United Nations must prevent Iraq from using its present advantages in the air war, but we, in exchange are not willing to give up our advantage on the battleground fronts. In other words, the United Nations must help us go and occupy Baghdad and establish another Islamic Republic there!" Certainly, such a logic cannot be taken seriously. As a result, Velayati's letter is nothing but a childish maneuver and its only result is stirring up Iraqi hatred. Since it indicates that Iran is alone, and that the United Nations is not even

willing to issue a mere resolution condemning the Iraqi air attacks on non-military regions of Iran. But regarding the second point, namely discussing peace within the Republic leadership, Hashemi Rafsanjani, the speaker of the Islamic Majlis, who has used a lot of effort in recent months to attract the attention of the western powers, has recently sent the message saying: "If I were in charge, I would have finished the war in 10 minutes!" Apparently Rafsanjani considers Khomeyni responsible for the continuation of the war and claims that as soon as the people's imam is omitted from the scene, the road will be paved for peace negotiations.

But even if we imagine that Rafsanjani's analysis is really his and not a rumor created by the West, it overlooks an important reality: That peace negotiations cannot be started in a political vacuum immediately and be fruitful. The Ayatollah's Republic, after five full years of war, has not yet propounded its realistic aims for the continuation of this strange war. How can a government that does not know exactly why it is fighting with Iraq possibly know what kind of peace it wants? War and peace is not like a current of electricity that you could switch off and on. To accept any kind of negotiations, even a cease fire, means to accept a fundamental change in the total world perspective of the Islamic Republic. Therefore, arguing about peace within the Republic leadership, is in fact, arguing about the total existence of the Islamic revolution.

At present, it is possible to distinguish two groups. The first group are the purists who prefer that in the Karbala of this era, the Islamic Republic should face the martyrdom with open arms and not submit to any agreement at all. Khomeyni, in spite of losing a large part of his popularity, is still the representative of this group. The second group is made up of those who do not have any other purpose except ruling the country and because of this, they are willing to accept any disgrace and contempt. If they realize that the continuation of the war will shorten the duration of their rule, they will easily open the door to peace and friendship discussion.

But the question of war and peace is not solely related to the Republic leadership, it is an issue concerning all the nation of Iran. Therefore, the position that the Islamic Republic opposition forces take in this regard is vitally important. Some of these forces have become extraneous extensions of the Iraqi police and military system and naturally, are not able to present a reasonable and at the same time, honorable and just solution. But in our opinion, the others also have not passed beyond the slogan stage in order to present a specific and realistic policy in regard to war and peace.

The defeat of the Islamic Republic in war is not necessarily the defeat of Iran. But a defeat in respect to peace, could be a defeat for all the nation of Iran.

Editorial Committee

9815/12899

CSO: 4640/1

IRAN

NVOI DECRIES ARMS DEALS WITH WEST

TAl11233 (Clandestine) National Voice of Iran in Persian 1730 GMT 9 Nov 85

[Unattributed commentary: "Disclosure of Deals by The Islamic Regime's Authorities"]

[Text] Dear compatriots: In order to prolong the war and satisfy its thirst for bloodshed and murder, Mr Khomeyni's Islamic regime is ready to sacrifice everything, including Iranian youths and teenagers and the nation's resources and wealth. In this connection the Velayat-e Faqih regime's concerted efforts to purchase military hardware and ammunition from Western countries. Particularly from great and small Satans such as America, Britain, and Israel, and the disclosure of these deals, have attracted more than ever the attention of our homeland's people and world public opinion.

Every now and then new documents and evidence are published by Western newspapers and mass media about the deals by the Velayat-e Faqih regime's middlemen to purchase arms by illicit means through brokers and intermediaries of international arms-selling corporations. Only recently a leader of the British Labor Party displayed and put at the disposal of journalists a secret document on the sale of smuggled military hardware by Britain to Khomeyni's Islamic regime, and questioned the British Government in this connection. Britain's official authorities could not deny the substance and content of this secret document and the illicit sale of war materiel to Iran.

The fact that periodically some aspects of the Velayat-e Faqih regime's deals on the purchase of smuggled weapons from arms-manufacturing companies are published in Western newspapers is, of course, not because Western states or companies feel sympathy for the Iranian nation or are opposed to various plundering deals with the Islamic Republic. All the military, intelligence, and government organizations of Western states that sell smuggled arms to the Islamic regime are well aware of the minute details of these deals and collusions. It is very likely that the principal middlemen and intermediaries of these deals are the same employees and staff of these Western government, military and intelligence organizations. Therefore, the aim of the clamor raised periodically in Western newspapers in this connection is aimed, first of all, at concealing the old and secret relations of Western states, foremost of all America and Britain, with the Velayat-e Faqih regime, and secondly, at further plundering Iran's oil income, or in other words at pillaging even more the Iranian nation's wealth.

Western countries want to use these propaganda maneuvers to obtain more concessions from Khomeyni's Velayat-e Faqih regime, as they have managed to do in recent years. Moreover, in these so-called disclosures by the Western mass media regarding the purchase of smuggled weapons by the emissaries of the Jamaran caliph, intelligence and military services of Western states, and above all America and Britain, have strived to disgrace second-hand and third-hand pawns and middlemen in order to save the main pawns who have a principal role in these deals and who are at the highest echelons of the Islamic leadership and the Velayat-e Faqih regime.

Documents and evidence published in newspapers regarding the purchase of smuggled arms by middlemen of Khomeyni's regime indicate that the Islamic Republic's and Velayat-e Faqih regime's middlemen enjoy broad financial and administrative authority, and squander huge amounts of the nation's treasury toward this end. Some of this immense amount, which seemingly is placed at the disposal of the middlemen and intermediaries of the Islamic Republic of Iran's regime to purchase arms, is deposited in the foreign bank accounts of some of the most senior officials of the Islamic regime. This will, undoubtedly, not surprise anyone because the Velayat-e Faqih regime's criminal authorities are afraid of their dark and gloomy future. They know that their rule is unstable and that sooner or later their disgraceful regime will be thrown into the garbage heap of history. For this reason these gentlemen have been exerting every effort for a long time now to pocket millions of dollars from the Iranian nation's income and wealth under various names and pretexts--from the illicit purchase of arms to so-called assistance to Muslims and Islamic movements.

These gentlemen, however, should not forget that by toppling the Islamic regime, the Iranian nation will surely settle accounts with them, and these executioners of the Iranian nation will not have the opportunity to make use of these funds and plundered wealth.

/8918

CS0: 4640/75

IRAN

EMIGRE PAPER ANALYZES RELATIONS WITH FRANCE

London KEYHAN in Persian 10 Oct 85 p 16

[London KEYHAN weekly in Persian; founder and publisher Dr Mesbahzadeh]

[Text] Despite French military aid to Iraq and the delivery of 24 Mirages to this country--which has caused great annoyance and anxiety for the Islamic Republic--the rumor of sending a special representative of the French government to Tehran still remains in force. About three months ago, the news about a high-level French mission visiting Tehran in the near future was published for the first time. Following that news, Hojjat ol-Islam Hassan Ruhani, President of the Defense Committee of the Islamic Majilis, visited Paris. At that time, Ruhani's statements about the positive changes in the Tehran-Paris relationship as a groundwork for the visit of the French mission to Tehran were discussed by the French news media. Ruhani had stated: "We have come to the conclusion that Paris is ready to understand our situation and revise its policy in regard to the Islamic Republic."

A month later (at the end of August), LE MONDE reported that Paris was using its efforts to improve relations with Tehran through Syria. It is probable that the Islamic Republic would force the Islamic Jihad to free four French hostages who have been held for months by the Ayatollah's supporters as a friendly gesture. Undoubtedly, if the news of the sale of the 24 French Mirage fighters to Iraq had not been published in the middle of September, most probably the high-level French mission would have visited Tehran by now and it is likely that the hostages would have been freed at the Ayatollah's signal.

According to close sources, Roland Dumas, Minister of External Relations of France, was the initiator of the opening of negotiations with the Islamic Republic. Even before his appointment to the Ministry of External Affairs, Dumas was a political expert and advisor to Francois Mitterrand and had negotiated with the Islamic officials. According to these sources, Dumas has convinced Francois Mitterrand that under present conditions, if France sides with Iraq, it will be in a position that is not suitable with its interests in the future decade. Dumas has stated that with its large population and great wealth, Iran needs friends, especially after the war to repair the destruction and cooperate for the revival of Iran.

According to the report of AL QABAS, since the Syrians have failed to free the French hostages, Paris is now looking to Tehran. Roland Dumas has expressed interest in traveling to Tehran personally to negotiate with the Islamic Republic. According to the same newspaper, if such a trip takes place, or if another envoy goes to Tehran, he will negotiate four important subjects with the proper authorities in Tehran. These four subjects are:

1 - France will be asking for the conclusion of the war and from Paris' viewpoint, victory for each side in the war is impossible. Therefore, if Tehran agrees to accept peace, France is willing to totally reverse its policies toward Iran and if necessary, even sell arms to Iran.

2 - The French envoy will bring to the attention of the Islamic Republic officials Paris' eagerness to have good relations with Iran and the French willingness to limit the activities of the Mujaheddin Khalq in this country.

3 - France will be prepared to settle its 1.5 billion dollar debt to Iran in the form of extending credits, investments and the export of industrial goods to the Islamic Republic.

4 - In return, Paris expects Tehran to arrange for the freedom of the four French hostages. Two of these hostages, Marcel Fountain and Marcel Cartou are diplomats and the other two, Jean Paul Kaufman is a writer and Michel Sura is a researcher.

AL QABAS predicts that despite the revelation of the sale of the Mirages to Iraq, the special envoy of the French government will visit Tehran at the end of October.

According to Beirut newspapers, in his discussions with Mitterrand, Gorbachev has confirmed the need to adopt a joint international policy in regard to the ever-increasing expansion of terrorism against governments. Sources close to the Elysee have stated: "France has asked the Soviets to use their influence on the two Islamic Republic allies, Libya and Syria, to pressure the Islamic regime to revise its policy in regard to its support of terrorist activities by underground groups in Lebanon. Likewise, the Soviets have asked France to accelerate its new policy of opening the closed doors with the Islamic Republic." The French seem glad that the Soviets have shared in the tragic events of last week's attack by Islamic terrorists since according to Paris newspapers: "At present, it is not only the West which must tolerate the pressure of the terrorists, as blind terrorism has proved that no one and no country is immune from aggression."

9815/12899

CSO: 4640/18

IRAN

PRO-KHOMEYNI TERRORISTS APPREHENDED

London KEYHAN in Persian 10 Oct 85 p 4

[London KEYHAN weekly in Persian; founder and publisher Dr Mesbahzadeh]

[Text] London--Scotland Yard's anti-terrorist squad arrested two Arabs--one Iraqi and one Jordanian--for possession of arms and explosives and planning to carry out terrorist acts in England. One of the detainees resides in London and the other arrived in London three weeks ago from Spain. According to reports from London newspapers, it is likely that these two entered London to assassinate Mahan Karam and Illia Qouri, representatives of the Palestine Liberation Organization, who are invited by Mrs. Thatcher to visit London next week.

The Victory Revolutionary Group under the leadership of Abu Nazal had threatened that if any members of the Palestine Liberation Organization negotiated with England or participated in King Hussein's or Yasser Arafat's peace plan, they would be killed by this organization's commandos. Sabri Al-aniba Abu Nezal, who was a friend of Arafat ten years ago, operates an underground terrorist group. Six months ago, news about his death and burial was published in Baghdad. But two weeks ago, AL QABAS newspaper published an interview with him and claimed that Abu Nazal lives in Libya. He is against any kind of peace with Israel and up to now, his commandos have participated in a string of terrorist acts without any positive results for the Palestinians. As Israel has used these acts as an excuse to inflict a blow on the Palestinians, it is rumored that Abu Nazal's group is secretly in touch with the Israeli intelligence organization.

With regard to the two detained Arabs in London, Yasser Arafat, the PLO leader, said: "If the news about sending these two people to assassinate the PLO representatives turns out to be true, then it is completely evident that these two have been in contact with Israel, since only Israel is disturbed by the official visit of PLO representatives to England."

The British police published the news of the arrest of the two twelve days after their arrest. A source close to Scotland Yard revealed that it is probable that the two were in touch with the Islamic guerrilla network which started attacking tourists and British institutions six months ago in Athens, Madrid, and Rome. A group calling itself the Muslim Revolutionary

Socialist Organization has declared war on London by placing bombs in three hotels in Athens and throwing bombs at British airline agencies in Rome and Madrid. Reports concerning the identity of this group indicate that there is a strong probability that these terrorists have ties with pro-Ayatollah Khomeyni terrorists in Lebanon and Colonel Qadhdhafi's regime.

9815/12899

CSO: 4640/23

IRAN

STRAINED RELATIONS BETWEEN TEHRAN, DAMASCUS CITED

[London KEYHAN in Persian 10 Oct 85 p 6]

[London KEYHAN weekly in Persian; founder and publisher Dr Mesbahzadeh]

[Text] As expected, the Islamic Republic and Syria are moving in the direction of a divorce. The unsuitable couple of today will probably be each other's enemy of tomorrow. The closeness of the fundamentalist regime of ayatollahs with the police and military government of the Assad brothers in Damascus, was nothing but a friendship of convenience from the beginning. Hafez Assad, the president of Syria represents all the things which Ayatollah Khomeyni is against. Nationalism, the separation of religion from the government, the role of military leadership in society, and so on...

Due to two reasons, Khomeyni had and still has to not only tolerate Assad, but also rely on him for very important political reasons. The first reason is Syrian aid to the Islamic Republic in cutting off the flow of Iraqi oil. The second reason is Syria's role in delivering Soviet arms to Iran.

In the past one or two years, the Syrian role in cutting off the flow of Iraqi oil has gradually lost its importance. At present, Iraq exports more oil than Iran and it is involved in increasing the capacity of its main oil pipeline via Turkey to the Mediterranean and from Saudi Arabia to the Red Sea.

In regard to the delivery of Soviet arms to Iran, it must be stated that Syria, especially in recent months, has become more thrifty. It seems that the new Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev, and Edward Shevardnadze would like to study the Islamic Republic case from a new viewpoint. At any rate, contrary to the first years of the Iraq-Iran war, Syria does not seem to be in a rush to deliver arms and spare parts to the Islamic Republic. To some extent, Syria's new course results from Saudi Arabian and Kuwaiti pressure but there is no doubt that Moscow has also recommended use of precaution to Damascus.

On the other hand, Hafez Assad had and still has two main reasons to attract the friendship of the Ayatollah. The first reason is that by involving Iraq in war, the Ayatollah has prevented the Baghdad Ba'ath party from competing with the Damascus Ba'ath party, and at a time when Egypt has been abandoned by the Arab world, Syria can claim Arab leadership.

The second reason for Syria's freindship with the Ayatollah is that Hafez Assad intends to represent himself as a politician who has control over all the extremist forces in the region and finally force the United States to officially recognize his regime as the principal side in the course of the Middle East dispute. It was based on the same direction that Hafez Assad intended to dominate the Palestine Liberation Organization and take all the terrorist groups in the region, including the Armenians and Kurds, under his wing. The Islamic Republic, as the most mischievous regime of the region has practically placed a part of its foreign policy at Hafez Assad's disposal.

Regardless of all this, the situation is in the process of change. Just the same way as the Islamic Republic cannot count on Syria as it did two years ago, Hafez Assad also cannot be sure that the Tehran ayatollahs are as worthwhile as they were two years ago. The physical point of encounter for both sides could be Lebanon and the hostage-taking issue of the Soviet diplomats is only part of the show which is gradually taking shape.

An extremist policy is always faced with the danger of confrontation with its Islamic rivals. The ultimate goal of Khomeyni is nothing short of domination of all the Islamic countries. He deeply considers Hafez Assad an infidel. Khomeyni is using his efforts to take possession of Lebanon by terror, radicalism and bribery. Also in his own way, Hafez Assad wants to annex Lebanon and in doing so, he uses military power, trickery, politics and diplomatic threats. Two expansionist regimes cannot be inserted in one tiny Lebanon and the events in Tripoli are but the prelude of Tehran-Damascus confrontation in Lebanon.

But the important question today is that the entire Islamic Republic and the probability of its existence is in doubt. Neither the United States nor the Soviet Union are certain that Tehran's ayatollahs will remain in power through next year and as a result, attracting the friendship of the Islamic Republic or at least maintaining its stability, does not have the same value today as it did yesterday.

9815/12899

CSO: 4640/20

IRAN

UNREST, TENSION REPORTED

GF181850 (Clandestine) Radio Iran in Persian 1330 GMT 18 Nov 85

[Text] According to our correspondent in Tehran, there is a strange atmosphere of unrest and tension in most of the districts and incidents have taken place which the regime tries to conceal from the people. The Radio Iran correspondent has briefly reported on these incidents. We draw your attention to this synopsis of events:

At 0930 [0600 GMT] on Sunday morning, on 10 November a patrol vehicle of the komiteh carrying 13 persons bound for Pol-e Rumi was passing along the Khashayar-Seyyed Khandan route when eight persons who had been arrested by the komiteh members alighted and escaped despite one of the guards firing his gun into the air.

Earlier, at 0530 [0200 GMT] a powerful bomb exploded near the office of the People's Front of Nimruz belonging to Afghan Mujahidin in Zabol. In the explosion, 50 percent of the building was damaged and two of the employees were injured.

On the same day, at 1445 [1115 GMT] another bomb exploded near the residence of the director of the People's Front of Nimruz in the village of (Siahtar). Two women and four infants were killed and a woman and her newborn child were critically injured. The entire house collapsed. The intended target of this attack was the director of the People's Front of Nimruz in Zabol.

At 0428 hours [0058 GMT] on Sunday 10 November, several unidentified persons fired upon the komiteh patrol unit in (Shandiz); two komiteh members were killed. Later, at 0630 [0300 GMT], several unidentified persons pelted a komiteh patrol unit with stones along Aryamehr Avenue in Tehran.

Another report states that at 0330 hours [0000 GMT] on Saturday 9 November two unidentified persons attacked the residence of a regime's Guards' Corps official and killed him. Our correspondent adds in another report: At 1030 hours [0700] on the same day, a group of farmers of Saveh staged protests outside the governorate of the city to express their anger and indignation over the country's agricultural policy. Also on the same day, 150 Armenians from Esfaha shouted slogans against the war and the warmongering Khomeyni

regime on the occasion of the internment rites of an Armenian soldier. Later the same day, at 2030 [1700 GMT], two occupants of Paykan automobile abducted two troublesome Hezbollahis. Also on the same day, along the Chaharmardan Avenue in Qom, a clergyman who was a regime employee was killed by a motorcyclist.

Another report states that on Wednesday 6 November the employees of the Ravand carpet company struck work to demand the dismissal of the Hezbollahi director of the company. Yet another report adds: On Tuesday, 26 October, in Northern 'Aliabad, two armed officials of the regime were fired upon by two motorcyclists and killed.

/6662

CSO: 4640/77

IRAN

CLANDESTINE NOTES FRICTION AMONG GROUPS

GF110520 (Clandestine) Radio Iran in Persian 1330 GMT 10 Nov 85

[Text] The National Democratic Front of Iran [jebhe-ye melli-ye democratic-e Iran] in a statement has announced its separation from the National Resistance Council. The statement signed by Bahman Nirumand, a member of the administrative council of the National Democratic Front and its spokesman, has been published in Persian press, published abroad and notes that the National Resistance Council has been turned into a dependent and identityless organization which, in truth, is only an appendix of the Mojahedin-e Khalq organization. As a result, the front no longer sees any reason to remain a member of the council.

The statement adds: Artificial and completely imaginary divisions between the revolution and counterrevolution; and hostile and terrorizing confrontations and continuous imposition of the will of the Mojahedin organization on the entire council has eradicated any hope of creation of a democratic atmosphere. This has resulted in the loss of a historic opportunity and the gradually atrophy of the council. Bani-Sadr, the United Front of the left, the Kurdish Democratic Party, Kar Party, Naser Pakdaman, and many other supporters have left the council. Those remaining have gradually been dissolved under the pressure of the Mojahedin-e Khalq organization and have lost their independent identity. The statement goes on to add: Current conditions in the council no longer have any common points with our plans and goals.

Our report adds that the administrative council of the National Democratic Front has warned Hedayatollah Matin-Daftari that if he refuses to resign from the National Resistance Council, he will be expelled from the National Democratic Front of Iran.

/6662

CSO: 4640/77

IRAN

RADIO IRAN SAYS ATMOSPHERE IN TOWNS 'ABNORMAL'

GF051652 (Clandestine) Radio Iran in Persian 1330 GMT 5 Nov 85

[Text] The atmosphere in Iranian towns continues to be abnormal. The correspondents of Radio Iran and nationalist elements indicate that hardly a day passes without some sort of an incident occurring in Tehran.

Last week the car carrying the minister of trade and commerce was shot at in Tehran by unknown gunmen. The report from our correspondent indicates that the incident occurred last Wednesday at 1640 but no one was hurt. Our reporter says the assailants riding motorcycles, after shooting several rounds into the car carrying Ja'fari, the regime's minister of trade and commerce, fled from the scenes.

In Sanandaj, one Iranian Kurdish group carried out a series of lightning attacks and managed to kill 17 of the regime's Revolution Guards.

A large number of unemployed people in Kermanshah [now called Bakhtaran] who have lost everything they own and who have grown weary of poverty and deprivation, gathered in front of the Central Committee headquarters of the Revolution Guards and asked Ruhollah Khomeyni to do something for them and provide them with employment instead of giving them empty slogans. Our reporter in Kermanshah says the armed Revolution Guards answered this just demand, as always, with guns. They attacked the rows of demonstrators and arrested 15 of them. Our reporter says that in Kermanshah no one is afraid of the regime's arbitrary arrests and threats these days and the atmosphere of discontent is prevalent in the town.

Last Wednesday at 1200 there was a bloody incident on Tehran's Sattarkhan Street. Our reporter says the passengers of a Peykan automobile, while approaching the flyover on Taj Street, opened automatic weapons' fire on a group of the regime's security officials and then fled from the area. One security official was wounded in the shoulder in this armed attack.

A large number of workers at Iran's national factory, which manufactures Peykan cars, gathered in front of the Ministry of Industries and asked for a pay increase. The demonstrations took place last Thursday at 0700.

/12712

CSO: 4640/66

IRAN

CLANDESTINE RADIO COMMENTS ON POPULATION, HEALTH HAZARDS

GF070835 (Clandestine) Radio Nejat-e Iran in Persian 0330 GMT 4 Nov 85

[Excerpts] Every day the regime newspapers print a new article on the level of helplessness of the government in dealing with problems of social and health services.

The newspapers, ordered and observed by the Imam, have reported that the death rate of children in Iran has risen as never before during the past 2 years; we have not reported this. The censored regime newspapers reported that 90 percent of Iran's drinking water, particularly in villages and smaller towns is contaminated; we have not reported this. The mercenary regime newspapers reported that a large number of patients admitted to hospitals have become ill by drinking this water; we have not reported this. They have not explained why water which makes you ill can be called drinking water. We asked the health officials how else can water be called undrinkable. This is the problem of water. However, the pollution problem goes much further than this. There is no need to go very far. If you start walking from the beginning of Masjed-e Shah and carry on from Bozarjomehri towards Khayyam Street, pass the city park, and go as far as Hassanabad crossroads, it would be surprising if you do not feel sick from the dirt and water running in streams; from the unrecognizable mixtures sold as food and beverages to the unemployed and homeless masses of people on the streets; from the garbage from cooking and eating, discarded on the streets; from mosquitoes and flies covering food refuse as a thick and even layer; and finally from the maddening bustle of Tehran. It would be surprising if you do not become sick from all this.

The former litany chanters, hymn writers, and vultures of the past, who are today the rulers of the so-called Islamic Republic, jumped the gun when they said there was housing available for all Iranians in Tehran and other large cities. Today, however, the problem of Khomeyni's regime is not just bringing the poor unemployed masses of villagers to the cities and providing them with housing, no, the regime needed people for demonstrations, marches, and gathering of masses. They needed people when Motahari was killed in a power struggle between the rulers of the Khomeyni regime. They were able to gather the masses for marching. When Behesti and others were torn to pieces at the Islamic Republican Party headquarters, they were able to give the prepared placards and photos to the thousands of hezbollahies, and began mourning ceremonies and filled the mosques and various places with people.

By doing this they provide appropriate food for television cameras and astonish foreign observers brought to Iran to see the fruits of the revolution. The more people are deceived the better. This has been the sole point of Khomeyni's power. In any way possible they must bring the people to the city streets, particularly Tehran. In this way he can stage the so-called glory and majesty of the so-called Islamic revolution of the Imam of ummah for the people of the world. It is not surprising that in every speech Khomeyni repeats the words, on the scene.

Now that the masses are tired of war, destruction, and rationing, Khomeyni is now suppressing organizations such as the Guards Corps, committees, revolution courts, the so-called Islamic committees, and others. The masses are left to die from pollution and hunger; all that is left is Khomeyni and his spear. One can lean against a spear but cannot sit on it. However, no dictator has learned a lesson from this; neither has Khomeyni.

/12712

CSO: 4640/65

IRAN

BRIEFS

THREAT TO DISSOLVE MAJLIS--Now that the level of disagreement has severely increased between the Majlis members who are for or against the cabinet of Mir Hoseyn Musavi, the Majlis members have been warned through Ayatollah Khomeyni's office and by Ahmad Khomeyni that if the disagreements continue among them and create problems for the cabinet, Ayatollah Khomeyni will issue an order to dissolve the Majlis. This threat has assumed a more serious aspect particularly since the election of new ministers, some of whom received only one-half the votes from the Majlis. Two did not receive any votes at all. [Text] [London KEYHAN in Persian 7 Nov 85 p 3 GF] /8918

FEAR OF ARMY--While the level of discontent is increasing in the country, the Islamic Republic is afraid of sudden action by the Army. During the past month, particularly following the order issued by Ayatollah Khomeyni to establish air and naval units--an action which caused a severe reaction in the Army--the rulers of the Islamic Republic began to praise the Army. For this reason, first Ayatollah Khomeyni extended his kindness and attention to the Army. Following this, during his Friday prayer sermon, Hashemi-raftsanjani expressed his pride in the power and ability of the Army. Later Musavi-ardabili, Khamene'i, Anbiatolonel Sayyad-shirazi began to honor and glorify the army. It is interesting that in their recent statements the rulers of the Islamic Republic have directed their attention to the Army Air Corps, which is prepared for every kind of defense operation in the cities, and has trained personnel for commando operations. It is also interesting to know that there are more of the regime's informers in this unit than in any other. Recently one member of this unit named Colonel Mohammad Hoseyn Jalali, who was the head of operations for the Army Air Corps during the previous regime, was appointed minister of defense. [Text] [London Keyhan in Persian 7 Nov 85 p 3 GF] /8918

POLICE CHIEF REPLACED--Colonel Samimi, chief of the Islamic Republic of Iran's police arrived in Bushehr Province this morning to review the situation in the province and to name the new chief of police for Bushehr Province. He was welcomed at the airport by local dignitaries. He then held a meeting with the province police officials and discussed various issues. Later in the morning Colonel Samimi attended a meeting at the governor general's office where he named Colonel Mansur Mahtash as the new chief of police for Bushehr Province to replace Colonel Hoseyniyan. He thanked Colonel Hoseyniyan for his services and then reviewed various matters of the province before visiting several of the local police and highway patrol stations in the area. [Summary] [Bushehr Domestic Service in Persian 1330 GMT 16 Nov 85 GF] /8918

LANDS EXPROPRIATED--Tehran, Nov 18, IRNA--The Office of the Prosecutor General of the Islamic Republic of Iran has expropriated 7600 hectares of lands of former senior officials of the deposed shah's regime, Tehran dailies report Monday. The dailies say that during a recent visit to the northern provinces of the country the Prosecutor-General Hoj [as received] Musavi Kho'ini had inspected the lands. The names of many top former military commanders in the ex-regime including General Azhari and General Qarabaqi are in the list of the people whose lands has been seized. The Persian daily 'ETELA'AT' in its headlines says the public lands had been distributed on the order of the ex-shah among his cronies. Recipients of lands were apparently supposed to convert them to farmlands for promoting agricultural production. [Text] [Tehran IRNA in English 1647 GMT 18 Nov 85 LD] /8918

JETTY CONSTRUCTION UNDERWAY--Tehran, Nov 18, IRNA--Construction works of the first jetty resistant to air, land, and sea attacks are underway in Qeshm Island, Persian Gulf, the morning daily JOMHURI ESLAMI reported Monday. The project, designed by Iranian experts, is highly advanced and at the same time its costs is only one tenth of other projects while it is far more stronger, the report said. After completion of the project, other naval establishment such as sea highways, fly overs, shelters, gas stations, and oil platforms can be installed. Manager of the project, Ahmad Masoudi, said that the Islamic Republic of Iran was willing to assist oppressed nations and the Third World countries in this field, the daily added. He noted that implementation of the project by the Iranian workers saved the flow of \$2 billion of foreign exchange. It quoted Masoudi as saying that the Iraqi-imposed war had encouraged Iranians to carry out various projects enabling them to reach economic self-sufficiency. [Text] [Tehran IRNA in English 1045 GMT 18 Nov 85 LD] /8918

COMMODITIES IMPORT--Tehran, Nov 19, IRNA--Due to increased domestic production, wheat imports for the current Iranian year is cut down by more than 1 million tons. The government has stopped purchase of commodities from the United States, France, the Zionist regime, South Africa and Egypt, on the grounds that policies of these countries are against stance of the Islamic Republic of Iran. Instead, it gives priority to Islamic countries of the Third World and neutral countries. Wheat is imported from Australia, Argentina and Turkey, and out of 3.5 million tons of domestic consumption for the last Iranian year (ended March 20, 1985) 3 million tons were imported. However, for the current year due to a 1 million ton increase in domestic output, wheat imports will be 2.5 million tons. Rice imports, mainly from Uruguay, Argentina, Thailand, and Suriname, for the current year is 500,000 tons. Last year it was 700,000 tons. This year's increased domestic sugar production will limit imports to 500,000 tons, enabling a cut back on its imports by 100,000 tons, imported from Turkey and Brazil. [Summary] [Tehran IRNA in English 1015 GMT 19 Nov 85 LD] /8918

OFFICIALS TAKEN HOSTAGE--A report from Kordestan indicates that 3 days ago, in an attack by Iraqi commandos on one of the revolution guards camps near Sanandaj in the early morning, Hasan Kafi, an official of the information center of the revolution guards of the Iranian Republic in south Kordestan, was captured with 14 others by the Iraqis. They were taken across the border. [Text] [(Clandestine) Voice of the Liberation of Iran in Persian 0330 GMT 10 Nov 85 GF] /8918

SABOTAGE ATTEMPT--While the Omani Government has announced its readiness to seek a just solution for termination of the Gulf war, some mercenaries of the Islamic Republic who intended to illegally enter the Sultanate of Oman were arrested by the police of that country. The Arabic language AL-DUSTUR newspaper published in London, which carried this item, states: Some terrorists of the Islamic Republic who had recently reached the mountainous region in southern Oman via the Oman Sea were arrested and sent to prison. AL-DUSTUR continues: In the initial interrogation, the Khomeyni agents admitted that they received training in terrorism at a naval base located in Bandar 'Abbas and had been dispatched to Oman. These arsonists also confessed that the objective of their illegal entry into Oman was subversion and carrying out acts of terrorism during the convening of the sixth conference of the heads of the GCC states in Muscat. [Text] [(Clandestine) Radio Iran in Persian 1330 GMT 12 Nov 85 GF] /6662

FADLALLAH URGES ARAB RESISTANCE--Beirut, Nov 9, IRNA--Prayers leader here Shaykh Muhammad Hasan Fadlallah said Friday that Saudi-sponsored conferences avoid the topic of the Zionist regime. Speaking in Friday prayers sermons, Fadlallah said that Arab countries spend billions of dollars to help Iraq in its war against the Islamic Republic but fall short in their resistance against the regime occupying Qods [Jerusalem]. He said Arab states toeing the U.S. line worry about the Islamic movement against the Zionist regime and consider it an obstacle vis-a-vis their own welfare. On the Damascus negotiations and agreements concerning Lebanon Fadlallah said, "The details of the agreements are not important to us. Our objective is how to face with Israel." He urged the participants at sessions on the Arab and Islamic world to be explicit and said that to declare positions in a clear-cut and unambiguous manner is as good as fighting against the Qods-occupying regime. [Text] [Tehran IRNA in English 1839 GMT 9 Nov 85 LD]

BANDAR 'ABBAS FLOATING DOCK--Tehran: A floating dock for Iran's Bandar 'Abbas shipbuilding plant, now nearing completion in West Germany, will be ready for delivery in the next few months. The \$1.5 million facility, one of the biggest of its kind in the world, will enable Iran to repair large vessels, according to a spokesman of the Bandar 'Abbas Port Authority. [Text] [Manama GULF DAILY NEWS in English 9 Nov 85 p 15 GF]

RUPTURE IN TRADE--Buenes Aires, Nov 16, IRNA--Iran has stopped purchasing commodities from Argentina due to having unilateral trade relations with that country, the semi-official LA NACION daily published here, wrote in a recent issue. It quited Iran's charge d'affaires to Argentina, Abbas Salari, as saying that probable changes in Iran's programmes to purchase goods from Argentina would be made due to unilateral commercial relations. Meanwhile, another official at Iran's embassy, Asefi, said that efforts made to sell Iran's oil and raw materials to Argentina have so far failed, the daily added. However, the Iranian officials have denied allegations that sale of Argentina's aircraft to Iraq has made Iran to take such a measure, the newspaper said. While Argentina's Foreign Ministry has not acknowledged Iran's recent decision to stop purchasing goods from that country, another Argentina daily AMBITO FINANCIERO has reported that Salari and Asefi Friday confirmed cancellation of the trip of an Iranian delegation to Argentina to purchase commodities from that country. [Text] [Tehran IRNA in English 1115 GMT 16 Nov 85 LD] /8918

ESFAHAN STEEL MILL--The Esfahan steel mill is in danger of grinding to a halt due to corrosion. The Voice of the Liberation of Iran correspondent reports from Esfahan: Following the grinding to a halt of the metallurgical unit of the Esfahan steel complex, furnace number one of this mill is deteriorating due to lack of technical supervision and the absence of experts. In view of the fact that furnace number one bears the majority of the burden of production of this huge industrial complex, two-thirds of the mill's production will be suspended if the Soviet experts do not return by the end of the month of Esfand [20 February-20 March] at the latest. [Text] [(Clandestine) Voice of the Liberation of Iran in Persian 1630 GMT 16 Nov 85 GF] /8918

CHAH BAHAR HARBOR--The volume of unloading and loading of goods in Chah Bahar's Martyr Beheshti harbor has reached 60,000 tons per day. The construction of this harbor has been prompted by its strategic position, the inception of the imposed war, and the plan to wipe out deprivation in deprived areas and at present is providing a great deal of employment in this part of our country. [Excerpts] [Tehran Domestic Service in Persian 1030 GMT 14 Nov 85 LD] /8918

PISTONS FOR GDR--According to IRNA, a piston manufacturing plant in Tabriz has saved over 26.5 million dm in foreign exchange, per annum, in accordance with self-reliant industrial policies and the principle of independence of foreign countries, adopted in our country. In the near future and based on a completed contract with the GDR, more than 50,000 pistons of various types manufactured in this plant will be exported to that country. [Excerpt] [Tehran Domestic Service in Persian 1030 GMT 17 Nov 85 LD] /8918

TRIBAL CENSUS STATISTICS--By the grace of God, the first phase of the country's tribal census has been completed thanks to cooperation afforded by the State Tribal Affairs Organization and the Iran Statistics center. The number of migratory families, as laid down by definition, is approximately 188,520 who own approximately 23,566,000 sheep and goats and some 255,638 cows and buffalo, which demonstrates the importance of the tribes in the country's stock breeding. Of these 16 areas where we gathered information, the area of Chahar Mahal va Bakhtiari, which also comprises a part of Khuzestan and Esfahan, according to our classification boasts 34,851 migratory families who constitute the majority. Next comes the Fars and Bushehr area, which also includes a part of Esfahan, which boasts some 30,338 migratory families. The number of the tribes throughout the country as we have learned from this census is 92, and there are 482 independent clans. One could say that the Kerman and Homozgan area, boasts of 27 tribes and therefore has the biggest concentration of tribes. Sistan va baluchestan, also boasts of 330 independent clans, the greatest number in this region. [Excerpts] [Tehran Domestic Service in Persian 1030 GMT 13 Nov 85 LD] /8918

CSO: 4640/77

PAKISTAN

UNREST IN KARACHI: REASONS ANALYZED

Karachi DAWN in English 2 Nov 85 p 9

[Text]

IN A MOVE that is without precedent the Federal Government, in consultation with the Sind Government, has established a Commission of Enquiry to pinpoint the reasons for cases of unrest in Karachi at the "slightest provocation" and after what have been termed "ordinary incidents". According to the announcement by the Cabinet Secretariat the riots and violence by mobs in Karachi at provocations common in any large city suggests underlying unrest, which should be investigated so that remedial measures can be adopted. The Commission which has been set up will examine several areas of civic deficiency in the city, as well as the administrative structure which needs reorganisation so that it can better meet the needs of the people. A study of this nature is not something that can be undertaken easily, particularly in three months — which is how much time has been given to the Commission to submit its report. The Commission obviously cannot achieve much if it undertakes to examine the question of unrest in Karachi without any frame of reference, for in that case wider sociological implications will come into play also. It must, therefore, examine the issue with particular reference to

certain specific matters. Some of these have already been spelled out — in fact stress has been put on two main aspects. One of these is the administrative set-up of the city, which might need reorganisation, while the other is the matter of poor civic amenities, including transport problems, in the city and its suburbs.

While examining the administrative structure, one important aspect into which the Commission should look is the responsiveness of officials to public needs and demands. This involves the basic issue of accountability also. The fact is that public officials often take the position that they do not have a duty to look into the needs of the people. People get the distinct impression that public officials feel they are not answerable to anyone for their misdeeds, or for their failure to perform their duties honestly. Something that is intimately associated with this attitude is corruption. Officials often seem to feel that any service they perform for the public needs extra payment: the result is that people are having to pay bribes for more and more services performed by officials. In fact some very routine tasks have to be paid for these days. Something else that disturbs people is that the

situation is getting worse steadily, and there is no telling to what extent it might deteriorate. It is not surprising, therefore, that tempers should rise when people are denied their rights by officials whose duty it is to help them. This, incidentally, is not something that is exclusive to Karachi. What seems to have happened here is that collective frustration has grown to a point where the flashpoint has been reached. As a result of this store of frustration people now react quickly to situations with violence. Other cities will also come to this point in the next few years, if matters are not taken in hand.

The provision of civic amenities is also something that is a sore point with Karachi, and that has contributed to the sense of deprivation and, consequently, anger. This city is the most rapidly growing urban area in the country. The existence of commerce and industry, coupled with the lack of opportunities in rural areas has meant the influx of large numbers of people into Karachi - who pay no local taxes at all. Despite knowing this fact, and

despite being told of the strain being put on the city, both the Federal and Provincial Governments have failed to inject sufficient funds to ensure that civic amenities here meet people's requirements at least minimally. In addition there are severe distortions in other areas. In the matter of public transport, for instance, not only is available transport totally inadequate for the city but also at times behaves as though it is above the law — and the reference here is to minibuses and the recent riots. All this is a source of irritation for people, and ultimately it gets to a point where tempers turn volatile. While examining Karachi's problem, which will also eventually be the problems of other cities, the Commission should keep in mind one important fact: that when legal and peaceful means of redress are available to people they do not turn to violence. The mob psychology that this city is adopting is a serious matter, which reflects serious shortcomings in bureaucratic and civic management. It should be seriously examined so that remedies can be applied.

/9317

CSO: 4600/83

PAKISTAN

SIND MINISTER SAYS MORE POLICE NEEDED TO CURB CRIME

Karachi DAWN in English 3 Nov 85 p 8

[Text]

HYDERABAD, Nov. 2: Sind Health Minister and Hyderabad Mayor Syed Ahad Yousuf has said that the city people were mourning the deaths of five innocent persons, including a couple and minor children who had been bludgeoned to death on Friday night in Makram Para and it had become imperative to restore the confidence of the citizens.

He told a news conference on Saturday that it was essential to increase the strength of the police as it was impossible for just 41 constables to patrol the whole of Latifabad which had a population of half a million.

He demanded immediate steps to improve the law and order situation and permanent solution of unemployment and other pressing problems of the city.

He also demanded that the status of Latifabad should be raised to that of a sub division.

Syed Ahad Yousuf cautioned that if the problems of the city were not solved without any further loss of time, the consequences would be disastrous.

He said he was not only prepared to sacrifice his mayorship and ministership but also his life for the cause of the people of Hyderabad.

He said as soon as he received the information about the brutal skull bashing he immediately rushed to Hyderabad and visited LMC Hospital and ordered the shifting of three seriously wounded persons to Karachi.

(Sixth death: Death toll in the skull bashing case rose to six on Saturday when a young woman, Bibi, who was admitted to the Jinnah Post-Graduate Medical Centre at Karachi succumbed to her injuries, reports our staff reporter.)

IGP assures: The Inspector General of Police (Sind) Agha Saadat Ali Shah visited the scene of crime today.

He assured that the police would leave no stone unturned in bringing the culprits (presumably so called 'hammer group') to book.

The IGP, who rushed to Hyderabad from Karachi in the morning further assured that the investigator, would keep in view all causes local or otherwise, and were in contact with police in other parts of the country where such crimes had occurred.

Meanwhile, it is learnt that several investigating teams have been constituted under the supervision of experienced officers to check every possible aspect of the crime. The two remaining wounded persons admitted to the LMC Hospital have shown signs of improvement.

Investigators: The DIG, Crime Branch, Mr. Azhar Ali Farooqi, also left Karachi for Hyderabad along with some expert detectives (APP adds).

A Rawalpindi police party, which had arrived in connection with the investigation of murder of 11 persons in Dhok Khabba, is also said to have gone to Hyderabad to join the investigations.

According to DIG, Crime Branch, the police were investigating each "hammer group" killing separately.

He said besides skull bashing cases in Lahore, Karachi, Kasur, Rawalpindi, Bahawalpur, Abbottabad, Azad Kashmir, Dharam Puri, about a dozen identical cases were registered in various parts of Punjab.

Sukkur alert: The DIGP, Sukkur Range, Syed Asif Ali Shah, has directed all the Superintendents of Police in Sukkur Division, to be alert and vigilant in taking every preventive action against the operations of the 'hammer group' in their areas.

Talking to APP on telephone this evening, the DIG said that he has directed the policemen in Sukkur Division particularly to keep a strict watch in areas along rail tracks as almost all the previous incidents committed by the "hammer group" in Sind so far took place in areas near railway tracks.

All the highways and other vulnerable places, he added, would be strictly watched by area police, besides keeping an eye over every suspect person or newcomers in

areas of jurisdiction of all police stations in the Division, particularly after midnight.

The police informers have also been activated in an attempt to round up the 'hammer group' criminals, he said.

Syed Asif Ali Shah further said that patrolling by police had been increased and police parties strengthened.

The DIG has also appealed to the people to take measures for their safety and also to inform their nearest police station in case they found some suspect criminal in the vicinity.

Shock expressed: Federal Minister for Food and Agriculture Qazi Abdul Majid Abul has expressed his deep shock and horror over the Hyderabad incident.

In a statement issued in Islamabad today, the minister expressed profound sympathy with the bereaved family and has hoped that the local administration would spare no pains to unearth the perpetrations of the heinous crime.

In Karachi MPA Ghulam Hussain also expressed deep shock over the incident and has appealed to the government to expedite the tracking down of the culprits.

/9317

CSO: 4600/83

PAKISTAN

ASGHAR KHAN WARNS ABOUT KALABAGH DAM

Karachi DAWN in English 3 Nov 85 p 2

[Text]

PESHAWAR, Nov 2: The defunct Tehrik-i-Istiqlal chief, Air Marshal (ret'd) Asghar Khan, has cautioned the Government against risks involved in going ahead with the construction of Kalabagh Dam, and advised them to leave the matter to constitutionally elected representatives to reach a consensus on the issue.

Talking to newsmen at the University Town residence of provincial chief of the party, Munir Shah he called for restoration of the 1973 Constitution in its original form, challenging the right of the Parliament to amend it. He said the 1973 constitution might not be a foolproof document but it was the only document which was acceptable to the people of Pakistan for it was passed by consensus of the units. It could, therefore, be amended by a democratically and constitutionally elected parliament with a mandate for amendments through consensus of the federating provinces, he maintained.

Earlier addressing the second session of the joint convention of Istiqlal Students Federation and Istiqlal Youth League, the former Air Chief severely criticised Waderas, Jagirdars and Zamindars for siding

with all dictatorial regimes in Pakistan and declared that his party would establish a social democracy in the country and distribute agricultural lands among farmers.

He announced confiscation of all Jagirs without compensation as soon as his party came into power. He also criticised the economic, industrial and agricultural policies of the regime pointing out that while Indian Punjab was still the granary of India, West Punjab (Pakistan) had turned into a deficit province, depending on American wheat.

POLITICAL PARTIES: Replying to a question the Tehrik chief expressed the view that practically restrictions would continue on political parties even after the passage of Political Parties Act, because the present rulers could not afford to face politicians and parties before people in the open. "This Government is devoid of political support and power and, therefore, they are afraid of the parties," he remarked. However, "we shall wait", he added.

JAMAAT-UL-ISLAMI: Asked to comment on the statement of Mian Tufail, Amir of defunct Jamaat-i-

Islami in which he had accused the retired Air Marshal and Khan Abdul Wali Khan of inviting the military to take over, Asghar Khan said that it was the outlawed Jamaat which joined hands with the military rulers and served under them in the government. "They have been supporting dictatorship in the country which is proved by their actions and policy consistently pursued since the inception of Pakistan. They know they cannot come in to power through democratic process," he remarked.

TIES WITH MRD: Questioned about MRD-Tehrik relations which appeared to be strained, the Tehrik chief dispelled all doubts about it specially after the ouster from the defunct PPP of elements raising the Confederation bogey. He said Tehrik's participation in MRD was at the central level because "we do not want to dilute our programme while in the alliance and particularly at district level", he maintained.

AFGHANISTAN: Answering a question on Afghanistan, Asghar Khan said that only a representative government could solve the problem. He accused the United States of interference.

/9317
CSO: 4600/83

PAKISTAN

KALABAGH: 'TRADEOFF' FOR SIND, NWFP SAID

Karachi DAWN (BUSINESS supplement) in English 2 Nov 85 p 1

[Article by M. Ziauddin]

[Text]

A POLITICO-ECONOMIC trade-off is reportedly in the offing on the Kalabagh dam project between the Federal Government and the provincial governments of NWFP and Sind.

This trade off would be, according to informed sources, over and above any compensation that would be paid to the people to be displaced or affected by the project and the expenditure likely to be incurred on rehabilitating them.

The federal and provincial officials of the concerned departments are reportedly in continuous contact for identifying the trade-off points which would be discussed at a higher level when the Federal Finance Minister goes to NWFP next week.

Survey

Meanwhile, the World Bank is reported to have asked the Government of Pakistan to conduct an in-depth survey to find out the exact number of people that would be affected by the project and the extent of their losses and submit a realistic scheme for their rehabilitation alongwith the compensation formula.

This survey is expected to be carried out by some local agency, having adequate experience and facilities.

It is being hinted by knowledgeable circles that the World Bank would cobble up the financial package for the 4 to 5 billion dollar project as soon as the result of this survey is submitted to it.

In what is regarded by these circles as a dramatic development, the World Bank, which upto three months back was not enthusiastic about the Kalabagh project, now appeared to be convinced of its economic viability as well as of its critical importance to Pakistan's energy needs.

Dramatic change

In the opinion of these circles, this dramatic change in the attitude of the World Bank towards the project was brought about by two factors.

They think that the Government of Pakistan has finally succeeded in convincing the US Administration of its nuclear innocence and the US Administration, as a *quid pro quo*, has agreed to assist in building the dam which would help Pakistan avert the looming energy crisis which was earlier planned to be met through the nuclear energy generation.

Construction industry

The changed attitude of the US Administration rather reportedly reported to have permeated to the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank.

Secondly, sensitive to the economic plight of many developing and developed countries resulting from a serious slump in the world construction business, the World Bank is reportedly finding itself viewing the Kalabagh dam project in a new light.

It is believed that in the changed circumstances the World Bank considered the Kalabagh dam as a mechanism to revive the world construction industry at least partly through the utilisation of some of the huge construction capacity lying idle all over the world.

The total cost of the project is estimated to be somewhere between 4 to 5 billion dollars. Of this about 40 per cent is to be financed through local resources.

The World Bank is expected to contribute something like 700 million dollars with the Asian Development Bank pitching in with another 700 million dollars.

The Government of Pakistan is reported to have informed the World Bank that it would seek an assistance of about 350 million dollars for the project from the US and about 200 million dollars from Japan.

Islamic Development Bank and the Kuwait Fund and other sources are expected to contribute another 450 million dollars.

Internal mobilisation

While the foreign exchange component for the project does not seem to pose such a big problem in the changed circumstances, it is not yet known how the Government of Pakistan would mobilise something like Rs. 26 billion (40 per cent of the project cost) over the six years of dam's construction period.

The Annual Development Plan, from next year onwards, would have to shell out as much as Rs. 4.5 billion annually. This is, indeed, a heavy burden.

While mobilisation of such a huge amount annually would surely pose a problem in the coming years, the immediate hurdle in the way of taking the project in

hand is said to be the increasing opposition to it from NWFP and Sind.

Orchestration

Some circles allege that the controversy was engineered and orchestrated by the very circles which are now trying in a hurry to diffuse it through the offer of a trade-off.

It is said that some six months ago, when these circles found that they would not be able to line up the foreign exchange resources required for launching the project in time, they engineered the controversy in order to escape the blame for failing to take in hand a very important energy project on schedule.

However, after the dramatic change in the attitude of the World Bank towards the project, in recent weeks, these very circles are reported to have become very active and vocal in support of the project and have issued categorical statements to the effect that no change of site or design of the project was being contemplated.

Chashma

According to independent experts, since the Chashma nuclear power project appears to have been abandoned, for all intents and purposes, and since there is no possibility of Pakistan acquiring capability of generating nuclear energy in the foreseeable future, the Kalabagh dam project remains the only option left for meeting the looming energy crisis in the 1990s.

On the other hand, they said that some of the objections raised by the NWFP and Sind, too, are valid.

The decision makers in Islamabad, while appearing rather in a haste to get the things going and bind the World Bank and other donors on the financial package before somebody changes his mind somewhere, find they cannot at this juncture avoid making a deal with those who appear to be politicising the whole issue.

Therefore, their attempts to bring about a quick trade-off.

PAKISTAN

FOREIGN INVESTORS FETED

Karachi DAWN in English 5 Nov 85 p 1

[Text] Islamabad, Nov 4--Federal Minister for Finance and Planning, Dr Mahbubul Haq has called upon the foreign investors to associate themselves in real partnership for the industrialisation of Pakistan.

The call was made here on Sunday night at a dinner hosted by the Finance Minister in honour of the visiting 22-member delegation of the International Public Affairs Centre (IPAC) of Belgium.

"We want to turn Pakistan into an industrial power which could bring benefits to all segments of society. Mere assembly plant or processing unit is not our goal," the Minister said.

In this context, the Finance Minister said foreign investment with ultimate aim of transfer of technology and mobilisation of indigenous resources is most welcome in Pakistan. He assured: "You will find us very liberal provided your policies conform to our national priorities." In fact the Government is already following a very liberal investment policy. Private investment opportunities are more open than at any other time. We are trying to create the necessary framework for exploring the full production potential of the country," he added.

Referring to the economic progress of the country, the Minister said that Pakistan has achieved the highest per capita income in the South Asian countries and has maintained a growth rate of 8.4 percent last year.

The Minister hoped that the IPAC delegation during its current visit would make an objective study of the investment potentials in Pakistan.

The dinner was attended by Speaker of the National Assembly, Syed Fakhr Imam, Begum Abida Hussain, MNA, Federal Minister for Commerce Mr Salim Saifullah Khan, Federal Minister for Kashmir Affairs, Syed Qasim Shah, Minister of State for Petroleum Dr Asad Mohammad Khan, Minister of State for Population Begum Atiya Enayetullah, Deputy Chairman Planning Commission, Mr V.A. Jafry, Federal Secretaries for Finance, Production, Water and Power, Establishment, Ambassadors of Germany, USA, Sweden and Chairman CBR.

Replying to Finance Minister's speech Mr Hermanus Koning, leader of the delegation, lauded Pakistan's economic progress. He described his talks with the Finance Minister and the Prime Minister as highly fruitful and hoped that his organisation would play its due role in exploring investment opportunities in Pakistan.

The IPAC delegation also called on the Minister of State for Petroleum and Natural Resources, Dr Mohammad Asad Khan and the Federal Minister for Water and Power, Mir Zafarullah Khan Jamali.

Briefing the delegation about the possibilities of foreign investment in petroleum sector, Dr Asad said that about 80 percent of the potential oil bearing areas of Pakistan was still unexplored.

He said that as a policy matter the present Government welcomes the foreign investment in the petroleum sector.--APP

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PAKISTAN

INDUS VALLEY RELICS TO BE EXHIBITED IN WEST

Karachi DAWN in English 5 Nov 85 p 1

[Text] Karachi, Nov 4--Rare antiquities representing the Indus Valley Civilisation will be exhibited in the West for two to two and half years as a part of "exporting" the cultural heritage of Pakistan and to raise funds for the preservation of the ancient site of Moenjodaro.

It will be one of the biggest undertakings of its type by the Government of Pakistan. Recently, Buddhist antiquities were displayed in some Japanese cities as a part of the same cultural promotion programme.

The exhibition to the West is aimed at familiarising the people about the ancient Indus Valley Civilisation which flourished more than 5,000 years ago.

The original antiquities will cover the famous sites of Moenjodaro, Harappa, Kot Diji, Nindowari and Mehrgarh.

So far, West Germany, France, Italy and the USA have shown willingness to sponsor the exhibition in their countries.

Between 200 to 250 antiquities will be taken out of the country which will perhaps be the largest single movement of original antiquities representing a major civilisation.

The sponsoring countries and the Government of Pakistan will insure against damage, loss or theft in transit and during display. The sum to be insured will run into millions of dollars.

As a safeguard, all the antiquities will not be transported by one single flight. Instead, these will be scattered to three or more flights.

A team from West Germany visited Pakistan recently and another team is expected soon to select the antiques.

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PAKISTAN

QAZI COURTS DEMANDED FOR NWFP

Karachi DAWN in English 5 Nov 85 p 2

[Text] Peshawar, Nov 4--The NWFP Assembly, on ninth day of its current session, today called upon the Government to enforce without further delay a complete Islamic system in all spheres of life.

It reminded the President Gen Mohammad Zia-ul-Haq of his commitment to the nation that if he was returned successful in last December's Referendum, he will accelerate the Islamisation process but regrettably no concrete steps have so far been taken in this direction.

Through a resolution moved by Dr Mohammad Yaqub Khan from Dir which was adopted by the House unanimously, the Assembly stressed the setting up of Qazi courts in the NWFP without unnecessary delay as was promised by the President.

Speaking on his resolution, Dr Yaqub questioned the Government as what hurdles remained in the way of complete enforcement of Islam after the successful completion of general elections and induction of civil government.

Maulana Abdul Baqi, the Provincial Auqaf Minister, supporting the resolution, recalled an offer by the Provincial Governor, Lt-Gen Fazle Haq, to the Federal Government at one of the Federal Cabinet meetings that if given consent he could enforce Islamic system in Frontier province within six months, but the Federal Government did not accede to his suggestion.

He asked the Federal Government to allow the NWFP Government now to forthwith set up Qazi courts in the province. Speakers on the resolution included Haji Usman from Hangu, Enayat Ali Shah and others.

Through another resolution adopted by the House the Assembly recommended to the Provincial Government to take back the challaning powers from police cops confining them to officers above the ASI rank. One resolution moved by Sardar Alam Bacha calling for adoption of Shalwar-Qameez as uniform by police force was rejected by the Assembly and the mover withdrew his resolution.--PPI

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PAKISTAN

MINISTER SAYS FOREIGN HAND POSSIBLE IN MYSTERIOUS MURDERS

Islamabad THE MUSLIM in English 3 Nov 85 p 1

[Text]

ISLAMABAD, Nov. 2: Interior Minister Aslam Khattak said here today the government was seriously concerned over mysterious murders that took place in different parts of the country.

Talking to newsmen at the Islamabad airport after bidding farewell to the President who left for Egypt, Mr. Khattak said every effort was being made to apprehend the culprits.

He was replying to a question when asked to comment on the murder of five persons in Hyderabad with a blunt weapon on the night of Oct. 31.

In response to another question the Minister said the involvement of a foreign hand could not be ruled out. He said on the basis of my experience in different fields, I could not rule out the possibility of foreign hand being involved in these acts. He said the forces inimical to Pakistan did not want this country to progress. There were elements who wanted to harm this country.

Replying to another question on the reported proposal of setting up a special force, he said this could be found in many countries. He said he was of the opinion that such a force should not be equipped with lethal weapons as was the case with the Federal Security Force. It should be provided with rubber bullets and coloured water.

Referring to similar mysterious murders in Dhok Khabba, Muza-ffarabad and Haripur, Mr. Khattak pointed out that he would take up the matter with the Prime Minister to see whatever agency could be utilised to trace out the murderers at the earliest.

Though these incidents were provincial matters, the Minister said, they called for centralised action.

Replying to another question as to why the officials of the law enforcing agencies were not held responsible and accountable for their inability to uncover the mystery behind these murders, Mr. Khattak remarked how the police could be blamed when its size was limited. He said there is one policeman for every 1500 citizens in our country.

Meanwhile the Inspector General Police, Sind Agha Saadat Ali Shah, left Karachi this morning for Hyderabad where five persons including a couple and minor children were brutally hammered to death, presumably by the 'Hathora group'.

The Deputy Inspector General police, Crime Branch Azhar Ali Farooqi, also left for Hyderabad along with some expert detectives.

A Rawalpindi police party, which had arrived in connection with the investigation of murder of 11 persons in Dhok Khabba, is also said to have gone to Hyderabad to join the investigations.

According to DIG Crime Branch the police were investigating each 'Hathora Gang' killing separately. He said besides head dashing cases in Lahore, Karachi, Kasur, Rawalpindi, Bahawalpur, Abbottabad, Azad Kashmir, Dhiram Pant, about a dozen cases of head dashing were registered in various parts of Punjab.

In the meantime the three injured victims of the latest incident who were brought to JPMC with serious head injuries, were operated upon last night. But till this morning they had not regained consciousness. — APP

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CSO: 4600/84

NWFP ASSEMBLY DISCUSSES LAW, ORDER

Karachi DAWN in English 4 Nov 85 p 2

[Text]

PESHAWAR, Nov 3: The NWFP Assembly today took up the law and order situation in the province for discussion when a number of adjournment motions were moved in this connection. These motions were almost of identical nature.

The entire session on the eighth day was devoted to the law and order situation wherein members presented their suggestions for making the police force an effective weapon in any eventuality.

Speaking first on his adjournment motion, Dr Yaqoob from Dir urged the implementation of Qisas and Diyat law and demanded that the Law of Evidence should be made effective so that security could be provided to the witness.

He suggested that a committee comprising Chief Justice of Peshawar High Court and members of the House, should be formed to inquire into the causes of law and order situation in the province.

He referred to the developments taking place on the borders of the country and said that foreign forces had reached the frontiers of the country, and attributed the law and order situation to the interference of foreign forces in the country, in general, and in the province, in particular.

He said that the creation of law and order situation in the country was a calculated move of the elements who were out to foil the rep-

resentative government in the country as elections were held despite their non-participation and opposition. Their main aim was to prolong Martial Law.

He referred to a number of incidents of murder, dacoity and kidnapping in district Dir and demanded that expeditious steps should be taken to curb such incidents. He also suggested that long term and short term measures should be taken for the improvement of police force.

CRITICAL SITUATION: Syed Manzoor Hussain from Mardan termed the law and order situation in the country as unsatisfactory, and expressed concern over the critical law and order situation.

He referred to the incident of Dharam Pani in which five innocent people were killed by some unknown persons. He contended that many other incidents of identical nature also occurred but these did not appear in the Press.

He criticised the method of police investigation and called it ineffective. He asked for immediate reorganisation of police force as, according to him, no change had been effected since the time of British rule. He called for introduction of a system based on justice to all the citizens, and said it could only be achieved with the introduction of Islamic order in the country. —APP

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CSO: 4600/84

PAKISTAN

LITERACY CENTERS PLANNED

Karachi DAWN in English 4 Nov 85 p 4

[Text]

ISLAMABAD, Nov 3: The Literacy and Mass Education Commission (LAMEC) has planned to set up 14,000 literacy centres and to teach four lakh illiterates during the current financial year.

In an interview here today, the Chairman, LAMEC, Sultan Daood said that the government had allocated an amount of Rs 60 million to the Commission for this purpose. About 3000 literacy centres have been set up in the various parts of the country particularly in the nine selected districts, he added.

Of total literacy centres, 1000 would be opened in each selected district, while remaining 5000 centres would be established in the other areas.

Referring to the message of the President Zia-ul-Haq on the international literacy day (Sept 8), he revealed the Commission has received a great response of the people even from abroad. The people from various walks of life have been greatly motivated by the message and requested the Commission through the letters for providing free of cost primers to teach illiterate people in their respective areas, he added.

The chairman observed that the people motivated by the President's message will greatly help uproot the curse of illiteracy from the country.

The 10 point programme of the President Zia-ul-Haq for the promotion of the literacy, he said, is being pursued and implemented to combat the menace of illiteracy from the country. The literacy classes are effectively functioning in all the jails of the country, he added.

The district literacy committees, union councils, sub-committees, provincial literacy councils of all the four provinces and Azad Jammu and Kashmir were actively cooperating with the Commission in its literacy campaign. The primers for the illiterates, he told, are being prepared in the different regional languages.

Citing his recommendations made to the President after his tours to Romania and Sri Lanka, Sultan Daood said that he had suggested a comprehensive programme prop-in-school for the education of out-school children by initiating evening classes in the schools.

The programme, he hoped, will be implemented after its approval from the next financial year. He suggested we should have "whole time or part time education system" instead of "whole time or no education system" for the eradication of illiteracy.

The chairman further said that he had also requested to the World Food Programme (WFP) for providing nutritional food like milk to the poor school children. The proposal, he added, is being favourably considered by the WFP.—APP

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PAKISTAN

BRIEFS

NORTHERN AREAS DEMAND REPRESENTATION--Skardu, Nov 3--Opinion leaders of Baltistan have urged the President and the Prime Minister to grant its due constitutional status to the Northern Areas as soon as possible. The appeal has been made by member of the Northern Areas Council Agha Ahmad Ali Shah, Agha Mohammad Ali Shah, Mohammad Ismail and Mohammad Jafar; Chairman, District Council, Baltistan, Haji Fida Mohammad; Chairman Municipal Committee, Skardu, Haji Ghulam Hyder, and President, District Bar Association, Baltistan, Syed Tahir Ali Shah. They said these areas were liberated by the people of the territory from Dogras and willingly merged with Pakistan and thus could not be termed as a disputed. They demanded Northern Areas' representation in the National Assembly and the Senate.--PPI [Text] [Karachi DAWN in English 4 Nov 85 p 3] /9317

SIND NDP REORGANIZATION--Karachi, Nov 3--The provincial branch of the banned National Democratic Party has finally severed all its links with the Central NDP and decided to function as an 'independent and autonomous' organisation. The provincial NDP has also dissolved the party's local set-up with immediate effect and appointed Mir Gohar Khan Baluch, Vice-President of Sind NDP, to reorganise the party in Karachi. The decisions were taken at the Provincial Council Session at the residence of Mr Akhtar Sheikh, President of Hyderabad NDP, at Hyderabad on Sunday. The meeting which was presided over by Mr Yusuf Jakrani, the Provincial Chief of NDP, also endorsed the decision of the National Coordination Committee to hold a national convention of the banned Party in January next by establishing contacts with the other leaders of the party in the country. The Council meeting also passed a number of resolutions expressing concern over the growing unemployment, ill-treatment of prisoners and demanded release of all political detenus, including Fazil Raho, Rasool Bakhsh Palejo, Jam Saqi, Masroor Ahsan, Khalil Qureshi, Ali Hyder Shah, Jabbar Khattak, and Prof Jamal Naqvi. [Text] [Karachi DAWN in English 4 Nov 85 p 12] /9317

SIND NDP FACTION CHIEF--Karachi, Nov 4--The Sind NDP Council at a meeting here on Monday elected Haji Sher Khan as President, Sind NDP; and Mr Hasan Brohi (Nawabshah) as the party's Central Joint Secretary. (The two offices had fallen vacant following disciplinary action taken by the NDP Secretary-General against the incumbents Mr Yusuf Jhakrani and Mr Hasan Firoz). For the NDP Karachi Division the Council elected Qazi Jamil

President and Mr Washdil Baloch Vice-President. The Council in a resolution said the Kalabagh Dam would cause havoc to the people of NWFP and Sind. Other resolutions demanded reinstatement of the sacked industrial workers and protested against the ejection of students from the hostels. [Text] [Karachi DAWN in English 5 Nov 85 p 8] /9317

ZIA DENIES AMNESTY CHARGE--Washington, Nov 1--Pakistani President Gen Mohammad Zia-ul-Haq has denied charges that his Government violates human rights, according to VOA. He said reports by Amnesty International that there are many political prisoners in Pakistan are mistaken. He said there are only two. President Zia issued the denial in an interview with the Egyptian newspaper Al-Ahram. [Text] [Karachi DAWN in English 2 Nov 85 p 14] /9317

NUMBER OF POLITICAL PRISONERS--Karachi, Nov 2--The Political Prisoners Release Committee (Sind) has said that there are a total of about 400 political prisoners still in jails in the country. A Press release, giving a breakup, said that in Punjab, a total of 175 are behind bars, in Haripur (NWFP) there are 57 detenus, while in Sind, including Karachi, the number of political prisoners total 112 and in Baluchistan their number is 55. The committee's convenor, Mir Mohammad Khan Baloch, speaking at the committee's meeting on Friday demanded release of all the detenus, including Ms Benazir Bhutto, Makhdoom Khaliquzzaman, Fazal Raho, Rasool Bakhsh Paleejo, Syed Imdad Husain Shah, Jam Saqi, Prof Jamal Naqvi, Kamal Warsi, Jabbar Khattak, Sharif Brohi and Sadiq Imrani. [Text] [Karachi DAWN in English 2 Nov 85 p 6] /9317

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